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THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1991: A
"QUOTA BILL," A CODIFICATION OF
GRIGGS, A PARTIAL RETURN TO
WARDS COVE, OR ALL OF THE
ABOvE?
Kingsley R. Browne*
Congress has not commanded that the less qualified be
preferred over the better qualified simply because of minor-
ity origins. Far from disparaging job qualifications as
such, Congress has made such qualifications the controlling
factor, so that race, religion, nationality, and sex become
irrelevant.'
INTRODUCTION
The tension between individual equality and group equality -
between equality of treatment and equality of result - has proba-
bly never been as central to public debate as it was during the
tortured history of the Civil Rights Act of 19912 and its vetoed
* Associate Professor of Law, Wayne State Umversity Law School. I would like to
thank Joseph Grano, Michael McIntyre, Stephen Schulman, and Robert Sedler for thewr
valuable comments on an earlier draft of tis article.
1. Gnggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 436 (1971).
2. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended m scattered sections of
42 U.S.C.A., 2 U.S.C.A., 16 U.S.C.A. and 29 U.S.C.A.).
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predecessor, the Civil Rights Act of 1990.3 Proponents defended
the 1991 Act declaring that it advanced individual equality.4 Oppo-
nents attacked the Act as an attempt to codify notions of group
entitlements and quotas.' Although the Act purportedly had little
to say about affirmnative action, whether described as "quotas" or
mere "preferences," concerns about affirmative action constituted
the undercurrent of the debate from the outset. An awareness of
that undercurrent is critical to the proper interpretation and under-
standing of the Act.
The purpose of this article is to examine the effect of the
3. H.R. REP. No. 856, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CoNG. REc. H9552-54 (1990).
Excerpts of various versions of the 1990 and 1991 Civil Rights Acts are set forth in
appendices at the end of this article. Appendix A: Original Civil Rights Act of 1990, S.
2104, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CoNG. REc. S1019, S1019 (Feb. 7, 1990). Appendix B:
Kennedy-Jeffords Substitute, Amend. 2110, S. 2104, 101st Cong., 2d Seas., 136 CONG.
REC. S9325, S9325 (July 10, 1990) (passed by Senate, July 18, 1990). Appendix C: Civil
Rights Act of 1990 (first version passed by House), H.R. 4000, 101st Cong., 2d Sess.,
136 CONG. REC. H6827, H6827-28 (Aug. 3, 1990). Appendix D: Conference Version of
Civil Rights Act of 1990 ("Vetoed Bill"), H.R. REP. No. 856, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136
CONG. REC. H9552, H9552-54 (Oct. 12, 1990). Appendix E: Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Act of 1991 ("The Original Danforth Bill"), S. 1208, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., 137
CONG. REC. S7023, S7023 (June 4, 1991). Appendix F: Civil Rights and Women's Equity
in Employment Act of 1991, H.R. 1, 102d Cong., 1st Seas., 137 CONG. REC. H3876,
H3878-80 (June 4, 1991). Appendix 0: Civil Rights Act of 1991, S. 1745, 102d Cong.,
1st Sess., reprinted in DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 186, D-1 to D-4 (Sept. 25, 1991) (as
originally introduced by Senator Danforth on Sept. 24, 1991). Appendix H: The Civil
Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 § 3, § 105, § 116 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.A., 2 U.S.C.A., 16 U.S.C.A. and 29 U.S.C.A.)
(signed into law on November 21, 1991).
4. See Senator Metzenbaum's comments:
I am hopeful that President Bush will focus on the purpose of this bill: To
restore the dream of every American, that in this great Nation you will get a
fair chance to prove yourself, regardless of your race, your creed, your gender
your national origin, or your color .... It is a bill to provide equal opportu-
nity for all Americans.
136 CONG. REC. S15,335 (1990) (statement of Sen. Metzenbaum). See also 136 CONG.
REC. H6807 (1990) (statement of Rep. Hawkins) ("Qualifications are and should be the
test, and that is all we am saying in this bill.").
5. See, e.g., comments made by Senator Hatch:
[W]hat kind of a society do we really wish to establish? . .. [I]s it a society
that has created a convoluted, tortured, and often contradictory legal system
which, as a practical matter, requires every job in America to match perfectly
the numerical mix of the surrounding, relevant labor pool; a society in which
one's right depends on the group to which he or she belongs; a society in
which group membership may be more important than ability and experience; a
society where every employment policy is governed by numerical quotas? Is
that what we are after?
136 CONG. REC. S15,333 (1990) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
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Civil Rights Act of 1991 on the disparate-impact theory of discrim-
ination and to explore the relationship between the debate over this
issue and the debate (or lack thereof) over affirmative action. Part I
of this article will summarize the disparate-impact theory of dis-
crimination as it has been developed in opinions of the Supreme
Court from Griggs v. Duke Power6 through Wards Cove Packing
Co. v. Atonio.! Part II will examine the extent to which Wards
Cove altered the prior law of disparate-impact discrimination, and,
in turn, how the 1991 Civil Rights Act altered the standards con-
tained in Wards Cove.
The 1991 Act was, in large part, a response to a series of
Supreme Court decisions handed down during the 1988 Term."
The most controversial of these cases was Wards Cove Packing
Co. v. Atonio, which many commentators considered to be a sub-
stantial cutback on, if not an overruling of, the Court's 1971 deci-
sion in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.9 In fact, Wards Cove was noth-
ing of the kind. The central holding of Griggs was that a plaintiff
may challenge facially neutral practices that are adopted without
discriminatory purpose if the practices result in an adverse impact
on a "protected class."10 The plaintiff will prevail on such a
showing unless the employer can demonstrate business necessity or
job relatedness. 1 The most important aspect of Griggs - that a
plaintiff can establish an unlawful employment practice even with-
6. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
7. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
8. See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989) (holding that 42
U.S.C. § 1981 does not prohibit harassment on the basis of race); Lorance v. AT&T
Technologies, Inc., 490 U.S. 900 (1989) (holding that the time to challenge a facially
neutral seniority system adopted for discriminatory purposes begins to run at the time the
system is adopted); Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989) (allowing plaintiffs harmed by
an affirmative-action plan contained in a consent decree to bring independent lawsuits
challenging the action); Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989) (holding
that plaintiffs in disparate-impact cases must prove that the challenged practice does not
serve the employer's legitimate interests); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228
(1989) (holding that in mixed-motive cases the employer can avoid liability by proving
that it would have taken the same action in the absence of discriminatory motivation).
9. See infra notes 13-22 and accompanying text for examples of reactions to the
Wards Cove decision.
10. The term "protected class" as used in this article denotes a class that is defined by
race or by sex; it does not mean only minorities and women. Every person is a member
of some protected class, because everyone has a race and a sex. Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 also prohibits discrimination on the basis of color, national origin,
and religion, so any discussion of race and sex discrimination should be read to include
discrimination on those bases as well.
11. Griggs, 101 U.S. at 431.
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out a showing of intent12 - was not challenged by a single Jus-
tice in Wards Cove. At most, the Wards Cove opinion made only
marginal adjustments to the disparate-impact doctrine, although, as
described below, it arguably did not change the doctrine at all.13
If Wards Cove did not challenge the central holding of
Griggs, the firestorm of protest that it engendered is difficult to
explain, but a firestorm it surely unleashed. The New York Times
repeatedly referred to Wards Cove as "overruling" the eighteen-
year-old unanimous precedent of Griggs.14 The Wards Cove hold-
ing was called a "startling turnabout"'5 and a reflection of "a
sharp break with the Court's own prior understanding. " 16 One
commentator suggested that in Wards Cove the Court "revisited"
12. Id.
13. Even some commentators favorable to the Wards Cove decision view it as having
worked a substantial change in the law. See, e.g., RICHARD EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN
GROUNDS 234 (1992) ("there is no defensible construction of Griggs that supports its
wholesale reinterpretation in Wards Cove"); Charles J. Cooper, Wards Cove Packing Co.
v. Atonio: A Step Toward Eliminating Quotas in the American Workplace, 14 HARV. J.L
& PuB. POLY 84, 90 (1991) ("In Wards Cove... the Supreme Court abandoned the
'business necessity' test as it has been applied since Griggs and redefined the employee's
burden in proving disparate impact. To establish a prima facie case, an employee must
now show more than 'a racial imbalance in the work force.'").
14. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, The Year the Court Turned to the Right, N.Y. TIMES,
July 7, 1989, at Al ("Griggs v. Duke Power... was effectively overruled this
term .... "); Id. ("Wards Cove v. Atonio ... overturned the Griggs decision in all but
name"); Editorial, A Red Herring in Black and White, N.Y. TIMEs, July 23, 1990, at A14
("[L]ast year in the Wards Cove case, a 5-to-4 majority overruled Griggs and placed new,
heavy burdens on civil rights plaintiffs."); Adam Clymer, President Rejects Senate Agree-
ment on Rights Measure, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 2, 1991, at Al ("For more than a year argu-
ments over civil rights legislation have focused on how to interpret a 1971 Supreme
Court decision, Griggs v. Duke Power Company, which was overruled by the Court in
1989 in Wards Cove v. Atonjo."). See also Reginald Alleyne, Smoking Guns are Hard to
Find, L.A. TIMES, June 12, 1989, at Part 2, Page 5 (the Supreme Court's "underlying
dislike" for Title VII "is openly revealed by the illogic of the reasoning" of Wards
Cove); id. ("The Wards Cove case illustrates how political catch phrases like 'strict
constructionist' and 'judges who are not activists' are little more than code words for
judges who, among other traits, simply dislike civil-rights legislation."); Marcia Coyle &
Fred Strasser, Is the High Court Hiding Reversals on Rights?, NAT'L L.J., June 19, 1989,
at 5 (quoting Isabelle K. Pinzler, director of the American Civil Liberties Union Women's
Rights Project: "The most fascinating aspect of the decision was its dishonesty ....
They have overruled Griggs but they deny it ... The doors of opportunity opened by
Griggs have been slammed shut. We're not out of business, but ironically, Title VII will
become the vehicle that prevents the remedying of systemic employment discrimination.").
15. Theodore Y. Blumoff & Harold S. Lewis, Jr., The Reagan Court and Title VII: A
Common-Law Outlook on a Statutory Task, 69 N.C. L. REv. 1, 28 (1990).
16. Id. at 73 (Blumoff and Lewis note that the Supreme Court first broke with prior
understanding in Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion in Watson v. Fort Worth Bank &
Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988)).
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Griggs' holding that adverse impact can serve as a basis of liabili-
ty, and "reached an opposite conclusion" by holding that only in-
tentional discrimination is proscribed by Title VII.17 The Court,
according to this commentator, "left little doubt that it intended to
dismantle Griggs." 8 Another commentator asserted that Wards
Cove "may have all but eliminated the disparate impact branch of
Title VII analysis."19 References to Dred Scott v. Sandford" and
Plessy v. Ferguson21 abounded.'
One can hypothesize a number of explanations for the strength
of the reaction to Wards Cove. The firestorm may have been exac-
erbated by the fact that Wards Cove was seen as not standing in
isolation, but rather as one of a whole series of closely decided
cases that the Court's critics viewed as cutting back on protection
against discrimination. 3 Had Wards Cove been the only civil
rights case of the 1988 Term, the necessary critical mass to over-
17. Robert Belton, The Dismanmling of the Griggs Disparate Impact Theory and the
Future of Title VII: The Need for a Third Reconstruction, 8 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 223,
224 (1990)
18. Id. at 237.
19. David A. Strauss, The Law and Economics of Racial Discrimination in Employ-
ment: The Case for Numerical Standards, 79 GEo. L. 3. 1619, 1644 n.52 (1991).
20. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
21. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
22. See, eg., Robert Belton, Causation and Burden-Shifting Doctrines in Employment
Discrimination Law Revisited: Some Thoughts on Hopkins and Wards Cove, 64 TUL. L.
REV. 1359, 1405 (1990) (In a real sense, the position of the conservative majority of the
Justices in Hopkins and Wards Cove is behind the times: their position is as outmoded as
that of the Court when it handed down its separate-but-equal decision in Plessy v.
Ferguson almost one hundred years ago"). See also Belton, The Dismantling of the Griggs
Disparate Impact Theory, supra note 17, at 247 CThe implicit message in Wards Cove
parallels the explicit message of the justices who dismantled the civil rights legislation of
the First Reconstruction."); Alan Freeman, Antidiscrimination Law: The View from 1989,
64 Tt L. REV. 1407, 1407 (1990) (calling the 1989 decisions "the greatest setback to
civil rights progress in a single Term of Court since the nineteenth c~ntury" and stating
that "t]he impact of the 1989 decisions was so dramatic as to parallel those of the post-
Civil War Reconstruction Era"); Linda S. Greene, Race in the 21st Century: Equality
Through Law?, 64 TuL. L. REV. 1515, 1517 (1990) ("The civil rights decisions of the
198[8] Term force us to refocus on a question presented time and time again, before and
after Dred Scott whether meaningful equality can be obtained for African-Americans
through law."); Stephen Reinhardt, Civil Rights and the New Federal Judiciary: The Re-
treat from Falrness, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 142, 149 (1991) ("Our legal system
has gone through similar times of racial insensitivity before, such as the era of Dred
Scott and Plessy v. Ferguson, and we have come out of those eras resilient.").
23. See 136 CONG. REC. S1022 (1990) (statement of Sen. Metzenbaum) ("In a stun-
ning series of 5-to-4 decisions announced last spring, the new majority on the Court
reversed longstanding precedents and denied protection to the victims of employment
discrimination.").
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rule it may not have coalesced. Misconception played a large role
in the controversy, leading to the oft-stated, but greatly exaggerat-
ed, argument that the Supreme Court is engaged in a systematic
pattern of cutting back on civil rights.24 Although it is true that
the Court has reached decisions that displease the "civil rights es-
tablishment"' in a number of cases, it is a vast over-generaliza-
tion to view this as part of a consistently anti-civil rights pattern.
Indeed, in the last half-dozen years the Court has issued numerous
employment-discrimination decisions that adopt positions urged by
the civil rights establishment.26
24. The following remarks of Representative Owens are typical of some of the more
fulsome rhetoric surrounding the bill:
For African-Americans and other minorities, the reign of Reagan was
catastrophic ... .Years of steady progress lurched to a halt; the clock didn't
just stop - it started ticking backward. Here again in America, racism has
been made socially acceptable ... . And now thanks to Ronald Reagan's
appointments to the Supreme Court, here again in America, racism in the
workplace has been made legally tenable .... Years of consensus and consis-
tent precedent were swept aside .... [W]hat the Court has said to employers
in Wards Cove is that while you still can't commit blatant, obvious acts of
discrimination against minorities and women, if you are sophisticated and dis-
creet about it, we will look the other way. You cannot hang a "no blacks al-
lowed" sign on your door, but if you're clever and come up with a standard-
ized test or some other superficially neutral ruse that achieves exactly the same
result, no one will stand in your way. You can be a bigot, in other words, so
long as you are a kind anid gentle one.
136 CONG. REC. H6/95 (1990) (statement of Rep. Owens).
25. The term "civil rights establishment" is probably the least confusing way to char-
acterize the interests being referred to here. The terms "pro-plaintiff" and "pro-employer"
do not fit well, because the position of civil rights organizations is not always contrary to
employer interests, as seen in the affirmative action cases. The terms "pro-civil rights"
and "anti-civil rights" are rejected, because they assume that a decision in favor of a
reverse-discrimination plaintiff is an "anti-civil rights" decision, which is a corruption of
the term.
What the constituents of the "civil rights establishment" seem to share is, first, a
strong (for some an irrebuttable) presumption that, in any given case, a female or minori-
ty plaintiff alleging discrimination should prevail in litigation; second, an assumption that
legal rules should impose a difficult burden on employers to justify a lack of proportional
representation in the workplace; and third, a belief that affirmative action plans, whether
voluntary or court-imposed, should be virtually immune from legal challenge.
26. See, e.g., International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 111 S. CL 1196
(1991) (fetal-protection policy held invalid); Yellow Freight System, Inc. v. Donnelly, 494
U.S. 820 (1990) (state courts have jurisdiction over Title VII cases); Watson v. Fort
Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988) (disparate-impact theory applies to subjective
employment practices); EEOC v. Commercial Office Products Co., 486 U.S. 107 (1988)
(untimeliness of filing with state agency does not invalidate EEOC charge; state agency
may "suspend" processing of charge without relinquishing jurisdiction); Johnson v. Trans-
portation Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987) (affirmative-action plan for women valid even in
the absence of prior discrimination by the employer); School Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273
[Vol. 43:287
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The language of Title VII does not easily lend itself to the
disparate-impact theory.27 Likewise, nothing in the legislative his-
tory supports the assertion that the 1964 Congress in any way in-
tended to outlaw job qualifications that were not intended to dis-
criminate. In fact, the relevant legislative history suggests the con-
trary.2 Nonetheless, the Griggs Court found Congress's intent to
(1987) (contagious diseases constitute handicap under Rehabilitation Act); United States v.
Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987) (a 1:1 black/white hiring ratio is a permissible remedy for
discrimination); California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987) (pref-
erential treatment for pregnant women is permissible); Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n
Local 28 v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421 (1986) (race-conscious remedies may run in favor of
non-victims of discrimination); Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385 (1986) (holding em-
ployer liable for compensation practices that perpetuated the effect of pre-Act discrimina-
tion); Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (claims of hostile-envi-
ronment sexual harassment are valid under Title VII).
Even Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), which was overturned by
the 1991 Act, was initially viewed as a victory for plaintiffs. See Charles S. Ralston,
Court vs. Congress: Judicial Interpretation of the Civil Rights Acts and Congressional
Response, 8 YALE L. & POLY REV. 205, 211 (1991) ("Interestingly, many advocates
initially considered this decision a victory for the civil rights forces, since Justice Brennan
wrote the plurality decision over a strong dissent by Justice Kennedy joined by the Chief
Justice and Justice Scalia.").
27. Section 703(a)(1) of Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer "to fail or refuse
to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise discriminate against any individual
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because
of such individuars race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.. . .. 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2(a)(1) (1988). Section 703(a)(2) makes it unlawful for an employer "to limit, seg-
regate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would
deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise ad-
versely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (1988) (emphasis added). In cases
subsequent to Griggs the Court has identified § 703(a)(2) as the source of the disparate-
impact prohibition. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 448-49 & n.9 (1982).
Section 706(g), the remedial provision of Title VII, is difficult to square with a view that
Title VII prohibited unintentional discrimination, since it provides remedies only for "in-
tentional" discrimination. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(g) (West Supp. 1992).
See also Mack A. Player, Is Griggs Dead? Reflecting (Fearfully) on Wards Cove
Packing Co. v. Atonio, 17 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 1, 2 (1989) (suggesting that neither the
language of the statute nor its legislative history supports the disparate-impact theory of
liability); George Rutherglen, Disparate Impact Under Title VII: An Objective Theory of
Discrimination, 73 VA. L. REV. 1297, 1298 (1987) (only a "strained interpretation" of
Title VII supports the finding of an explicit statutory prohibition of policies with adverse
impact). See generally Michael E. Gold, Griggs' Folly: An Essay on the Theory, Prob-
lems, and Origin of the Adverse Impact Definition of Employment Discrimination and a
Recommendation for Reform, 7 INDUs. RE LJ. 429 (1985) (arguing that the original
intent of Title VII did not include adverse impact theory).
28. For example, in their influential interpretive memorandum, Senators Clark and Case
said:
There is no requirement in Title VII that employers abandon bona fide qual-
ification tests where, because of differences in background and education, mem-
1993]
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prohibit facially neutral practices "plain from the language of the
statute,"29 although the Court provided no analysis of the statutory
language and little analysis of the legislative history in support of
its conclusion.
The weak doctrinal foundation of Griggs may have also con-
tributed to the reaction to Wards Cove. Although the Court in
Wards Cove did not question the central holding of Griggs, recog-
nition of Griggs' shaky underpinnings may have caused some
anxiety among supporters who feared that Griggs was a likely
candidate for overruling.
Griggs was, without a doubt, the most significant Title VII
case ever decided; indeed, it is almost trite to refer to it as a
"landmark" decision in the law." There is usually little reflection,
however, about why the case is entitled to landmark status. If
Griggs had come out the other way and had simply enforced the
most obvious meaning of the statutory language and acted in ap-
parent harmony with the drafters' purpose to eliminate intentional
discrimination, it is unlikely that Griggs would have been consid-
ered a landmark case or even an important one. Paradoxically, the
landmark status of Griggs was the very factor that rendered it vul-
bets of some groups are able to perform better on these tests than members of
other groups. An employer may set his qualifications as high as he likes, he
may test to determine which applicants have these qualifications, and he may
hire, assign, and promote on the basis of test performance.
110 CONG. REC. 7213 (1964). By far the most thorough analysis of the legislative history
on the disparate-impact issue is found in Gold, supra note 27.
29. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429 (1971).
30. For references to the landmark status of Griggs, see, e.g., Ruth G. Blumrosen,
Remedies for Wage Discrimination, 20 U. Mica. J.L. REF. 99, 139 (1986); Leroy D.
Clark, The Future Civil Rights Agenda: Speculation on Litigation, Legislation, and Organi-
zation, 38 CATH. U. L. REV. 795, 809 (1989); John J. Donahue, I & Peter Siegelman,
The Changing Nature of Employment Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REV. 983,
998 (1991); Joel W. Friedman, Redefining Equality, Discrimination, and Affirmative Action
Under Title VII: The Access Principle, 65 T. L. REV. 41, 49 (1986); Berta E.
Hernandez, Title VII v. Seniority: The Supreme Court Giveth and the Supreme Court
Taketh Away, 35 AM. U. L. REV. 339, 349 (1986); Minna J. Kotkin, Public Remedies for
Private Wrongs: Rethinking the Title VII Back Pay Remedy, 41 HASTINGS L. 1301, 1311
(1990); Pamela L. Perry, Two Faces of Disparate Impact Discrimination, 59 FoRDHAM L.
REV. 523, 525 (1991); Mark A. Rothstein, Employee Selection Based on Susceptibility to
Occupational Illness, 81 MCH. L. REV. 1379, 1453 (1983); Elaine W. Shoben, Employee
Recruitment by Design or Default: Uncertainty Under Title VII, 47 OHio ST. LJ. 891,
895 (1986).
See also Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 665 (1989) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) ("Chief Justice Burger's landmark opinion [in Griggs] established that an em-
ployer may violate the statute even when acting in complete good faith without any in-
vidious intent.").
[Vol. 43:287
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nerable.
The reaction to Wards Cove also may have been intensified
by the fact that it was seen as breaking a tacit understanding be-
tween the Court and Congress under which the former would ad-
vance the cause of equality of result, through preferential treatment
or otherwise, without the need for action by the latter." Before
Wards Cove, the Court had repeatedly advanced equality of result
in the face of apparently contrary statutory direction. For example,
in Griggs itself, the Court took a statute that prohibited depriving
individuals of employment opportunities because of the individual's
race and read it as prohibiting deprivation of opportunities of
groups.32 In United Steelworkers v. Weber,33 the Court interpret-
ed a statute whose plain meaning admits of no exception to its
command of nondiscrimination, and whose legislative history is
unambiguous on the point,3 and held that employers could, in
31. The "betrayal" theme was rampant in the congressional debates on the Civil Rights
Acts of 1990 and 1991. See, e.g., Senator Kennedy's comments:
In the past year . . . the Supreme Court has issued a series of rulings that
mark an abrupt and unfortunate departure from its historic vigilance in protect-
ing civil rights. The fabric of justice has been tom. Significant gaps have been
opened in the existing laws that prohibit racism and other types of bias in our
society.
136 CONG. REC. S1018 (1990) (statement of Sen. Kennedy). See also id. at 1022 (state-
ment of Sen. Jeffords) (the Supreme Court is moving backwards and "reneg[ing] on histo-
ry"); 137 CONG. REC. S15,287 (1991) (statement of Sen. Metzenbaum) (the civil rights
decisions of the 1988 Term symbolize the Court's abandonment of its "traditional role as
protector of the powerless in our society.").
32. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
33. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
34. Justice Rehnquist's exhaustive review of the legislative history of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act in his dissent stands in stark contrast to the almost non-existent use of legisla-
tive history by the majority in Weber. Indeed, the Weber majority could not point to a
single statement in the legislative history of the 1964 Act suggesting that racial preferenc-
es were permissible. The majority acknowledged that the language of the statute seemed
to contradict its position but nonetheless rested its decision on the amorphous desire of
the 1964 Congress to improve 'the plight of the Negro in our economy." Id. at 202
(citing 110 CONG. REC. 6548 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey)). Yet, given that
Weber's claim of discrimination was supported by the text of the statute, the burden on
the question of legislative history was clearly on the majority, and the majority did not
carry it. Justice Remquist's discussion of the legislative history went essentially unan-
swered. Several statements cited in Justice Rehnquist's dissent were express statements by
important sponsors of the legislation suggesting that employers would not be permitted to
employ racial preferences. Id. at 231-55 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). For example, in a
floor speech, Hubert Humphrey stated. "The 'bugaboo' [that courts could require employ-
ers to achieve a certain balance] is "nonexistent': In fact, the very opposite is true. Title
VII prohibits discrimination. In effect, it says that race, religion, and national origin are
not to be used as the basis for hiring and firing." 110 CONG. REC. 6549 (1964). See also
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fact, discriminate against certain individuals for the purpose of
advancing affirmative-action goals.35 Again, in California Federal
Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra,3 the Court interpreted a provi-
sion of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of Title VII that required
pregnant women to "be treated the same . .. as other persons not
so affected" 37 as allowing pregnant women to be treated better
than any other persons.38
In each of these cases, the Court acted in a manner contrary
to the ordinary meaning of the provisions that were being interpret-
ed and contrary to the apparent intention of the drafters as revealed
by the legislative history. It is extremely doubtful that political
considerations would have permitted congressional adoption of any
of these rules at the time the relevant statutes were enacted. None-
theless, the Court adopted all of them without the need for the
public debate and the concern for political consequences that ac-
company legislative action.
The primary concern of Wards Cove opponents may have had
id. at 6553 (statement of Sen. Humphrey) ("It is claimed that the bill would require racial
quotas for all hiring, when in fact it provides that race shall not be a basis for making
personnel decisions.").
Senator Humphrey also stated:
The title does not provide that any preferential treatment in employment shall
be given to Negroes or to any other persons or groups. It does not provide
that any quota systems may be established to maintain racial balance in em-
ployment. In fact, the title would prohibit preferential treatment for any particu-
lar group, and any person, whether or not a member of any minority group
would be permitted to file a complaint of discriminatory employment practices.
Id. at 11,848. Similarly, Senator Celler stated: "The Bill would do no more than prevent
. . . employers from discriminating against or in favor of workers because of their
race . . . ," id. at 1518, and Senator Kuchel assured opponents that employers "could not
discriminate in favor of or against a person because of his race .... In such matters .
. . the bill now before us is color-blind," id. at 6564. Senator Saltonstall stated that Title
VII "provides no preferential treatment for any group of citizens. In fact, it specifically
prohibits such treatment." Id. at 12,691. Fimally, the interpretive memorandum of Senators
Clark and Case assured that:
[Title VII's] effect is prospective and not retrospective. Thus, for example, if a
business has been discriminating in the past and as a result has an all-white
working force, when the title comes into effect the employer's obligation would
be simply to fill future vacancies on a nondiscriminatory basis. He would not
be obliged - or indeed permitted - to fire whites in order to hire Negroes,
or to prefer Negroes for future vacancies, or once Negroes are hired, to give
them special seniority rights at the expense of the white workers hired earlier.
Id. at 7213.
35. Weber, 443 U.S. at 204.
36. 479 U.S. 272 (1989).
37. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988).
38. Guerra, 479 U.S. at 287.
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less to do with the law of disparate-impact discrimination itself
than it did with the law of affirmative action.39 A common jus-
tification for relaxed scrutiny of affirmative-action plans is that a
permissive standard is necessary to relieve employers of a dilem-
ma: if they adopt affirmative-action plans, they face reverse-dis-
crimination suits; if they do not adopt such plans, they face dispa-
rate-impact suits. This relationship between the disparate-impact
theory and affirmative action had been noted by Supreme Court
Justices' and academic commentators.' Indeed, prior to Wards
39. See Blumoff & Lewis, supra note 15, at 15 C[D]isparate impact analysis is par-
tially incompatible with the principle of merit. The basic principle of color-blindness may
obstruct the goal of equal achievement. The incompatibility creates the persistent fear that
equality may demand what many see as pernicious and even illegal activity.").
40. For example, in his concurrence in United Steelworkers v. Weber, Justice Blackmun
stated that although he was not convinced that the legislative history of Title VII support-
ed affirmative action, the majority's interpretation was necessary because of "practical and
equitable [considerations] only partially perceived, if perceived at all" by Congress when it
enacted the statute. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 209 (1979) (Blackmnun,
.., concurring). Among these considerations is that employers would have to walk a tight-
rope between liability to minorities if they did not adopt affirmative action, and liability
to whites if they did. Id. at 210. According to Justice Blackmun, affirmative-action plans
allow an employer to reduce the likelihood that plaintiffs can successfully raise a dispa-
rate-impact claim. Id. at 211. Similarly, in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, Justice Black-
mun noted that if an employer's hiring practices are measured by a standard which is so
high as to be impractical, it would "leave the employer little choice . . . but to engage
in a subjective quota system of employment selection." Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,
422 U.S. 405, 449 (1975) (Blackmnun, J., concurring).
Justice Powell addressed the same issue in Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440
(1982). Justice Powell suggested that preventing employers from defending disparate-impact
suits by demonstrating an absence of "bottom-line" disparities would decrease employers'
incentives to engage in affirmative action, since proportional representation would no lon-
ger insulate employers from liability. Id. at 463 (Powell, J., dissenting).
41. For example, in a recent article about the Wards Cove case, Mack A. Player ob-
served that disparate-impact liability is "a key premise upon which affirmative action is
based" and expressed the fear that a relatively relaxed standard of disparate impact would
"reduce[ ] the pressure on employers to adopt affirmative action plans as a basis for
avoiding liability premised on impact." Player, supra note 27, at 45 n.167. See also Al-
fred W. Blurosen, The Legacy of Griggs: Social Progress and Subjective Judgments, 63
CH.-KENT L. REV. 1, 6 (1987): "Griggs provides the underlying justification for race con-
scious affirmative action programs under Title VII. Identification of 'disparate impact'
requires that employers be race conscious. Once disparate impact is identified, voluntary
action to ameliorate it is necessary to avoid liability in the absence of business necessity."
Robert Belton has made the same point:
The Griggs disparate impact theory provided both the practical and doctrinal
foundations for race- and sex-specific affirmative action plans. . . . It was
generally agreed that a validation study provided the most probative evidence of
business necessity. Validation, however, was commonly known to be difficult,
costly, and time-consuming. Accordingly, many employers sought alternative
ways to reduce the likelihood of a disparate impact suit. Primarily, they adopt-
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
Cove, the fact that such a relationship existed was uncontroversial.
After Wards Cove, however, in the context of attempts to "codify"
Griggs, political considerations necessitated the disclaimer of any
relationship between Griggs and racial preferences. As a result, that
which had previously been openly acknowledged was now
denied.42 Although Wards Cove critics repeatedly disavowed any
interest in encouraging preferential hiring,43  they must have
ed affirmative action plans, pursuant to which they expressly took race or sex
into account in hiring or promoting in order to substantially reduce racial and
sexual disparities in their workforce. By reducing these disparities, it became
more difficult for plaintiffs to use statistical evidence to establish a prima facie
case of disparate impact discrimination.
Belton, supra note 17, at 231.
Elizabeth Bartholet has also noted the relationship between the disparate-impact
theory and affirmative action:
Employers have also been under some pressure to avoid the costs of litigation
- or of validation - by adopting selection systems that have no adverse im-
pact. . . .Griggs has thus encouraged employers to develop hiring and promo-
tion systems that select on a racially proportionate basis from among qualified
candidates. The Supreme Court's approval in United Steelworkers v. Weber of a
race-conscious employment scheme was the logical consequence of the Griggs
doctrine. Employers - compelled by Griggs to eschew policies that had an
unnecessary adverse impact on blacks - could not be penalized for adopting
policies designed to ensure that blacks were employed on a proportionate basis.
Elizabeth Bartholet, Application of Title VII to Jobs in High Places, 95 HARV. L. REV.
947, 954 (1982).
42. See, e.g., 136 CONG. REc. S15,327 (1990) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) ("(Jn all
the 18 years it was in effect, the Griggs rule did not force employers to resort to quo-
tas."). See also 136 CONG. REC. H6778 (1990) (statement of Rep. Fish); Id. at H6786
(statement of Rep. Conyers); Id. at H6791 (statement of Rep. Hayes) (all disavowing any
relationship between Griggs and quotas).
Supporters of affirmative action and the disparate-impact theory 'apparently are at-
tempting to have it both ways. On the one hand, they say that the employer needs the
safe harbor of affirmative action to protect against disparate-impact suits, and on the other
hand, they deny that the disparate-impact rules cause employers to adopt preferences. See
Blumoff & Lewis, supra note 15, at 31 ("Most of the new constraints rest largely on
consequential reasoning. Conclusions based on the fear of detrimental consequences -
here, quotas - ordinarily ought to dictate result only when the feared consequences are
likely to occur, a matter for empirical inquiry."). But see Rutherglen, supra note 27, at
1315 (the EEOC Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures "used strict standards of
scientific validity as a lever to increase the defendant's burden of proof and virtually to
require preferences as the easiest means of eliminating adverse impact").
43. See supra note 42. See also Senator Jeffords' discussion of this issue:
There is considerable confusion over the use of the term "quotas." I think the
most obvious confusion is the reference which the Senator from Iowa alluded
to in the latter part of his talk about quotas or affirmative action type pro-
grams. This has nothing to do with that. Those are contracts through the Feder-
al Government wherein there is an affirmative action required to reduce dis-
crimination. This has nothing to do with that.
136 CoNG. REC. S15,365 (1990) (statement of Sen. Jeffords).
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known what was at stake. 4
I. DISPARATE-IMPACT THEORY FROM GRIGGs TO WARDS COVE
In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., the Court held that Title VII
prohibits facially neutral practices, adopted without discriminatory
intent, if those practices have an adverse impact on a protected
group and the practices do not bear a "manifest relationship to the
employment in question."45 Griggs involved a challenge to Duke
Power's requirements of a high-school education and satisfactory
scores on two professionally prepared aptitude tests as conditions
of obtaining any of a number of mostly blue-collar positions with
Duke Power Company.4' The Supreme Court observed that the
lesser performance of blacks in meeting these requirements was a
consequence of poor education received in segregated schools and
that the diploma and test requirements tended to "'freeze' the status
quo of prior discriminatory employment practices."47 The Court
found that these requirements violated Title VII because the em-
ployer could not show a relationship between the requirements and
job performance.48
Griggs could have been viewed as a narrow case that operated
either to permit disparate-impact challenges only to practices that
perpetuate the effects of discrimination in employment or education
or to facilitate challenges to intentional discrimination by dispens-
ing with a requirement of proving intent in certain cases. Subse-
quent cases made clear, however, that its scope was much broader.
For example, in Dothard v. Rawlinson,49 the Court applied dispa-
rate-impact analysis in a challenge to a height-and-weight require-
ment for prison guards. The female plaintiff's challenge was suc-
cessful, even though the fact that women, on average, are shorter
44. One oft-stated objection to the quota argument was that quotas are illegal. See,
e.g., 136 CONG. REC. S15,365-66 (1990) (statement of Sen. Jeffords) ("Quotas in the term
used, for instance, are illegal."); Id. at H6799 (1990) (statement of Rep. Vento) ("This is
clearly not a quota bill. Quotas are illegal."). In fact, the Court upheld a quota system in
United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 197 (1979), where the employer set aside
50% of the positions in a training program for blacks.
45. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432.
46. Id. at 425-26.
47. Id. at 426-28. Prior to the effective date of Title VIL Duke Power had an open
policy of racial discrimination. In response to Title VII, the company modified its employ-
ment requirements into what became the challenged practices in Griggs. Id.
48. Id. at 431.
49. 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
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and lighter than men is not a product of any kind of discrimina-
tion, at least not discrimination by humans. In Connecticut v.
Teal,5' a test requirement was subject to a disparate-impact chal-
lenge even though the employer had in place an affirmative-action
plan that resulted in an overrepresentation of blacks in the chal-
lenged positions, negating any argument that the test requirement
was adopted for the purpose of discrimination. The Court found
that a non-discriminatory bottom line did not prevent a plaintiff
from establishing a prima facie case of disparate impact nor was it
a defense to a disparate-impact challenge.51
Between Griggs and Wards Cove, the level of the Court's
scrutiny of practices having a disparate impact varied greatly. In
1975, the Court in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody 2 applied the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ["EEOC"] Guidelines
on testing in such a stringent fashion that it was predicted that
employers would no longer be able to engage in testing at all. 3
On the other hand, the following year in Washington v. Davis,54
the Court upheld a written test of verbal ability on a much lesser
showing, relying in part on the intuitive ground that reading ability
is important to the training program and to the job of police offi-
cer.55 The next year, the Court in Dothard v. Rawlinson stated
that a practice with a disparate impact "must be shown to be nec-
essary to safe and efficient job performance to survive a Title VII
challenge."5 6 However, two years after Dothard, the Court in New
York City Transit Authority v. Beazers7 held that the employer
need show only that its "legitimate employment goals ... are sig-
nificantly served by - even if they do not require" the challenged
practice.58 In sum, the Court had never adopted a monolithic posi-
50. 457 U.S. 440 (1982).
51. Id. at 442.
52. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
53. James G. Johnson, Albemarle Paper Company v. Moody: The Aftermath of Griggs
and the Death of Employment Testing, 27 HASTINGS LJ. 1239, 1239 (1976) (The
Albemarle decision appears to signal an end to employee testing because in giving great
deference to the [EEOC]'s Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, the Court effec-
tively mandated strict compliance.").
54. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
55. Id. at 254 (Stevens, J., concurring).
56. Dothard, 433 U.S. at 332 n.14.
57. 440 U.S. 568 (1979).
58. Id. at 587 n.31.
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tion on the disparate-impact standards. 9
Part of the reason for the Court's failure to settle on an appro-
priate standard has been a lack of consensus about the underlying
rationale for the disparate-impact theory.6° Griggs itself suggested
that Title VII was directed at "removal of artificial, arbitrary, and
unnecessary barriers to employment "61 and struck down require-
ments that it viewed as arbitrary and unrelated to job performance.
In Albemarle Paper, on the other hand, the Court struck down tests
that probably did bear an overall relationship to performance of at
least some of the jobs for which they were used.62 The tests were
struck down because they did not satisfy the rigorous validation
standards of the EEOC Guidelines.63 Lack of arbitrariness was not
the issue in Albemarle Paper.64 Rather, the Court required that
practices satisfy a much higher level of justification. By the time
of Beazer, the last disparate-impact case where the standard of
business necessity was applied, the Court had retreated to a more
Griggs-like approach that looked to whether the challenged practice
furthered a legitimate employer interest.65 Suggestions that the
Wards Cove Court abandoned a consistent line of precedent reflect
blindness to the fact that since Griggs, the Court simply has not
been of a single mind about the purpose of the disparate-impact
59. Prior to Wards Cove, it was widely recognized that the Court's disparate-impact
cases were inconsistent, a fact that is easy to forget in the aftermath of Wards Cove,
which created an incentive for critics of the case to claim that all of those cases that
they never liked, such as Davis and Beazer, were part of the "good old days" of Griggs.
See Paulette M. Caldwell, Reaffirming the Disproportionate Effects Standard of Liability in
Title VII Litigation, 46 U. Pr'. L. REV. 555, 561-62 (1985) (discussing the vacillation in
distinguishing discriminatory motive and disparate impact in Title VII opinions since
Albemarle); Barbara Lemer, Washington v. Davis: Quantity, Quality, and Equality in Em-
ployment Testing, 1976 SUP. CT. REV. 263, 268 (discussing the Court's attempt in Davis
to mitigate the disproportionate burden of proof on defendants in impact cases);
Rutherglen, supra note 27, at 1319 (discussing the confusing nature of lower court stan-
dards and approaches to disparate impact cases).
60. George Rutherglen has described the Court as vacillating between two purposes:
preventing pretextual discrimination and discouraging employment practices with adverse
impact. Rutherglen, supra note 27, at 1313-14.
61. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
62. Albemarle Paper, 422 U.S. at 436.
63. Id. at 435-36. Validation is the process of determining whether a selection device
actually measures what it is intended to measure. Barbara Lerner, Employment Discrimina-
tion: Adverse Impact, Validity, and Equality, 1979 SUP. CT. REV. 17, 18.
64. Albemarle Paper, 422 U.S. at 436.
65. Beazer, 440 U.S. at 592-93.
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doctrine.' Although critics have been suggesting for years that
the Court was retreating from Griggs,7 it has actually been re-
treating from Albemarle Paper, which appeared to set an impos-
sibly high level of justification for employers." It is not a
coincidence that Griggs was the last unanimous disparate-impact
decision of the Court. By the time Wards Cove reached the Su-
preme Court, the battle lines had been drawn for over a decade.
In Wards Cove, the Court considered a disparate-impact suit
brought by non-white, mostly Filipino and Alaska Native, cannery
workers against two salmon canneries.' The plaintiffs alleged that
a variety of the employers' hiring and promotion practices had
created a racially stratified work force.7" Most of the cannery jobs
were unskilled positions held by non-whites; most of the
noncannery jobs were skilled positions held by whites.71 To dem-
onstrate the statistical adverse impact, the plaintiffs compared the
racial composition of the cannery work force with the racial com-
position of the noncannery work force.' Based upon that compar-
ison, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit sustained the
claims of the cannery workers."
In reversing the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court held that
comparison of these two components of the employers' work forces
was inappropriate.7 4 The Court found "nonsensical" the assertion
66. See Earl M. Maltz, Ttle VI and Upper Level Employment - A Response to Pro-
fessor Bartholet, 77 NW. U. L. REV. 776, 778, 779 (1983) (discussing the continuing de-
velopment of the effects test since Griggs and the impossibility of finding a general doc-
trine that the Court has applied across-the-board).
67. See, e.g., Hannah A. Furnish, A Path Through the Maze: Disparate Impact and
Disparate Treatment Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 After Beazer and
Burdine, 23 B.C. L. REV. 419, 420 (1982) (arguing that 'the defendant's burden in dispa-
rate impact cases is diminishing"); Hernandez, supra note 30, at 357 (arguing that the
Court in American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63 (1982), "undem-ined the
Court's holding in Griggs"); Linda M. Mealey, Note, English-Only Rules and 'Innocent"
Employers: Clarfying National Origin Discrimination and Disparate Impact Theory Un-
der Tile VII, 74 MINN. L. REV. 387, 405 (1989) (arguing that the Supreme Court "weak-
ened" the Griggs standard in Beazer).
68. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 430-31 (1975).
69. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 647 (1989).
70. These practices included nepotism, a rehire preference, a lack of objective hiring
criteria, separate hiring channels, and a practice of not promoting from within. Id. at 647-
48.
71. Id. at 647.
72. Id. at 651.
73. Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., 827 F.2d 439, 444-45 (9th Cir. 1987), rev'd,
490 U.S. 642 (1989).
74. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 651 (1989).
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that discrimination in the selection of skilled noncannery workers
could be demonstrated by pointing to a high proportion of minori-
ties in the unskilled cannery positions.' "Racial imbalance in one
segment of an employer's workforce," declared the Court, "does
not, without more, establish a prima facie case of disparate impact
with respect to the selection of workers for the employer's other
positions."' Instead, the "'proper comparison [is] between the
racial composition of [the at-issue jobs] and the racial composition
of the qualified population... in the relevant labor market."' 7
Having found the plaintiffs' statistical comparison inappropri-
ate, the Court could have simply remanded the case for reevalua-
tion in light of its analysis of the statistical comparison. However,
because the employers' petition for certiorari had also challenged,
more generally, the standards applied by the Ninth Circuit in ana-
lyzing disparate-impact claims, the Court proceeded to consider the
proper order and allocation of proof in disparate-impact cases.
The rule with respect to disparate-impact challenges under Ti-
tle VII as described in Wards Cove is: (1) the plaintiff must first
identify a specific practice or practices causing the disparate im-
pact;7" (2) the burden of production, but not the burden of per-
suasion, then shifts to the employer to justify the challenged prac-
tice79 (3) by showing that the practice "serves, in a significant
way, the legitimate employment goals of the employer";"0 and
(4) even if the practice does serve the employer's legitimate em-
ployment goals, the plaintiff may still prevail by demonstrating that
the employer rejected alternative practices that would have both
reduced the disparate impact and still served the employer's inter-
ests as well, because such a showing would "belie a claim by [the
employers] that their incumbent practices are being employed for
75. 1d&
76. Id. at 653.
77. Id. at 650 (quoting Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 308
(1977)). The 1991 Act does not alter the Wards Cove holding that a disparity between
two segments of an employer's work force does not establish disparate impact. Signifi-
cantly, none of the many versions of the Civil Rights Acts of 1990 or 1991 would have
overturned, or affected in any way, that holding. For example, the Senate Report on the
original Civil Rights Act of 1990, a more sweeping bill than that which ultimately passed,
made clear that the bill did not change how disparate impact is proved. S. REP. No. 315,
101st Cong., 2d Sess. 47 (1990).
78. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 656-58.
79. ld. at 659-60.
80. Id. at 659.
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non-discriminatory reasons.
In describing the respective burdens in Wards Cove, the Court
gave no indication that it believed that it was breaking new
ground.12 More significantly, not a single member of the Court
questioned the basic, and most important, holding of Griggs: that a
plaintiff can prevail by showing a substantial disparate impact even
absent an intent to discriminate. 3 Nonetheless, an outcry against
the decision resulted.
II. DISPARATE-IMPACr STANDARDS UNDER THE CIVIL RIGHTS
ACT OF 1991
A. The Legislation
Within two weeks of the Court's decision in Wards Cove,
Senator Howard Metzenbaum of Ohio introduced The Fair Employ-
ment Reinstatement Act, a bill designed to overrule the decision.'
Ultimately, that bill was substantially incorporated into the original
version of the Civil Rights Act of 1990,85 which was introduced
in both the House and Senate on February 7, 1990.86 The 1990
bill would have legislatively overruled a number of Supreme Court
decisions from the 1988 Term and earlier terms, 7 allowed com-
pensatory and punitive damages, extended the statute of limitations,
81. Id. at 660-61.
82. The closest the Court came to suggesting that its position deviated from prior law
was its statement with respect to whether it is a peruasion or a production burden that
shifts:
We acknowledge that some of our earlier decisions can be read as suggesting
otherwise. But to the extent that those cases speak of an employer's "burden of
proof" with respect to a legitimate business justification defense, they should
have been understood to mean an employer's production - but not persuasion
- burden.
Id. at 660 (citations omitted).
83. See, e.g., id. at 642-43 (favorably citing the holding of Griggs in the opening
paragraph) and id. at 662 (Stevens, L, dissenting) (citing the central holding of Griggs).
In light of this fact, it is surprising to note that some commentators assert that after
Wards Cove only intentionally discriminatory practices violate Title VII. See, e.g., Belton,
supra note 22, at 1404; Blumoff & Lewis, supra note 15, at 6.
84. Fair Employment Reinstatement Act, S. 1261, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG.
REC. S7512-13 (1989) (statement of Sen. Metzenbaum).
85. See 136 CONG. REC. S1018-19 (1990) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
86. S. 2104, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990); 136 CONG. REC. SI018 (1990); -LR. 4000,
101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990), infra Appendix A.
87. By one count, the 1990 Act would have "overturn[ed] 25 Supreme Court decisions
to some degree .... " House Names Conferees for Omnibus Civil Rights Legislation,
DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 182, at A-7 (Sept. 19, 1990).
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and effected a number of other procedural changes."8 After eight
months of rancorous debate, a modified version of the bill was
passed by the House and Senate in October 1990 but vetoed by
President Bush. 9
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 was introduced in the House on
January 3, 1991, and passed on June 5, 1991. 90 It was in large
part similar to the ,vetoed version of the 1990 bill, except that
some compromise language that had been in the vetoed version of
the bill had been removed.9' In the Senate, the Democratic bill
was expected to be introduced in the winter, but it was held in
abeyance while Senator John Danforth, Republican of Missouri, at-
tempted to fashion a compromise that would be acceptable to both
supporters and opponents of the 1990 bill.' He introduced three
bills in early summer, which among them covered most of the
areas covered by the omnibus bill.93 Then, in September of 1991,
Senator Danforth introduced a single comprehensive bill.' For
weeks, faced with veto threats by President Bush, the bill made no
apparent progress, although closed-door negotiations between the
White House and Senators proceeded.95 Even as late as October
88. See 136 CONG. REC. S1020 (1990).
89. See 136 CONG. REC. S16,457 (1990).
90. H.R. 1, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991), infra Appendix E.
91. See, e.g., Cynthia L. Alexander, Note, The Defeat of the Civil Rights Act of 1990:
Wading Through the Rhetoric in Search of Compromise, 44 VAND. L. REV. 595, 597 n.9
(1991) (noting the removal of language from the vetoed Act).
92. No Democratic bill had been introduced in the Senate, because Senator Edward M.
Kennedy was unable to obtain the support of "moderate Republicans," including Senator
Danforth. Steven A. Holmes, Business and Rights Groups Fail In Effort to Draft Bill on
Job Bias, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 1991, at Al and A10.
93. In an attempt to break the stalemate over the Civil Rights Act, Senator Danforth
introduced three separate bills, each dealing with only some of the issues contained in the
onnibus bill. See Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1991, S. 1207, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.,
137 CONG. REc. S7020-23 (1991) (among other things, overruling Patterson v. McLean
Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989), Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, Inc., 490 U.S. 900
(1989), Martin v. Wildks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989), and Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490
U.S. 228 (1989)); Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1991, S. 1208, 102d Cong., 1st
Sess., 137 CONG. REC. S7023-24 (1991) (modifying disparate treatment analysis); Civil
Rights and Remedies Act of 1991, S. 1209, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1991), 137 CONG.
REC. S7024-25 (1991) (providing for damages and civil penalties).
94. S. 1745, 102d Cong., Ist Sess. (1991). See Sen. John Danforth (R-Mo) Introduces
Civil Rights Act of 1991, DAiLY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 186, at D-1 to D-4 (Sept. 25,
1991), infra Appendix G.
95. See Adam Clymer, Senate Democrats Back a Compromise on Civil Rights Bill,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 1991, at sec. 1, p. 1; Adam Clymer, Senators and Bush Reach
Agreement on Civil Rights Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 1991, at A-1.
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23, 1991, the Administration had vowed to veto the Danforth
bill.9 Then, on October 25, the supporters of the Danforth Bill
and the White House reached a compromise agreementY That bill
passed the Senate on October 30," and the House on November
7.' President Bush signed the bill on November 21."w
The primary impasse between supporters and opponents of the
bill concerned the disparate-impact standards. Opponents argued
that the disparate-impact provisions went far beyond any standards
ever announced by the Court and imposed such a difficult burden
on employers to justify practices having a disparate impact that
they would be forced to hire by the numbers so that they would
not be in the position of having to defend their statistics.1 Pro-
ponents of the bill argued that all they wished to do was return the
law to its pre-Wards Cove state, and they denied that the bill
would have the effect of forcing employers to adopt quotas."°
The proponents' denial of any intent to encourage employers
96. Statement of Administration Policy on S. 1745 (Oct. 23, 1991), reprinted in DAILY
LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 206, at F-i (Oct. 24, 1991).
97. White House Announces Civil Rights Compromise Ending Two-Year Long Dispute,
DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 208, at A-11 (Oct. 28, 1991). Leading congressional Dem-
ocrats speculated that part of the pressure on President Bush to reach a compromise came
from the much-publicized Clarence Thomas confirmation hearings and the strong showing
of David Duke in the Louisiana gubernatorial campaign. Id.
98. Because of the inadvertent omission of language exempting the Wards Cove Pack-
ing Company from the disparate-impact standards of the bill, the Senate had to vote on
the bill again on November 5.
99. H.R. REP. No. 102-40(i), 10ist Cong., Ist Sess. (1991), reprinted in 1991
U.S.C.C.A.N. 549.
100. The Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.A., 2 U.S.C.A., 16 U.S.C.A. and 29 U.S.C.A.),
infra Appendix H.
101. See the President's remarks on the 1990 Act:
S. 2104 creates powerful incentives for employers to adopt hiring and promo-
tion quotas. These incentives ... created by the bill[ ] ... will make it diffi-
cult for employers to defend legitimate employment practices. In many cases, a
defense against unfounded allegations will be impossible . . . . [U]nable to
defend legitimate practices in court, employers will be driven to adopt quotas
in order to avoid liability.
President's Veto Message on the Civil Rights Act of 1990, 136 CoNG. REC. S16,418-19
(1990).
102. Their denials were so vehement that quota claims were labelled racist and akin to
the Willie Horton advertisements from the 1988 presidential campaign. See, e.g., 137
CONG. REC. H9538 (1991) (statement of Rep. Stokes) ("Sadly, the President's problem
with H.R. I was never quotas, the problem was politics. Those politics were the same
divisive, racial politics that in 1988 gave us Willie Horton ... ."); see also 137 CONG.
REC. H3953 (1991) (statement of Rep. Costello); 136 CONG. REC. H6801 (1990) (state-
ment of Rep. Dellums).
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to adopt quotas is significant. In supporting the bill, they did not
argue that it would result in race-conscious hiring or that such
hiring would be a good thing; instead, they specifically disavowed
any intent to require or even encourage race-conscious hiring 3
and took issue with opponents' arguments that the bill would have
the asserted effect. Thus, the two sides agreed that a bill having
the practical effect of requiring employers to engage in quota hir-
ing would be inappropriate. 104
On one level, it might be said that the parties really never
joined issue in the quota debate, because they did not clearly de-
fine their terms in such a way that the two sides could actually be
said to be arguing about the same issue. Opponents of the bill
seemed to define "quotas" to include race or sex preferences for
the purpose of achieving proportional representation.1 5 On the
other hand, some of the proponents of the bill possibly believed
that the bill would encourage employers to adopt such preferences
but that such preferences did not constitute "quotas." They could
have been basing their argument on a definition of quotas as com-
pletely inflexible requirements that do not permit an employer to
take job 4ualifications into account." 4 If that was the proponents'
103. 'At one point during the debates, Democrats actually accused Republicans of favor-
ing quotas because of opposition to an amendment that contained anti-quota language. See,
e.g., 136 CONG. Rsc. H6807 (1990) (statement of Rep. Hawkins) (emphasizing that dis-
crimination against any individual, black or white, is prohibited and noting that qualifica-
tions, not race, should be the determinative test).
104. Significantly, the 1991 Act does not define the term "disparate impact." It may be
that proponents of the Act were concerned about the political ramifications of spelling out
the term, which itself may sound like a description of a quota requirement. The House
Report states: "The Committee intends the term 'disparate impact' to retain the meaning it
has been given by the courts in the cases extending from Griggs up to the decision in
Wards Cove." H.R. REP. No. 102-40(1), 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1991), reprinted in 1991
U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 570.
105. See Statement of Admin itration Policy on S. 1745 (OcL 23, 1991), reprinted in
DALY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 206, at F-I (Oct. 24, 1991) (arguing that the disparate-im-
pact provisions would force employers "to adopt quotas and other unfair hiring preferenc-
es.").
106. For example, the Brooks-Fish substitute, a House version of the Act, specifically
outlawed quotas, but defined "quotas" so narrowly that no preference could ever be so
strong as to amount a quota under the bill. A quota was defined as "a fixed number or
percentage of persons of a particular race, color, religion, sex, or national origin which
must be attained, or which cannot be exceeded, regardless of whether such persons meet
necessary qualifications for the job." The sponsors argued that this prohibition of quotas
should overcome the objections of those who suggested the bill would lead to quota
hiring. See Joint Statement of the Sponsors of' the Brooks-Fish Substitute Regarding
Anti-Quota Provisions, 137 CoNG. REc. 13931 (1991).
Ti Supreme Court has given some support to such a definition of the term "quota"
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definition, their failure to identify it in the course of a debate
intended for public consumption inevitably misled their audience.
An artificial distinction under which any element of flexibility
at all in a "disfavored" quota converts it into a "favored" goal is
not a distinction that the public is likely to make.1" Members of
the general public would be likely to identify as a quota a system
under which an employer attempts to cause its work force to mir-
ror the racial composition of the general population, and under
which a supervisor's achievement of this objective is considered in
his performance reviews. In short, to the extent that the
proponents' denial that a "quota bill" was at issue rested on an
undisclosed view of the nature of quotas that is counter to common
understanding, the public could scarcely be faulted for misconstru-
ing the positions of those favoring the legislation.
Many of the denials of an intent to encourage quotas cannot
reasonably be viewed as based upon an asserted distinction be-
tween preferences and quotas. First, that distinction was not urged
by supporters as a reason to support the bill. Proponents did not
argue that, even though the Act would force employers to adopt
affinative-action plans, it would not require inflexible quotas.
Second, much of the discussion focused on how the bill was in-
tended to ensure that legitimate qualifications, not race, be the con-
trolling factors."
Although some of the proponents of the bill may have been
strong supporters of race and sex preferences, it is significant that
throughout the debates on the bill, there were constant denials that
this bill had anything to do with affirmative action in any
in its affrmative-action cases. See Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n Local 28 v. EEOC,
478 U.S. 421, 495-96 (1986) (O'Connor I., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (refer-
ring to a quota as a "'fixed number or percentage which must be attained or which can-
not be exceeded', and would do so 'regardless of the number of potential applicants who
meet necessary qualifications'") (quoting Memorandum - PermLsible Goals and Tmeta-
bles in State and Local Government Employment Practices (March 23, 1973), reprinted in
2 Empl. Prac. Guide (CCH) 1 3776 (1985)).
107. See Kingsley L Browne, Comparable Worth: An Impermissible Form of Affirmative
Action?, 22 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 717, 732-33 n.95 (1989) (criticizing the articulated distinc-
tion between quotas and goals as meaningless).
108. See, e.g., 137 CONG. REC. H3953 (1991) (statement of Rep. Costello) ("This legis-
lation is about equal opportunity for all workers, and not handouts, quotas, or unfair
advantages.").
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form." It is true, of course, that a body of opinion holds that
the important thing is not whether the employer's selection devices
are valid, but rather whether they increase the representation of
women and minorities in the workforce. For example, Eleanor
Holmes Norton, while Chairwoman of the EEOC, complained that
the ability of employers to validate their selection devices allowed
them to avoid having to achieve proportional representation. 11In
the debates over the current Act, however, supporters of the bill
did not take Norton's position by arguing that the business necessi-
ty defense should be so rigorous as to force proportional represen-
tation; instead, they argued that they simply wanted employers to
use job-related qualifications and that the bill allowed them to do
SO.
One significant consequence of the reluctance of supporters of
the Act to appear to endorse preferences is that the only substan-
tive change in the law of affirmative action effected by the Act
was to outlaw a particular form of affirmative action - race
norming. Race norming is the process of adjusting test scores so
that scores are reported in terms of a comparison of a particular
109. See, e.g., Senator Kennedy's remarks:
The rhetorical smoke screen that our opponents are already laying down is a
blatant attempt to divert this important civil rights debate into a dead-end de-
bate over quotas, minority set-asides and affirmative action. That is not the
measure we are proposing. The bill does not address those questions, and it
does not require quotas.
136 CONG. REC. S 1019 (1990) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
110. See the comments of Eleanor H. Norton at the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission Meeting of December 22, 1977:
It is clear that the employers around the country are increasingly sophisticated
in the validation of tests. Because employers make money and will learn to do
what the government wants them to do. And the government says what we
really want you to do is validate tests, that is what they are going to spend
their money doing . . . . We do not see, however, comparable evidence that
validated tests have in fact gotten black and brown bodies, or for that matter,
females into places as a result of the validation of those tests. In other words,
we do not see the kind of causal relation that I think, when the great - and I
regard it as a great - new enforcement tool was discovered some years ago,
we do not see quite the causal relationship we had expected to see .... So
if the commission, in effect, says to employers, as long as you validate your
tests we're really not concerned about you anymore . . . it is saying that the
presence of real people who are not in the work force, is not as important as
making sure that the tests have been validated.
Lerner, Employment Discrimination, supra note 63, at 40 n.62.
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test taker with other test takers of the same race.' Thus, the
highest test score of a black is reported as equal to the highest test
score of a white, even if the raw scores on the tests are substan-
tially different. 112 The only distinction between race norming and
other forms of affirmative action is that the issue of race norming
had recently been brought to the forefront of public conscious-
ness"' and members of Congress, even those supporting affir-
mative action, appeared hesitant to defend it.
Despite the claims of the bill's proponents, there can be no
doubt that the initial 1990 Act was, in practical operation, a quota
bill. That bill allowed plaintiffs to challenge an employer's bottom-
line statistics, and the employer could defend practices (or the
bottom-line disparity itself) only by proving that the practices were
"essential to effective job performance." 4 It is axiomatic that if
the burden on employers to justify statistical disparities is high
enough, employers will be able to avoid liability only by avoiding
those disparities in the first place. Senator John Danforth, the lead-
ing force behind the 1991 Civil Rights Act, himself acknowledged
that the requirements of the original 1990 Act were too stringent
and likely to lead to quotas.'
An understanding of the quota debate is a necessary prerequi-
site to a proper interpretation of the Act. In resolving questions of
111. On December 13, 1991, the Department of Labor ordered that, effective immediate-
ly, "Employment and Training Administration (ETA) contractors and grantees and pro-
grams under the National Apprenticeship Act shall terminate the use of within-group con-
version scoring or other race or ethnicity-based adjustments to [General Aptitude Test
Battery] scores in making selection and referral decisions." Labor Department's Policy
Decision on the General Aptitude Test Battery, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 241, at D-1
(Dec. 16, 1991).
112. See infra note 388.
113. See id.
114. See S. 2104 § 3, § 4, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG. REC. S1019, 81019
(1990), infra Appendix A § 3, § 4.
115.
The definition of "business necessity" in the original bill was that the business
practice was "essential to effective job performance" .... My feeling
was ...that this definition, "essential to effective job performance," was really
impossible from the standpoint of business and was way, way too tough.
Therefore, we went about the task of reformulating the definition, to have a
more balanced view of "business necessity."
136 CbNG. REC. S15,341 (1990) (statement of Sen. Danforth). See also Charles A.
Shanor, Some Observations on Broadly Construing Civil Rights Laws, 14 HARV. 3.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 8, 9 (1991) (arguing that the 1990 Act "would alter America's social fabric
fairly dramatically," in part because of the increase in "incentives for employers to use
numerical balancing within their work forces").
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interpretation under the Act, courts should be mindful of the fact
that all parties to the debate agreed that it should not be interpreted
in such a way as to force employers to "hire by the numbers" and
that, whether explicitly or implicitly, all parties shared an assump-
tion that the attempt by employers to predict job performance is a
legitimate enterprise. Moreover, courts should not accept the appar-
ent assumption of many commentators that the sole importance of
the law is to separate out deserving and undeserving plaintiffs in
litigation. The primary goal of Title VII is voluntary employer
compliance," 6 and the statute must be interpreted with an eye
toward the kind of employer behavior that it will induce. 7
Because the Act did not expressly overrule much of Wards
Cove, the Act's effect on the law of disparate-impact discrimination
cannot be understood without a clear understanding of Wards
Cove's effect on prior law. The remainder of this article will exam-
ine first, how Wards Cove fit into prior law with respect to each
of its controversial holdings, and second, how the 1991 Act affect-
ed the holding of Wards Cove.
B. The Effect of the Legislation and Wards Cove on Prior Law
Opponents of Wards Cove argued that it broke with prior law
on four points: (1) the allocation of the burden of persuasion;
(2) the plaintiff's obligation to identify a specific practice or prac-
tices causing the disparate impact; (3) the standard of "business
necessity"; and (4) the treatment of alternatives." s An analysis of
these elements will demonstrate that they are fully consistent with
prior case law of the Supreme Court, even if they depart in some
116. "The purpose of [Title VII] is to achieve a peaceful and voluntary settlement of
the persistent problem of racial and religious discrimination or segregation by estab-
lishments doing business with the general public, and by unions and professional, busi-
ness, and trade associations." S. REP No. 872, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964), reprinted in
1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2355.
117. Unfortunately, although Title VII is primarily a regulator of employer behavior, its
success is often measured primarily in terms of who wins specific litigated cases, rather
than in terms of the way in which it modifies employer behavior. The focus on litigation
has tended to minimize the attention paid to the more important question, which is how
the statute affects the millions of employment decisions that are never subject to litigation.
See Kingsley R. Browne, Tite VII as Censorship: Hostile Environment Harassment and
the First Amendment, 52 OHIo ST. LI. 481 (1991) (criticizing the hostile-environment
theory because of the pressure it imposes on employers to censor employee speech).
118. See, e.g., Belton, supra note 17, at 243-44; Player, supra note 27, at 14-16.
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respects from the approach taken by some lower courts." 9  Be-
cause, as we will see, the 1991 Civil Rights Act specifically over-
ruled only the allocation of the burden of persuasion to the plain-
tiff, how Wards Cove fit in with prior law remains quite critical to
current law.
1 20
119. Compare Powers v. Alabama Dep't of Educ., 854 F.2d 1285, 1293 (11th Cir.
1988), cert denied, 490 U.S. 1107 (1989) (plaintiff need show only disparity; employer
then must identify and justify practices that caused result) and Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d
1249, 1267 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1115 (1985) (once the disparate
impact of particular practice is shown, the burden of persuasion shifts to employer to
show business necessity) and Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir.),
cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 and 1007 (1971) ("The test is whether there exists an
overriding legitimate business purpose such that the practice is necessary to the safe and
efficient operation of the business.") with Pouncy v. Prudential Ins. Co., 668 F.2d 795,
800 (5th Cir. 1982) (plaintiff must identify specific practices causing the impact) and
Croker v. Boeing Co., 662 F.2d 975, 991 (3d Cir. 1981) (en banc) (burden of persuasion
remains with plaintiff at all times) and Contreras v. City of Los Angeles, 656 F.2d 1267
(9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1021 (1982) (Supreme Court's disparate-impact
cases approve "employment practices that significantly serve, but are neither required by
nor necessary to, the employer's legitimate business interests.").
Significantly, most cases that adopted one position of the original 1990 Act rejected
the other positions. Perhaps the courts recognized that a combination of all the elements
would place an impossible burden on the employer. Thus, for example, while Powers
allowed the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case merely by showing a disparity, it
permitted the defendant to come forward with just a showing of job-relatedness. Similarly,
while Segar placed the burden of persuasion on the defendant, it required the plaintiff to
challenge specific practices.
Since the criticism of the Wards Cove decision was that it deviated from the Su-
preme Court's own prior decisions, not that it was at variance with lower court decisions,
the discussion of the impact of Wards Cove will focus on how it relates to the Supreme
Court's precedents rather than its effect on the rules being applied in lower courts, which,
in many instances, went beyond what had been authorized by the Supreme Court, and
which lacked any substantial measure of consistency.
120. The enacted version of the 1991 Act limits the use of statements in the legislative
history in interpreting the disparate-impact provisions to the interpretive memorandum
found at 137 CONG. REc. S15,276 (1991).
Section 105(b) of the Act provides:
No statements other than the interpretive memorandum appearing at Vol. 137
Congressional Record S 15276 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1991) shall be considered
legislative history of, or relied upon in any way as legislative history in con-
struing or applying, any provision of this Act that relates to Wards Cove -
Business necessity/cumulation/altemative business practice.
Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, § 105(b) (1991).
The interpretive memorandum states, in its entirety:
The final compromise on S. 1745 agreed to by several Senate sponsors, includ-
ing Senators Danforth, Kennedy, and Dole, and the Administration states that
with respect to Wards Cove - Business necessity/cumulation/alternative busi-
ness practice - the exclusive legislative history is as follows:
The terms "business necessity" and "job related" are intended
to reflect the concepts enunciated by the Supreme Court in Griggs v.
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1. The Shifting of the Burden of Production but not Persuasion
a. Wards Cove
Although the Wards Cove ruling on the burden-of-persuasion
issue was unambiguously overruled by the 1991 Act, it is worth-
while to discuss the consistency of the Wards Cove resolution of
that issue with prior precedent. Much of the controversy over
Wards Cove involved the assertion that the Court overruled a con-
sistent body of prior precedent, and much of the overreaction cen-
tered on the burden-of-persuasion issue.121
Despite widespread statements to the contrary, in addressing
the question of whether the burden that shifts to the employer is
one of production or persuasion, the Supreme Court in Wards Cove
resolved an issue it had never previously specifically addressed."2
Although it had in previous cases used words such as "prove,"
"demonstrate," and "show" to describe what an employer must do
to answer the plaintiff's prima facie case, the Court had never
expressly described what it meant by those words."~ Thus, what-
ever course the Court ultimately chose could not fairly be de-
scribed as inconsistent with its prior precedent.124 However, the
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), and in the other Supreme
Court decisions prior to Wards Cove Pa~king Co. v. Abonio, 490
U.S. 642 (1989).
When a decision-making process includes particular, functional-
ly-integrated practices which are components of the same criterion,
standard, method of administration, or test, such as the height and
weight requirements designed to measure strength in Dothard v.
Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977), the particular, functionally-integrated
practices may be analyzed as one employment practice.
137 CONG. REc. S15,276 (1991).
121. See supra note 14.
122. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonlo, 490 U.S. 642, 660 (1989).
123. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Connecticut v.
Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
124. Although most lower courts that had expressly addressed the issue had held that
the defendant bears a burden of persuasion, not all courts had done so. See supra note
121. See also Martha Chamallas, Evolving Conceptions of Equality Under Tide VII: Dis-
parate Impact Theory and the Demise of the Bottom Line Principle, 31 U.C.L.A. L. REv.
305, 319 (1983) ("Lower courts are also in conflict over whether the defendant in a dis-
parate impact case should shoulder both the burden of production and the burden of per-
suasion on the issue of justification for a challenged practice that adversely affects minori-
ties."). Compare Johnson v. Uncle Ben's, Inc., 657 F.2d 750, 753 (5th Cir. 1981), cer.
denied, 459 U.S. 968 (1982) (once plaintiff proves its prima facie case, both the burden
of production and the burden of persuasion shift to defendant), and Kirby v. Colony
Furniture Co., 613 F.2d 696 (8th Cir. 1980) (same), with Croker v. Boeing Co., 662 F.2d
975, 991 (3d Cir. 1981) (en banc) (plaintiff retains burden of persuasion; defendant's
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Court's ultimate resolution of the question was consistent with its
earlier cases, as well as with the development of the same issue
under the disparate-treatment theory.
12
The Wards Cove Court acknowledged that "some of [its]
earlier decisions can be read as suggesting" that the burden that
shifts is one of persuasion, but the Court stated that these cases
"should have been understood to mean an employer's production
- but not persuasion - burden."126 The Court reasoned that
shifting only the production burden, and thereby leaving the burden
of proving illegal discrimination on the plaintiff at all times, is
consistent with the approach of Rule 301 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence 7 and with the rule in disparate-treatment cases.
12
In his dissent, Justice Stevens argued that "[d]ecisions of this
Court and other federal courts repeatedly have recognized that
while the employer's burden in a disparate-treatment case is simply
one of coming forward with evidence of legitimate business pur-
pose, its burden in a disparate-impact case is proof of an affirma-
burden is solely one of production).
A number of commentators have noted that the Supreme Court had never explicitly
held that the burden that shifts to the employer is one of persuasion. See, e.g.,
Rutherglen, supra note 27, at 1312 n.63 ("The Supreme Court seems to have required
[the employer to meet a persuasion burden] in its leading decisions on the theory of
disparate impact."); Player, supra note 27, at 2 ("Without ever precisely so holding, the
Court over the years appeared to assume that the employer's burden ...was a burden
of persuasion ... .").
Perhaps the closest the Court had come to addressing that issue was in New York
City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 587 n.31 (1979), where the Court stated:
"Whether or not [plaintiffs'] weak showing was sufficient to establish a prima facie case,
it clearly failed to carry [plaintiffs'] ultimate burden of proving a violation of Title VII."
125. Although most of the lower courts that had addressed the issue prior to Wards
Cove had concluded that the burden that shifted was one of persuasion, the furor sur-
rounding Wards Cove involved the assertion that the Supreme Court had deviated from its
own precedents, not from the standards employed by lower courts. See, e.g., articles cited
supra at note 14.
126. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 660.
127. FED. R. EVD. 301. Rule 301 states that:
In all civil actions and proceedings not otherwise provided for by Act of Con-
gress, or by these rules, a presumption imposes on the party against whom it is
directed the burden of going forward with evidence to rebut or meet the pre-
sumption, but does not shift the burden of proof in the sense of the risk of
nonpersuasion, which remains throughout the trial upon the party on whom it
was originally cast.
Id.
128. See, e.g., Texas Dept of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981)
(burden of persuasion remains with the plaintiff at all times).
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five defense of business necessity." 9 In support of this assertion,
Justice Stevens pointed to the Court's prior descriptions of the
employer's burden as one of "demonstrating," "proving," or "show-
ing" job-relatedness.1 3" Significantly, Justice Stevens was unable
to point to a single instance in which the Court had described the
employer's burden as one of persuasion.13 1 Although Justice
Stevens seemed to assume that the words "demonstrate," "prove,"
and "show" describe a burden of persuasion, the discussion below
reveals the falsity of that assumption.
The evolution of the burden-of-proof issue under Griggs par-
allels the evolution of the same issue under the disparate-treatment
theory of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.132 In McDonnell
Douglas, the Court held that in a .disparate-treatment case, once the
plaintiff has established a prima facie case, "[t]he burden then must
shift to the employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscrimina-
tory reason for the employee's rejection." 133 It held that such an
articulation would rebut the employee's prima facie case and "dis-
charge the [employer's] burden of proof."134 Later, in Furnco
Construction Corp. v. Waters35, the Court described the burden
that shifts to the employer as one of "proving that he based his
employment decision on a legitimate consideration and not an
illegitimate one such as race." "
129. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 668.
130. Justice Stevens provided his support in a footnote as follows:
See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S., at 802, n.14. See also, e.g., Teal, 457 U.S.,
at 446 ("employer must . . . demonstrate that *any given requirement [has] a
manifest relationship to the employment in question'"); New York City Transit
Authority v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 587 (1979) (employer "rebutted" prima facie
case by "demonstration that its narcotics rule.. .'is job related'"); Dothard v.
Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977) (employer has to "prov[eJ that the chal-
lenged requirements are job related"); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S.
405, 425 (1975) (employer has "burden of proving that its tests are 'job
related'"); Griggs, 401 U.S., at 432 (employer has "burden of showing that any
given requirement must have a manifest relationship to the employment").
Id. at 668 n.14 (Stevens, 3., dissenting) (emphasis added).
131. Id.
132. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
133. Id. at 802 (emphasis added).
134. Id. at 803 (emphasis added).
135. 438 U.S. 567 (1978).
136. Id. at 577. In his Furnco dissent Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, com-
pared the employer's burden of proof under McDonnell Douglas and Griggs. In a dispa-
rate-treatment case, according to Justice Marshall, "the burden shifts to the employer who
must prove that he had a 'legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the [plaintiffs] rejec-
tion.'" Id. at 582 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802).
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Subsequently, in Board of Trustees of Keene State College v.
Sweeney 37, the Supreme Court reversed a decision of the First
Circuit that had held that the employer's burden was to "prove ab-
sence of discriminatory motive." 3' The Court stated:
While words such as "articulate," "show," and "prove,"
may have more or less similar meanings depending upon
the context in which they are used, we think that there is a
significant distinction between merely "articulat[ing] some
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" and "prov[ing] ab-
sence of discriminatory motive." 139
Thus, the Court acknowledged that the words "articulate," "show,"
and "prove" could refer to either a production burden or a persua-
sion burden.14° Even with this relatively clear description of a
rule shifting only the burden of production, however, the Court
was required to revisit the question in Texas Dept. of Community
Affairs v. Burdine.141 In Burdine, the Court unequivocally held
that the burden of persuasion never shifts to the defendant in such
cases. 142
In a disparate-impact case, "the burden shifts to the employer to show that the practice
has 'a manifest relationship to the employment in question.'" L at 583 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432). To the extent that there is a difference in
these two standards, the burden of "showing" presumably is not greater than the burden
of "proving." Thus, Justice Marshall must have been saying that the burden placed upon
the employer in a disparate-impact case is no greater, and is perhaps less, than the burden
placed on the employer in a disparate-treatment case.
137. 439 U.S. 24 (1978) (per curiam).
138. Id.
139. Id. at 25.
140. Justice Stevens, dissenting in Sweeney, took issue with the majority's conclusion
that "prove" and "articulate" mean something different and argued that the Court of Ap-
peals had not shifted the burden of persuasion by requiring the employer to "prove" ab-
sence of discriminatory motivation. He asserted that "when an executive takes the witness
stand to 'articulate' his reason, the litigant for whom he speaks is thereby proving those
reasons." Id. at 28-29 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens stated:
Whether the issue is phrased in the affirmative or in the negative, the ultimate
question involves an identification of the real reason for the employment deci-
sion. On that question - as all of these cases make perfectly clear - it is
only the burden of producing evidence of- legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons
which shifts to the employer;, the burden of persuasion, as the Court of Ap-
peals properly recognized, remains with the plaintiff.
Id. at 29.
141. 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
142. The Court stated:
The burden that shifts to the defendant . . . is to rebut the presumption of
discrimination by producing evidence that the plaintiff was rejected, or someone
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The above discussion reveals that an assertion that the Supreme
Court's decisions have consistently placed the burden of persuasion
on the employer in disparate-impact cases cannot rest upon the
facile quotation of words such as "demonstrate," "prove," and
"show." When those same words were used in the disparate-treat-
ment context, they were held to denote the employer's burden of
production, not persuasion."'
The mere fact that the Court's precedents do not demonstrate
that the employer's burden should be characterized as an affinna-
tive defense does not necessarily mean that such a characterization
would be wrong. Justice Stevens, after arguing from precedent in
his dissent, went on to argue that "thoughtful reflection on com-
mon-law pleading principles"'" also demonstrates that the
employer's justification in a disparate-impact action is "a classic
example of an affirmative defense." 4 5 He explained:
In the ordinary civil trial, the plaintiff bears the burden of
persuading the trier of fact that the defendant has harmed
her. See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 328 A,
433 B (1965) (hereinafter Restatement). The defendant may
undercut plaintiff's efforts both by confronting plaintiff's
evidence during her case in chief and by submitting coun-
tervailing evidence during its own case. But if the plaintiff
proves the existence of the harmful act, the defendant can
escape liability only by persuading the factfmder that the
act was justified or excusable. See, e.g., Restatement §§
454-461, 463-467.14
Justice Stevens then reasoned that because intent plays no role in
the disparate-impact inquiry, once a disparate impact is shown, the
employer's burden is to show "why it is necessary to the operation
else was preferred, for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. The defendant
need not persuade the court that it was actually motivated by the proffered
reasons. It is sufficient if the defendant's evidence raises a genuine issue of
fact as to whether it discriminated against the plaintiff .... If the defendant
carries this burden of production, the presumption raised by the prima facie
case is rebutted, and the factual inquiry proceeds to a new level of specificity.
Id. at 254-55.
143. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
144. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 669 (Stevens, L, dissenting).
145. Id. at 670.
146. Id. at 669.
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of the business."147
Justice Stevens was mistaken about both the plaintiff's burden
in an ordinary civil trial and the relevance of this reasoning to the
disparate-impact setting. Contrary to his suggestion, in the ordinary
civil trial a plaintiff's showing that the defendant harmed her does
not shift the burden to the defendant to justify the action. 41 If
the plaintiff asserts nothing more than harm caused by the defen-
dant, the plaintiff's complaint will not withstand a motion to dis-
miss. The plaintiff must also establish that the defendant breached
a legal duty toward her. She may not just assert that the defendant
was driving a car that hit her; she must also assert that the defen-
dant was driving negligently or that the defendant intended to
strike her.1
49
For example, once the plaintiff has shown that the defendant
intended to strike her, the defendant might assert an affirmnative
defense in justification. The defendant might argue that the striking
was justified by the doctrine of self-defense, at which point the
defendant would have the burden of persuasion on the self-defense
issue. Similarly, in a discrimination action, once the plaintiff has
demonstrated that the employer intentionally based an adverse
employment action on her sex, the employer might raise the de-
fense that in the particular circumstances sex is a bona fide occu-
pational qualification, or BFOQ. The employer properly bears the
burden of persuasion on the BFOQ issue because it is claiming
exemption from a generally applicable prohibition against discrimi-
nation on the basis of sex."s In essence, the employer is stating
that it is discriminating, but the discrimination is permissible be-
147. Id. at 670. The phrase "necessary to the operation of the business" comes from an
unrelated section of Title VII, the bona fide occupational qualification provision. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e).
148. The sections of the Restatement of Torts cited by Justice Stevens are inapposite.
Section 328A provides that it is the plaintiff's obligation to prove duty, breach, causation,
and damages. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328A (1965). Section 433B provides
that the plaintiff has the obligation to prove that the tortious action of the defeedant
harmed him. Id. § 433B. The remaining sections deal primarily with the liability of a
negligent actor for unanticipated harm and the defense of contributory negligence. None of
the sections cited supports a finding of liability in the absence of wrongful conduct on
the part of the defendant. See Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 669 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
149. Even strict liability cases involving defective products require more than a mere
showing that the plaintiff was injured by the defendant's product The plaintiff must also
show that the product was defective and unreasonably dangerous. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
TORTS § 402A (1965).
150. See International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, III S. Ct. 1196, 1204 (1991).
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cause it falls within a particular statutory exception upon which the
employer is entitled to rely.
Fundamentally, the question of whether the burden that shifts is
one of persuasion or one of production depends upon what consti-
tutes the wrong in a disparate-impact case. If the wrong is, as
Justice Stevens seemed to suggest in Wards Cove, that an employer
has a work force that is out of balance, 51 then arguably it makes
sense to say that an employer must prove the "affirmative defense"
of "business necessity." 52 The general statutory requirement of
proportional representation has been violated, and now the employ-
er must justify it. The affirmative defense is simply an act of grace
by Congress, an exception to a general rule imposing a propor-
tional-representation requirement. However, if the wrong is the
placement of arbitrary barriers that are not related to the
employer's legitimate business concerns in the way of minority ad-
vancement, as suggested in Griggs," then showing that the bar-
rier is arbitrary is logically part of the plaintiff's case.
Section 7030) of Title VII strongly suggests that a statistical
imbalance in an employer's work force is not prima facie unlawful,
since it provides that an employer is not obligated to grant prefer-
ential treatment to remedy a statistical imbalance in the work
force.J 5 Presumably, employers are not required to remedy an
imbalance in the work force because an imbalance in itself does
not violate Title VII, nor, unlike a McDonnell Douglas prima facie
case, does it even indicate a substantial likelihood that impermissi-
ble discrimination has occurred.
In stark contrast to the situation under the BFOQ analysis
151. Wards Cove 490 U.S. at 676-77 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
152. Justice Blaclaun's view of this issue is also apparently skewed by his interpreta-
tion of what constitutes the wrong. In his opinion in Watson, he suggested that "numeri-
cal disparity" is itself "an improper effect." Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487
U.S. 977, 1004 (1988) (Blaclanun, J., concurring).
153. See also Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 450 (1982) (describing Dothard v.
Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977), as holding that "minimum statutory height and weight
requirements for correctional counselors were the sort of arbitrary barrier to equal employ-
ment opportunity for women forbidden by Title VI").
154. Section 7030) provides:
Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be interpreted to require any employ-
er... to grant preferential treatment to any individual or to any group ...
on account of an imbalance which may exist with respect to the total number
or percentage of persons of any [protected class] in comparison with the total
number or percentage of persons of such [protected class] in ...the available
work force ....
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-20).
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described above, when an employer resists a suit charging the em-
ployer with adopting a neutral practice that turns out to have a
disparate impact, the employer does not acknowledge discrimination
and claim that it falls within some exception. Rather the employer
denies discrimination altogether. Treating the employer's justifica-
tion as an affirmative defense means that any employer with a
work force that is out of balance is presumed to be violating the
law. However, lack of proportional representation has never been
prima facie unlawful.'55 Title VII has always been an anti-dis-
crimination statute, not a proportional-representation statute."5
Some opponents of Wards Cove have also argued that the
burden of persuasion should be shifted to the employer because the
employer is better able to adduce evidence of business justifica-
tion. 1 7 The employer's superior access to evidence is, of course,
precisely the reason that the burden of production shifts to the em-
ployer. The employer must show, first, its reasons for using the
challenged practice and, second, a relationship between the practice
and the employer's legitimate employment goals. Once that evi-
dence has been presented to the court, however, there is no need to
depart from the ordinary civil rules by requiring that the employer
bear the burden of persuasion. Placing the burden of production on
the employer creates the proper incentives on the employer to
justify the challenged practice, since the plaintiff need challenge
only the justifications presented by the employer.
The Court's refusal in Wards Cove to treat job-relatedness as
an affirmative defense was far more faithful to ordinary civil-plead-
ing rules than its treatment of an employer's affirmative-action
defense, which met with no objection from opponents of Wards
155. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339-40 (1977).
156. It makes little sense to say that an employer's rebuttal burden is greater where the
plaintiff alleges that the employer's actions were not intended to be discriminatory than
where the plaintiff alleges intentional discrimination. In disparate-treatment cases, the prima
facie case "raises an inference of discrimination . . . because we presume these acts, if
otherwise unexplained, are more likely than not based on the consideration of impermissi-
ble factors." Fumco Construction Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978). There is no
shifting of the burden of persuasion under McDonnell Douglas even though it is based on
the rationale that it is more likely than not that the employer engaged in illegal discrimi-
nation. A fortiori, in an impact case there should be no shifting of the burden of persua-
sion, since the prima facie case shows only imbalance; it does not imply that the imbal-
ance is an impermissible one.
157. See, e.g., Blumoff & Lewis, supra note 15, at 29 (the allocation puts a burden on
the plaintiff, who is more likely to lack knowledge of the employer's business).
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Cove. In Johnson v. Transportation Agency58 , the Court held that
a plaintiff raising a reverse-discrimination claim must prove the in-
validity of the employer's affirmative action plan.159 The employ-
er need not prove that its plan is justified under the Court's affir-
mative-action precedents."6 However, requiring the employer to
prove the validity of an affirmative-action plan is far more justifi-
able than requiring it to prove the job-relatedness of a facially
neutral employment requirement. After all, when an employer dis-
advantages a white or a male by granting a hiring preference to a
minority or a woman, it is doing what the express language of
Section 703(a) of Title VII plainly prohibits: "fail[ing] or refus[ing]
to hire . . .a[n] individual . . .because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin." 16 Thus, the employer's
158. 480 U.S. 616 (1986).
159. Id. at 626.
160. The Court held that challenges to affirmative-action plans should be considered
under the standards of McDonnell Douglas. The Johnson Court stated:
This case... fits readily within the analytical framework set forth in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Once a plaintiff es-
tablishes a prima facie case that race or sex has been taken into account in an
employer's employment decision, the burden shifts to the employer to articulate
a nondiscriminatory rationale for its decision. The existence of an affirmative
action plan provides such a rationale. If such a plan is articulated as the basis
for the employers decision, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to prove that the
employer's justification is pretextual and the plan is invalid.
480 U.S. at 626.
The use of the McDonnell Douglas standard in affirmative-action cases is wholly
inappropriate because its analysis provides a method for determining, through circumstan-
tial evidence, whether a decision was based upon one of the prohibited classifications
established by Title VII. In a reverse-discrimination case, the question is not whether race
or sex was the reason for the decision, but whether the employer's use of'race or sex
was justified under the circumstances. As with the BFOQ defense, that is properly an
affirmative defense for which the employer should bear the burden of persuasion.
161. Some have argued that the Court's decisions in Weber and Johnson are consistent
with the statutory language because Congress did not define the term "discriminate" in
Title VII, and therefore the Court could define it to exclude adverse action taken pursuant
to an affirmative-action plan. Under such reasoning, it can be argued that affirmative
action does not constitute an affirmative defense; it is simply action that falls outside the
prohibitory language of the statute. The problem with such an argument is that it is in-
consistent with both the language of the statute and the statute's legislative history.
Section 703(a)(1) does not simply make it unlawful to "discriminate against any
individual ... because of such individual's" membership in a protected class; instead, it
makes it unlawful for an employer "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individ-
ual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual ...because of such individual's"
membership in such a class. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Therefore, regardless of what the
term "discriminate" means, failure to hire because of race or sex is plainly encompassed
by the language of the statute.
The legislative history suggests that Congress knew exactly what it meant by the
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position is that he is discriminating, but he has a good reason.
That is a classic affirmative defense. On the other hand, nothing in
the language of Title VII suggests that an employer that is making
employment decisions on the basis of race- or sex-neutral criteria is
violating the statute; thus, there is no need for a defense.
If Wards Cove had actually held what many of its critics sug-
gest, the uproar over the decision might be more understandable.
The interpretation articulated in the Summary of the 1990 Act was
that under Wards Cove, "victims of discrimination must bear the
heavy burden of proving that the employer has no legal justifica-
tion for its exclusionary practices."' 62 Similarly, a New York
Times editorial characterized Wards Cove as requiring the plaintiff
to prove that a practice having a disparate impact is "utterly unrea-
sonable."1 63 Other critics have argued that Wards Cove puts on
plaintiffs the impossible burden of proving a negative.i 4 For ex-
ample, in his testimony on the 1990 Act, former Transportation
Secretary William Coleman gave the following description of
Wards Cove: "Wards Cove, as a practical matter, requires civil
rights plaintiffs to 'prove a negative' - to demonstrate that among
the enormous number of conceivable business interests, not one is
term -discriminate." The Clark-Case interpretive memorandum stated:
[What is now § 703] prohibits discrimination in employment because of race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin. It has been suggested that the concept of
discrimination is vague. In fact it is clear and simple and has no hidden mean-
ings. To discriminate is to make a distinction, to make a difference in treat-
ment or favor, and those distinctions or differences in treatment or favor which
are prohibited by [the section] are those which are based on any of the five
forbidden criteria: race, color, religion, sex, and national origin.
110 CONG. REc. 7213 (1964).
162. Summary of the Civil Rights Act of 1990, 136 CONG. REC. S1021 (1990). The
willingness of opponents of Wards Cove to characterize persons who have been adversely
affected by practices with a disparate impact as "victims of discrimination" without a
showing of either intent to discriminate or even arbitrariness of the practice shows just
how far they have traveled from the perspective of the original supporters of Title VIL
163. Reconstructing Civil Rights, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 12, 1990, at A20.
164. See, e.g., Diana R. Gordon, A Civil Rights Bill for Workers: Civil Rights Act of
1990, THE NATION 14 (July 9, 1990); ABA Resolution and Report on Civil Rights Legis-
lation Adopted by House of Delegates, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 31, at E-1 (Feb. 14,
1990); New Civil Rights Legislation Essentia4 Departing NAACP Attorney Goldstein Says,
DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 131, at A-4 (July 11, 1989) (quoting Barry Goldstein, for-
mer attorney with the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund); Sen. Metzenbaum to
Offer Bill to Overturn Wards Cove Decision, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 109, at A-6
(June 8, 1989).
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connected in the requisite manner to the disputed job require-
ment."
165
As previously demonstrated, the holding of Wards Cove did
nothing of the sort.166 Wards Cove required only that the plaintiff
identify the practice responsible for the disparate impact. Once the
plaintiff accomplished this, the employer would lose unless it pro-
duced evidence to demonstrate that the practice "serve[d], in a
significant way, the legitimate employment goals of the employ-
er."16 Moreover, not just any justification by the employer would
meet this burden; the Court emphasized that "[a] mere insubstantial
justification in this regard will not suffice" because under so low a
standard of review discrimination could be carried out through the
use of employment practices that appear neutral."16 The
employer's explanation must be "clear and reasonably specif-
ic." 1" Moreover, the plaintiff need not combat every conceivable
justification for the employer's practice as Secretary Coleman ar-
gued; instead, he need only attack the justification actually offered
by the employer.17
Some have argued that the burden on the employer is unduly
light. For example, in their amicus brief in Wards Cove, the
NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, et al., argued that
were the Court to adopt the rule that it did, "[t]he ' employer's
burden would be reduced to such an extent that all but the most
unimaginative employers - unable even to articulate a legitimate
reason for practices having a significant adverse impact - would
be able to rebut a showing of disparate impact discrimination, no
165. Civil Rights Act of 1990: Hearing on S. 2104 before the Senate Labor and Human
Resources Committee, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1990) (statement of William T. Coleman,
Jr.), reprinted In 136 CONG. REC. S9351 (1990). See also Samuel Issacharoff, Contractual
Liberties in Discriminatory Markets, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1219, 1239 n.108 (1992) (citing
Wards Cove as holding that "disparate impact plaintiffs must prove the absence of any
business justification for the challenged employment practice").
166. See supra notes 74-81 and accompanying text.
167. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 659.
168. Id.
169. Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 258 (1981). As in
disparate-treatment cases, the employer's rebuttal burden is designed to allow the inquiry
to proceed to a more specific level. The employer's rebuttal in a disparate-treatment case
focuses the pretext inquiry, allowing the plaintiff to narrow in on the employer's offered
justification, rather than excluding all conceivable legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for
the action. Similarly, in a disparate-impact case, the employer's evidence allows the plain-
tiff to focus on the asserted business justification.
170. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 658, 659.
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matter how compelling."171 Such concern is unjustified. Although
the employer may rebut the prima facie case by 'presenting evi-
dence that the challenged practice substantially serves its legitimate
employment goals, its burden is more than merely to "articulate a
legitimate reason."1" Instead, unlike an employer in a disparate-
treatment case, the employer under Wards Cove must introduce
evidence to show that the practice in fact furthers its legitimate
goals. 173
In sum, those who would impose the burden of persuasion on
employers in disparate-impact cases cannot contend that they are
simply insisting on application of general principles of pleading
and proof. Such principles actually contradict their position. If
opponents of Wards Cove were motivated by a desire to vindicate
traditional pleading and proof rules in Title VII cases, they also
would have opposed Johnson's imposition on the plaintiff of the
burden of proving that an employer's affirmative-action plan is
invalid. The absence of any such opposition to a case that did
override traditional burden-of-proof principles suggests that consid-
erations far removed ftom concerns over the fair allocation of these
burdens accounted for the vigor with which critics attacked Wards
Cove.
171. Brief for the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund et al. at 47-48, Wards
Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, (No. 87-1387), 490 U.S. 642 (1989), microformed on U.S.
Supreme Court Records and Briefs (Congressional Info. Serv.).
172. Id.
173. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 659.
Mack A. Player argues that the Court had assumed in its prior cases that the
defendant's burden in a disparate-impact case was a burden of persuasion. Player bases
his belief on the Court's suggestion that the defendant's burden in a disparate-impact case
is heavier that its burden in a disparate-treatment case. Player, supra note 27, at 30 n.142.
That conclusion does not follow. A defendant's obligation in a treatment case is merely
to articulate some reason other than a discriminatory one. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). For example, if the defendant gave as a reason that it
would not hire someone who was bom on a Wednesday, it has satisfied its obligation.
However, under the disparate-impact theory even if the plaintiff retains the ultimate burden
of persuasion, the defendant must meet a burden of production to show that this apparent-
ly irrational preference was the basis for its action and that the practice in fact furthers
the employer's legitimate goals.
The obligation of the employer to demonstrate that the practice actually serves its
interests rebuts the suggestion of many of Wards Cove's critics that the Court has rejected
an impact model in favor of an intent model. See, e.g., William B. Gould, IV, The Su-
preme Court and Employment Discrimination Law in 1989: Judicial Retreat and Congres-
sional Response, 64 TUL L. REV. 1485, 1497 (1990) ("The logic of Wards Cove, particu-
larly as it relates to the employer's defense against a prima facie case, is that intent is
now sine qua non to a statutory violation, a proposition explicitly rejected in Griggs.").
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b. The Burden of Persuasion under the Civil Rights Act
Despite the ample foundation supporting a rule shifting only
the burden of production, the Act shifted the burden of persuasion
to the employer to justify the challenged practice. The Act provides
that once the complaining party "demonstrates" that a particular
employment practice causes a disparate impact, the employer must
"demonstrate" that the challenged practice is justified. 74 The Act
defines the term "demonstrates" to mean "meets the burdens of
production and persuasion." 5 Politically, this provision was easi-
est to change because President Bush had not opposed shifting the
burden of persuasion. As will be seen, this is the only unambigu-
ous change in the disparate-impact rules that the 1991 Act effect-
edLt 76
2. The Particularity Requirement: Must the Plaintiff Demonstrate
that Specific Practices Caused the Disparate Impact?
a. Wards Cove
The Wards Cove majority noted that a plaintiff must identify
the specific practice or practices that produce the disparate im-
pact."7 Just as a defendant cannot avoid liability by demonstrat-
ing racial balance at the bottom line,17' a plaintiff cannot estab-
lish a case of disparate impact by demonstrating imbalance at the
bottom line.179 According to the Court, allowing such claims
would "result in employers being potentially liable for 'the myriad
of innocent causes that may lead to statistical imbalances in the
composition of their work forces. ' ""l
Although Justice Stevens labelled the requirement of identifying
specific practices as an "additional proof requirement,""" all of
the Supreme Court's prior disparate-impact cases had involved spe-
cific challenges to discrete employment practices, such as diploma
174. Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (West Supp. 1992),
Infra Appendix H § 105.
175. Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e(m) (West Supp. 1992), infra Ap-
pendix H § 104.
176. See, e.g., infra note 193 and accompanying text.
177. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 648, 656.
178. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 450 (1982).
179. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 656-57. See also Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust,
487 U.S. 977, 994 (1988).
180. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 657 (quoting Watson, 487 U.S. at 992).
181. Id. at 672 (Stevens, ., dissenting).
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requirements or standardized tests. 182 The Court had consistently
analyzed attacks on an employer's overall employment practices
under a disparate-treatment analysis. For example, in Furnco Con-
struction Corp. v. Waters, the Court held that where plaintiffs chal-
lenged an employer's hiring processes, the case was properly ana-
lyzed as a disparate-treatment case rather than a disparate-impact
case."8 3 The Furnco Court distinguished cases such as Griggs'"
and Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody"5 on the ground that those
cases involved employment tests or "particularized require-
ments."
-I 6
The notion that Title VII had always permitted "bottom line"
disparate-impact challenges is also inconsistent with the "pattern or
practice" cases, such as International Brotherhood of Teamsters v.
United States. 87 In Teamsters, the United States attempted to
support its claims of intentional discrimination by relying upon
statistical disparities. The Court rejected the defendant's argument
that a plaintiff could not establish a violation of Title VII based
solely on a statistical showing,' 8 holding that although the imbal-
ance itself was not unlawful, it was relevant insofar as it tended to
suggest that the employer had engaged in intentional discrimina-
tion.8 9 The Court in Teamsters made clear that imbalance by it-
self does not violate Title VII." If plaintiffs had a burden of
showing only that the overall result of the hiring process was dis-
proportionate, there would have been no need in class cases to
consider whether the disparity was a consequence of intentional
discrimination. This would be especially true if, as opponents of
Wards Cove have argued, the defendant's rebuttal burden is signifi-
182. See infra text accompanying notes 264-66.
183.. Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978) (the case involved an
employer delegating hiring responsibilities to a supervisor, who, in turn, primarily hired
people he had formerly employed).
,184. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
185. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
186. Furnco, 438 U.S. at 575 n.7.
187. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
188. Id. at 340.
189. Id. at 339-40 n.20. See also Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S.
299 (1977).
190. Similarly, in Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249, 1266 (D.C. Cir. f984), cert. denied
sub nor. Meese v. Segar, 471 U.S. 1115 (1985), a case frequently cited by critics of
Wards Cove, the D.C., Circuit compared a pattern-or-practice case, in which the plaintiffs
challenge -the employment system as a whole," and disparate-impact zases, in which
plaintiffs "challenge the disparate impact of specific employment practices."
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canly higher in a disparate-impact case than in a disparate-treat-
ment case.191 Because the makeup of an employer's workforce is
by definition a result of the sum total of its hiring practices, a
theory of liability that is based upon the bottom-line results of the
employer's hiring practices is equivalent to a rule that an absence
of proportional representation in the employer's work force is pri-
ma facie unlawful."9
b. The "Particularity" Requirement under the Civil Rights Act
One of the most contentious issues in the controversy leading
up to the passage of the 1991 Act was whether plaintiffs would
have to identify a specific practice that led to a numerical dispari-
191. The Supreme Court had never permitted disparate-impact challenges based upon the
bottom line, and many Courts of Appeals had been similarly reluctant. The leading case
is Pouncy v. Prudential Ins. Co., 668 F.2d 795 (5th Cir. 1982), in which the plaintiff had
argued that a number of employment practices had resulted in a concentration of blacks
in lower-level positions. The Fifth Circuit rejected this claim, stating that the disparate-
impact theory is not -the appropriate vehicle from which to launch a wide ranging attack
on the cumulative effect of a company's employment practices." Id. at 800. George
Rutherglen, in an article that appeared prior to the controversy engendered by Wards Cove
and its predecessor, Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988), character-
ized this holding of Pouncy as being relatively noncontroversial. He observed, "[a]ll of the
circuits apparently agree with this holding." Rutherglen, supra note 27, at 1339-40 n.175
(citing Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., 810 F.2d 1477, 1485 (9th Cir. 1987) (en
banc), rev'd, 490 U.S. 642 (1989); Rossini v. Ogilvy & Mather, Inc., 798 F.2d 590, 605
(2d Cir. 1986); Griffin v. Board of Regents, 795 F.2d 1281, 1288-89 (7th Cir. 1086);
Robinson v. Polaroid Corp., 732 F.2d 1010, 1014 (1st Cir. 1984); Mortensen v. Callaway,
672 F.2d 822, 824 (10th Cir. 1982)).
192. Many critics of the Wards Cove reasoning understood that the burden they wished
to place upon employers would be an impossible one to meet. For example, the amicus
brief submitted by the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law in Wards Cove
urged the Court not to impose the burden on plaintiffs to demonstrate causation, stating:
[l]t would be virtually impossible for plaintiffs to prove with any more speci-
ficity the causal connection between a particular subjective practice and a par-
ticular disparate impact ... . [Miultiple regression analysis is ill-suited to deal
with unquantifiable variables such as subjective hiring criteria. Indeed, it is
difficult to envision any method of isolating the significance of an individual
subjective practice in such a situation ....
Brief of the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law at 20, Wards Cove Packing
Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989) (No. 87-1387). The Lawyers' -Committee further
stated that "[e]ven to attempt such proof of specific causation is a daunting task," and
reported that in an earlier disparate-impact case in which it had participated, it had been
necessary to review 150,000 pages of records and to incur substantial expense. Id. at 21
n.13. If it is impossible to demonstrate exactly what caused the disparity, as the Lawyers'
Committee suggested, it is equally impossible for the employer to demonstrate the "busi-
ness necessity" of the cause. Therefore, under this standard the employer automatically
/oses, a result that the Lawyers' Committee could scarcely have overlooked.
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ty. The bill as passed is ambiguous on this point.' 9' The Act first
states the general requirement that the plaintiff must demonstrate
that "each particular challenged employment practice causes a dis-
parate impact,""9 but goes on to qualify this requirement by pro-
viding, "except that if the complaining party can demonstrate to the
court that the elements of a respondent's decisionmaking process
are not capable of separation for analysis, the decisionmaking pro-
cess may be analyzed as one employment practice." 95 The criti-
cal issue under this provision will be determining what showing is
necessary to persuade the court that the elements of the employer's
decisionmaking process cannot be separated for analysis. A permis-
sive approach will lead to routine bottom-line challenges and will
substantially impair an employer's ability to select the best person
for the job. On the other hand, a strict approach will lead to infre-
193. New § 703(k)(1)(A) provides in part:
(A) An unlawful employment practice based on disparate impact is established
under this title only if -
(i) a complaining party demonstrates that a respondent uses a
particular employment practice that causes a disparate impact on the
basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin and the respon-
dent fails to demonstrate that the challenged practice is job related
for the position in question and consistent with business necessity;
42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (West Supp. 1992), infra Appendix H § 105.
New § 703(k)(1)(B)(i) provides:
With respect to demonstrating that a particular employment practice causes a
disparate impact as described in subparagraph (A)(i), the complaining paity shall
demonstrate that each particular challenged employment practice causes a dispa-
rate impact, except that if the complaining party can demonstrate to the court
that the elements of a respondent's decisionmaking process are not capable of
separation for analysis, the decisionmaking process may be analyzed as one
employment practice.
Id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(B)(i) (West Supp. 1992), infra Appendix H § 105.
194. Id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(B)(i) (West Supp. 1992), infra Appendix H § 105.
195. Id. The proviso contained in subparagraph (ii) would be difficult to understand if
not for the fact that it appears to be a carryover from earlier versions of the bill. It pro-
vides that "[i]f the respondent demonstrates that a specific employment practice does not
cause the disparate impact, the respondent shall not be required to demonstrate that such
practice is required by business necessity." Id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(B)(ii) (West Supp. 1992),
infra Appendix H § 105. It is unclear how this proviso would ever be called into play
under the enacted bill. Before the employer would get to the point of trying to exonerate
a particular practice, the court would already have decided that the elements of the
employer's decisionmaking were "not capable of separation for analysis." Id § 2000e-
2(k)(1)(B)(i) (West Supp. 1992), infra Appendix H § 105. Unless the court was mistaken
about separability, there is no way that the employer could demonstrate the lack of dispa-
rate impact caused by the practice. This proviso was important only under earlier versions
that allowed the plaintiff to challenge a group of employment practices without also dem-
onstrating their inseparability.
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quent use of this exception.
The statutory language suggests a narrow exception. The "par-
ticularity" requirement is mentioned three times,"9 followed by
an exception that clearly puts the burden of proof on the plaintiff
to demonstrate entitlement to the exception."9 On the other hand,
earlier versions of the Act reveal a very different scheme. The
original 1990 Act permitted a plaintiff to challenge "a group of
employment practices,"' 98 which was defined as "a combination
of employment practices or an overall employment process."' 99 In
response to objections that such a rule would allow routine bottom-
line challenges and thereby increase the pressure on employers to
engage in quota hiring, subsequent versions at least nominally
placed some burden on plaintiffs to attempt to identify the particu-
lar practices involved. For example, the vetoed version of the 1990
Act allowed the plaintiff to challenge a group of employment
practices,2° but it required that the plaintiff identify which spe-
cific practice or practices caused the impact unless the court deter-
mined after discovery that evidence was not available to identify
the cause of the disparity.'O Under such a rule there would never
196. Id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (West Supp. 1992), infra Appendix H § 105 (mentioning
the "particularity" requirement once), and id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(B)(i) (West Supp. 1992),
infra Appendix H § 105 (mentioning the "particularity" requirement twice).
197. Id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(B)(i) (West Supp. 1992), infra Appendix H § 105.
198. S. 2104 § 4, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG. REC. SlO19 (1990), infra Appen-
dix A § 4.
199. S. 2104 § 3, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG. REC. S1019 (1990), infra Appen-
dix A § 3.
200. The term "group of employment practices" was defined as "a combination of em-
ployment practices that produces one or more decisions." Vetoed Version of 1990 Act,
H.R. REP. No. 856 § 3, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG. REC. H9552, H9552 (1990),
infra Appendix D § 3.
201. The bill stated that:
the complaining party shall be required to demonstrate which specific practice
or practices are responsible for the disparate impact in all cases unless the
court finds after discovery (1) that the respondent has destroyed, concealed or
refused to produce existing records that are necessary to make this showing, or
(11) that the respondent failed to keep such records; and except where the court
makes such a finding, the respondent shall be required to demonstrate business
necessity only as to those specific practices demonstrated by the complaining
party to have been responsible in whole or in significant part for the disparate
impact.
H.R. REP. No. 856 § 3, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG. REC. H9552, H9552-53
(1990), infra Appendix D § 4.
The Civil Rights and Women's Equity in Employment Act appeared to place no
burden on the plaintiff to demonstrate an inability to identify the responsible practice. The
Act required only that the plaintiff identify a group of practices. Identification of specific
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be a circumstance under which the employer did not have to justi-
fy bottom-line disparities. If the plaintiff could identify a practice
causing the disparity, then the issue would be joined and the de-
fendant would be put to its proof. If the plaintiff could not identify
such a practice, then the exception would apply and the defendant
would still be put to its proof.
Unlike earlier versions, the enacted version does not allow
cumulation simply on a showing that the plaintiff is unable to
separate out the components. Instead, the Act calls for a more rig-
orous approach. In the enacted version, the elements must not be
capable of separation for analysis. The plaintiff has the burden of
proving that he is entitled to rely on that exception and cannot
satisfy that burden merely by showing that he has been unable to
identify those elements or that it would be Very difficult or expen-
sive to do so. Furthermore, the "incapable of separation" standard
places a substantially greater burden on the plaintiff than earlier
versions of the Act, which would have required the plaintiff to
show only that the employer's records do not reveal the effect of
the various components of the practices.
Plaintiffs commonly attempt to demonstrate discrimination
through the statistical technique of multiple regression analysis.
Using this technique, the plaintiff separates the effects of the vari-
practices was required only if the court found that the complaining party could identify
which practices contributed to the impact:
(B) a complaining party demonstrates that a group of employment practices
results in a disparate impact on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or na-
tional origin, and the respondent fails to demonstrate that such group of em-
ployment practices is required by business necessity, except that -
(i) except as provided in clause (iii), if a complaining party demon-
strates that a group of employment practices results in a disparate
impact, such party shall not be required to demonstrate which specif-
ic practice or practices within the group results in such disparate
impact;
(iii) if the court finds that the complaining party can identify, from
records or other information of the respondent reasonably available
(through discovery or otherwise), which specific practice or practices
contributed to the disparate impact -
(1) the complaining party shall be required to demonstrate which
specific practice or practices contributed to the disparate im-
pact ....
Civil Rights and Women's Equity in Employment Act of 1991, H.R. I § 202, 102d
Cong., 1st Seass, 137 CONG. REC. H3876, H3879 (1991), infra Appendix F § 202.
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ous components of a selection system."n The particularity provi-
sion appears to place the burden of performing this analysis on the
plaintiff rather than placing it on the employer whenever the plain-
tiff shows a bottom-line disparity.
Most significantly, a narrow view of the cumulation provision
is consistent with the disavowal of all parties to the debate of any
intention to encourage employers to hire by the numbers.' 3 A
liberal interpretation of the cumulation provision would create
substantial incentives for employers to engage in quota hiring. If
the obligation to identify the responsible practices is easily dis-
pensed with, statistical disparities become presumptively illegal.
When a statute converts a statistical disparity into liability for
discrimination, many employers will attempt to avoid the statute's
consequences by ensuring that their work forces are statistically
balanced.0 4
202. See Bartholet, supra note 41, at 999 (suggesting that statistical analysis can deter-
mine what factors are important in decisionmaing "even if the employer has no clear
policies setting the weight for various objective and subjective factors").
203. For example, § 13 of the vetoed 1990 Act provided that "[n]othing in the amend-
ments made by this Act shall be construed to require or encourage an employer to adopt
hiring or promotion quotas on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."
H.RL REP. No. 856 § 13, lost Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG. REC. H9552, H9554 (1990),
infra Appendix D § 13. See supra note 42 for a discussion of the disavowal of quotas
by supporters of the legislation.
204. What little "official" legislative history there is also indicates that the exception is
to be given a narrow meaning. According to the interpretive memorandum, in order for
cumulation to be appropriate, the plaintiff must identify "particular, functionally-integrated
practices" and these must be -components of the same criterion, standard, method of
administration, or test." 137 CONG. REC. S15,276 (1991). Only under these circumstances
can practices be analyzed as a single employment practice.
The parties to the compromise attempted to place a very different "spin" on the
meaning of this provision. On the one hand, Senator Edward Kennedy viewed it as very
broad, identifying three classes of cases in which it would be called into play: (1) where
determination of the specific impact is made impossible because the employer "subjective-
ly combines together several practices"; (2) where, after a diligent effort, the plaintiff is
unable to obtain information that allows him to identify specific practices causing the
disparate impact; and (3) where the employer's processes include -particular, functionally
integrated practices which are components of the same criterion, standard, method of ad-
ministration, or test .. . " Id at S15,234 (statement of Sen. Kennedy). Only the third
situation finds any direct support in the "official" legislative history. The prior two are
standards contained in previously rejected versions of the Act.
On the other hand, an interpretive memorandum placed in the record by Senator
Dole viewed this as a very limited exception. The only example he gave besides the
height-and-weight requirement was a challenge to an entire paper-and-pencil test without
the need to challenge individual questions. Id. at S15,472, S15,474. See also id. at
S15,315-19 (statement of Sen. Hatch). Even if reliance on these statements were not fore-
closed by the Act, the disparity between them would severely limit their utility as inter-
pretive aids.
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A broad interpretation of the exception would create a blanket
authorization for bottom-line challenges and frustrate an employer's
good-faith efforts to obtain employees who are more than minimal-
ly qualified. Employers who reject the safe harbor of quota hiring
might still avoid liability by relying on standards that could un-
questionably pass muster under the most stringent standards. How-
ever, under a bottom-line rule, the employer could do so only in
those instances where it used discrete requirements on an "up or
down" basis.
Where the employer maintains minimum qualifications, it is
usually not terribly difficult to ascertain their effects. On the other
hand, whenever an employer makes judgments based upon an
applicant's overall qualifications, a broad view of the exception
would make the employer's bottom-line statistics subject to chal-
lenge in virtually every case. Consequently, the employer would
have little chance of mounting an effective defense.
Most of the debate over the Act focused on the minimum
qualifications considered by the employer as absolutely necessary
attributes of a successful applicant. Some members of Congress
seemed to assume that employers do most of their hiring by elimi-
nating those who lack the minimum qualifications and then ran-
domly hiring from the remaining applicants. While this assumption
arguably holds true for the hiring decisions for some entry-level
positions, it applies to little else.205 The notion that employees,
even at the unskilled entry level, are fungible is simply incorrect.
Although all potential applicants may possess the requisite job
skills, they probably will not be equally good employees. In ad-
dition to possessing job skills, a good employee is punctual, dedi-
cated, honest, reliable, able to get along with co-workers and su-
pervisors, and does not present discipline problems. An employer
will take these factors into account in any hiring decision, thus
205. See, e.g., Elizabeth Bartholet on fungibility:
Subjective assessments play a role in most upper level employment decisions
regarding hiring, promotion, job placement, and salary. Tests and objective
criteria such as education and experience requirements are ordinarily used on
the upper level primarily as minimumn qualifications for certain positions. Once
minimum qualifications are met, they and other objective criteria are usually
considered only as part of an overall subjective assessment, which is typically
based on a variety of subjective procedures: an interview, an evaluation of
biographical information, and evaluation of performance in previous educational
or work settings.
Bartholet, supra note 41, at 973.
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going beyond objective requirements such as skill level. If the Act
is interpreted on the assumption that employers hire at random
from the pool of minimally qualified applicants, the use of mini-
mum qualifications will not be the primary casualty of the Act;
instead, it will be the efforts of employers to find the most quali-
fied employees that will be outlawed.
Consider how the bottom-line principle would apply in the
following example: An employer establishes as minimum qualifica-
tions for the position of secretary one year's prior experience, a
high school diploma, and the ability to pass a typing and spelling
test. The "qualified applicant pool" consists of all applicants who
satisfy these properly validated requirements. If the employer hires
randomly from this pool, the racial composition of its work force
should approximate the racial composition of the qualified applicant
pool and it need not worry about disparate-impact challenges.
But what if the employer does not hire randomly from within
the pool? What if, instead, the employer decides that it will at-
tempt to hire the best person? Thus, when there are multiple appli-
cants for a single position, the employer considers everything that
it believes relevant to predicting the quality of an employee, in-
cluding: (1) the applicant's demeanor in the interview; (2) the
number of years the applicant has been in the field as well as the
length of tenure in prior positions; (3) the quality of the applicant's.
prior experience; (4) contents of letters of recommendation; (5)
education beyond the minimum job requirements; (6) a score above
the minimum on the typing and spelling test; and (7) anything else,
either positive or negative, that might be in an applicant's record
that sheds any light on his ability or experience. For any given
employment decision, these "plus factors" will play a greater or
lesser role depending upon the number and profile of applicants. If
there is only one applicant for a given position, they will play no
role at all.
After three years of following the above procedure in a race-
blind way, a disappointed, minimally qualified minority applicant
sues the employer on the ground that the sum total of the
employer's employment process has had a disparate impact on
minorities as measured by minority representation in the employer's
secretarial work force. At that point, the scope of the particularity
requirement becomes critical because it determines whether the
plaintiff must identify some specific element of the employer's
decisionmaking that is responsible for the impact - thereby requir-
ing the employer to defend only that particular element - or whe-
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ther it is enough to point to the bottom-line disparity and assert
that because everything that the employer considers has contributed
to the outcome, the entire process is subject to challenge. By al-
lowing a challenge based on bottom-line disparity, a court will
require the employer to defend every aspect of any applicant's
record that it has ever considered in making hiring judgments.
For the employer, a great deal is at stake in determining the
scope of the cumulation provision. If the plaintiff in the above
example has established a prima facie case, then under the Act the
employer must prove that something is justified. The exact nature
of that something is not entirely clear, however. Either the employ-
er must show that every factor that it has ever considered in mak-
ing employment decisions is justified, or it must show that the
hiring process itself is justified. Even if the employer validates
every factor that it has ever considered in making employment
decisions, it may still be liable unless it can show that one or more
of the validated practices actually caused all of the disparate im-
pact. Otherwise, the disparity is still unexplained. Under a rule that
makes a disparity itself prima facie unlawful, unexplained disparity
necessarily produces employer liability. Were this the rule, perverse
effects would follow. Even if the effect is not quota hiring (and at
times it will be), an interpretation of the Act that ignores the reali-
ty that rational persons change their behavior in response to threats
of legal liability will produce a great deal of mischief in terms of
efficiency and fairness. Such an interpretation is grounded in a
simplistic model of employer decision-making that does not exist in
the real world. Ironically, an interpretation based on this false
model would promote a simplistic form of decisionmaking in
which race and sex are as important in hiring decisions as are the
few job qualifications that employers would still be permitted to
consider. Although some of the critics of Wards Cove demonstrate
a profound suspicion of the use of employment qualifications,2
there are in fact legitimate bases for assessing job qualifica-
tions.2" Therefore, a categorical hostility toward job qualifica-
tions should not be implied into the new Act.
The difficulty that employers face in defending their selection
206. See 137 CONG. REC. H3834, H3845 (1991) (statement of Rep. Torres); Pamela L.
Perry, Two Faces of Disparate Impact Discrimination, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 523, 554
(1991) (the ill-defined nature of subjective criteria makes them susceptible to concealed
discrimination).
207. See, e.g., Lemer, supra note 58, at 279.
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criteria is that whether they opt for "objective" or "subjective"
criteria, they will be subject to criticism, often by the same people.
If employers use objective criteria, such as test scores, they are
criticized because they are trying to reduce people to numbers.
Instead, employers are told that they should consider the "whole
person." After all, some people who do poorly on standardized
tests will be good employees, and there may be something in an
applicant's record to Suggest that the test score is not a good mea-
sure of that person's qualifications."°a
On the other hand, if the employer does attempt to measure the
whole person, the employer is criticized for using "subjective"
criteria, since, given the infinite variety of background and experi-
ence that applicants may have, there is no way to quantify the total
qualifications of the applicants. For many, the very subjectivity of
the selection process is suspect, because it gives the employer the
opportunity to engage in either conscious or unconscious discrimi-
nation.' However, it must be remembered that even if multiple
subjective criteria may not be challenged under the disparate-impact
theory, they may still be challenged under a disparate-treatment
theory as long as the plaintiff asserts that the employer is deliber-
ately discriminating. 210
In applying anti-discrimination laws, courts must bear in mind
that separating the competent from the incompetent, the highly
qualified from the minimally qualified, and the minimally qualified
from the unqualified, all require human judgment. If we want
208. This point was recognized by the Supreme Court:
The facts of this case demonstrate the inadequacy of broad and general testing
devices as well as the infirmity of using diplomas or degrees as fixed measures
of capability. History is filled with examples of men and women who rendered
highly effective performance without the conventional badges of accomplishment
in terms of certificates, diplomas, or degrees. Diplomas and tests are useful
servants, but Congress has mandated the commonsense proposition that they are
not to become masters of reality.
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433 (1971).
209. See, e.g., Bibbs v. Block, 749 F.2d 508, 512 (8th Cir. 1984) (discussing the sus-
pect subjective nature of the selection pr ocedure); Martinez v. El Paso County, 710 F.2d
1102, 1104 n.2 (5th Cir. 1983) (discussing the suspect nature of subjective evaluations
because they provide an easy way to discriminate). Cf. Nanty v. Barrows Co., 660 F.2d
1327, 1334 (9th Cir. 1981) (although the same potential for abuse of subjective criteria
exists for low-level and high-level jobs, the necessity of employing subjective criteria for
higher-echelon employment makes use of subjective criteria less "inherently suspect").
210. See Blumoff & Lewis, supra note 15, at 38 ("In fact, insistence on reliable evi-
dance that an identified practice caused an adverse impact is reasonable, particularly since
most intentionally discriminatory uses of unidentifiable or immeasurable discretionary prac-
tices will be redressable through individual or systemic evidence of disparate treatment.").
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employers to engage in those endeavors, we must be willing to
accept that they will in fact be exercising judgment, rather than
complaining whenever judgment is involved.211 It must also be
recognized that as applicants become less and less fungible, selec-
tion criteria must become more and more subjective. 212
Subjectivity does not imply arbitrariness. There is a common
but incorrect assumption that if an employer cannot quantify its
hiring or promotion decisions, the employer does not take the
process sufficiently seriously or wishes to mask invidious discrimi-
nation. When it is argued that hiring decisions are not always
based upon quantifiable variables and that an undue burden should
not be placed upon employers to defend their decisions, the argu-
ment is taken to imply that the employers' decisions are so arbi-
trary that even they cannot figure out how they made them. Al-
211.
Courts striking down lower level subjective systems have often suggested that
systems based on purely objective criteria would be preferable. It is not clear
that this solution is particularly good on the lower level, and it certaintly does
not make much sense on the upper level. Few would argue, for example, that
business managers should be promoted solely on the basis of seniority or that
academics should be hired on the basis of the number of hours taught or pages
published.
[C]ourts often refer to the need for guidelines specifying the weight to be
given various factors. But predictive judgments about how people will perform
complex jobs may best be made by entrusting an intelligent decisionmaker with
discretion to make an overall assessment. In fact, employers at the upper level
have rarely chosen to use elaborate weighing schemes, presumably because no
one is sure exactly what factors make for success and how important each is.
Bartholet, supra note 41, at 1006-08.
212. Some people tend to associate fungibility with the status of the job, the notion
being that applicants are fuigible for lower-level jobs, whereas for higher level jobs they
are not. See id. at 957. Thus, some have argued, subjective criteria are appropriate when
hiring lawyers but not when hiring police officers. See Elaine W. Shoben, Probing the
Discriminatory Effects of Employee Selection Procedures with Disparate Impact Analysis
Under Title VII, 56 TEX. L. REV. 1, 33 (1977) (discussing the fungibility of applicants
for jobs requiring skills that are easily obtained or commonly possessed by large numbers
of people such as police officers, fire fighters, many factory workers, and bank tellers).
The relevant distinction, however, is not between high-level and low-level jobs; it is
between complex and simple jobs. The distinction is important, because many "low-level-
jobs, such as police officer, are in fact quite complex. See Lemer, supra note 59, at 279.
As Barbara Lerner has pointed out, the job of a police officer is a very complex one, but
the usual requirement is only a high school degree. Id. at 283. Many of the complex
traits necessary for the job, such as physical courage and good judgment in a variety of
tense situations are not easily measured. It is only a form of elitism that suggests that
uneducated people are fungible, while educated people are not. See Lemer, supra note 63,
at 31, 32.
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though a nice rhetorical point, the argument misses the mark.
To say that it is impractical, if not impossible, to assign nu-
merical values to every attribute of each applicant does not mean
that a decision favoring one applicant over another is arbitrary. It
merely reflects the fact that people do not ordinarily make deci-
sions in an entirely quantifiable way. This is due, in large part, to
the difficulty of knowing ahead of time how much weight to give
a particular attribute in the absence of knowledge of all of the
other attributes of all the other options under consideration.213
The employer may be behaving in a perfectly rational manner, but
with so many attributes to consider it would be very difficult to
construct a model that would allow such judgments to be quanti-
fied in advance.
Deciding which applicant to hire or which employee to pro-
mote is necessarily a subjective process. Such a decision is similar
in its subjectivity to other important decisions that we take quite
seriously, such as the selection of a spouse, a home, a college, or
a presidential candidate. Although most of us are reasonably confi-
dent that we have very good reasons for our choices, few of us
could satisfy a court of law that our decisions were the best ones
or even provide a replicable blueprint describing how the decisions
were made. Few of us believe that a better decision would have
been made by assigning varying numbers of positive and negative
points for each attribute that was relevant and then accepting the
choice dictated by the formula.
Important life decisions are not criticized for their frivolity
because they were not reached by a quantifiable process. There is
no reason to impose a greater burden of justification on an em-
ployer, and there is no way for an employer to satisfy such a bur-
den. Yet, a bottom-line approach would place this more stringent
burden on an employer. If an employer's work force reflects imbal-
ance at the bottom line and the employer is unable to justify that
imbalance objectively, it is assumed that the employer is somehow
at fault, if not because the hiring process is infected with discrimi-
nation, then because the employer has failed to ensure that its em-
ployment decisions are made "rationally."
213. An appropriate analogy would be the prospective home buyer who, at the outset,
might believe that a large backyard is very important and be unwilling to buy a house
without this feature. However, the buyer may end up finding a house that has a great
studio or a terrific wine cellar and decide to buy it even though it also has a small back-
yard.
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Opponents of subjective employment criteria fail to realize that
the more important a decision, the less likely it is that an objective
method will be employed to make it.2 14 Employers have a vital
interest in selecting the best possible employees, and most take the
selection decision quite seriously. It would be a mistake to interpret
the Civil Rights Act in such a way as to codify a misplaced suspi-
cion of subjective criteria, but the bottom-line approach to subjec-
tive criteria would do exactly that.215 An employer would be
faced with two options. First, the employer could eliminate the use
of all subjective considerations, hiring randomly or relying solely
on objective criteria that can be validated. Few employers will
choose this option because the selection of employees is too im-
portant for the employer to abandon reliance on qualifications or,
except perhaps in the case of some entry-level positions, to dele-
gate the decision to the designers of standardized tests. Even if
employers were otherwise disposed toward standardized tests, the
validation requirements applied to these tests can often be so diffi-
cult and expensive to satisfy that employers, at least in the private
sector, have substantially reduced reliance on them.216
Second, employers could continue to use subjective multifacet-
ed judgments while simultaneously protecting against liability under
Title VII. To accomplish this, they would, to the extent possible,
rely on the qualifications necessary to maintain quality in the
workforce, but at the same time ensure that there is no disparity at
the bottom line by engaging in race- or sex-conscious hiring. Em-
ployers would select some employees not because they are the best
candidates but because they are the appropriate race or sex.217
214. For example, the decision of what brand of gasoline to buy is based almost en-
tirely on two objective criteria: location of the gas station and price. On the other hand,
the decision of what car to buy to put the gasoline in is a much more multifaceted sub-
jective judgment. Price and location of the dealership are relevant, but many more, often
unquantifiable, factors, go into the decision: judgments about reliability, safety, image,
reputation of the manufacturer, performance, appearance, place of manufacture, as well as
the way it makes the owner feel. Although many consumers have strong brand preferenc-
es for automobiles, the diversity of those preferences demonstrates their subjectivity.
215. See Bartholet, supra note 41, at 1026-27 (urging adoption of quotas on the ground
that subjective criteria cannot be validated effectively).
216. See James Owartney et al., Statistics, the Law and Tie VII: An Economists' View,
54 NOTRE DAME LAW. 633, 643 (1979) (estimating that it costs $20,000 to $100,000 to
validate a single test).
217. Although Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982), establishes that the employer
is not completely immunized by the absence of bottom-line disparities, lawsuits are sub-
stantially less likely to be filed where there is proportional representation.
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In sum, bottom-line challenges must be the exception under the
Act, rather than the rule. Congress did not intend to outlaw the
selection of the best person for the job or to force employers to
pay for the privilege of doing so by adopting hiring quotas. A
broad interpretation of the "not capable of separation for analysis"
exception would indeed make the Act a "quota bill."
3. The Standard of "Business Necessity"
a. Wards Cove
The Wards Cove formulation of the employer's justification -
that the practice is justified if it "serves, in a significant way, the
legitimate employment goals of the employer" 21 ' - was respon-
sible for a great deal of the outcry against Wards Cove, the asser-
tion being that the Court was retreating from a test of strict neces-
sity. Much of the confusion derived from the Griggs Court's use
of the phrase "business necessity," a phrase that is not self-defining
and that has been the subject of a great deal of disagreement. The
term "business necessity," which was used in Griggs as a short-
hand expression, seems to have assumed a talismanic significance
for some courts and commentators. A more thorough examination
of both the analysis and language of Griggs reveals that the Court
did not lay down a test of "strict necessity," but rather a test of
"job relatedness" or "non-arbitrariness." Wards Cove preserved this
test.
219
Introducing the phrase "business necessity" into the law of
Title VII, the Court in Griggs stated: "The Act proscribes not only
overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but
discriminatory in operation. The touchstone is business necessity. If
an employment practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot
be shown to be related to job performance, the practice is prohibit-
ed."' The phrase "related to job performance" is key to the
analysis of Griggs. The Court in Griggs did not hold that testing
requirements were permissible only if the employer could not run
its business without them, or if effective job performance was
impossible without them, or if it had a compelling need to use
218. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 659.
219. See also Hamer v. City of Atlanta, 872 F.2d 1521, 1533 (11th Cir. 1989)
("Business necessity is closely akin to job relatedness and the terms are often inter-
changed.").
220. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
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them.22' Instead, it held that testing requirements could not be
used unless they were "job related. " ' 2 If the requirements were
job-related, they satisfied the test of "business necessity."223 The
Court's opinion reveals that it was concerned with the imposition
of arbitrary requirements that tended to exclude minorities. As the
Court stated, "What is required by Congress is the removal of arti-
ficial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment when the
barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial or
other impermissible classification." 24
If the Court in Griggs meant, as Justice Stevens argued in
Wards Cove, that a selection device must be "essential to effective
221. Id.
222. Although the phrase "business necessity" appears in the Griggs opinion only once,
and then in the context of the "job related" idea, id., the concept of "job-relatedness"
appears repeatedly. For example, the following statements are contained in Griggs.
"If an employment practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown
to be related to job performance, the practice is prohibited." Id. at 431 (em-
phasis added).
"On the record before us, neither the high school completion requirement nor
the general intelligence test is shown to bear a demonstrable relationship to
successfil performance of the jobs for which it was used." Id. (emphasis add-
ed).
"Both were adopted . . . without meaningful study of their relationship to job-
performance ability." Id. (emphasis added).
"Congress has placed on the employer the burden of showing that any given
requirement must have a manifest relationship to the' employment in question."
Id. at 432 (emphasis added).
"The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, having enforcement responsi-
bility, has issued guidelines interpreting section 703(h) to permit only the use
of job-related tests." Id. at 433 (emphasis added).
"The [EEOC] guidelines demand that employers using tests have available 'data
demonstrating that the test is predictive of or significantly correlated with im-
portant elements of work behavior. .. ." Id. at 433 n.9 (emphasis added).
"Nothing in the Act precludes the use of testing or measuring procedures; obvi-
ously they are useful. What Congress has forbidden is giving these devices and
mechanisms controlling force unless they are demonstrably a reasonable mea-
sure of job performance." Id. at 436 (emphasis added).
"What Congress has commanded is that any tests used must measure the per-
son for the job and not the person in the abstract." Id. (emphasis added).
223. Id. at 432.
224. Id. at 431.
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job performance,"' it is curious that the Court had never held
that a selection device that it believed was "job related" was none-
theless invalid because it was not "essential."6 Instead, the
Court consistently inquired whether a challenged requirement was
related to the job.' The only support that Justice Stevens pro-
vided for his argument that a practice with a disparate impact must
be "essential" is a passage from Dothard v. Rawlinson that he
modified to support his point:z2 "Later, we held that prison ad-
ministrators had failed to 'rebu[t] the prima facie case of discrimi-
nation by showing that the height and weight requirements are ...
essential to effective job performance."' n9 A look at the actual
passage in Dothard reveals a very different thought:
225. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 671 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Dothard v.
Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 331 (1977)).
226. In fact, just the opposite was done in New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440
U.S. 568 (1979), and Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), in which the Court
upheld practices with a lesser showing than strict necessity.
227. Justice Stevens' dissent in Wards Cove neatly summarizes the kind of showing the
Court has required. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 668 n.14 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In ad-
dressing a different point - whether the employer's burden is one of production or per-
suasion - Justice Stevens included the following footnote:
See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S., at 802, n.14. See also, e.g., Teal, 457 U.S.,
at 446 ("employer must . .. demonstrate that 'any given requirement [has] a
manifest relationship to the employment in question'"); New York City Transit
Authority v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 587 (1979) (employer "rebutted" prima facie
case by "demonstration that its narcotics rule ... 'is job related"); Dothard v.
Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977) (employer has to "prov[e] that the chal-
lenged requirements are job related-); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S.
405, 425 (1975) (employer has "burden of proving that its tests are 'job
related'"); Griggs, 401 U.S., at 432 (employer has "burden of showing that any
given requirement must have a manifest relationship to the employment")
(emphasis added).
Id. See also supra note 131 and accompanying text.
Justice Stevens' profession of astonishment a few pages later at the majority's
rejection of a requirement that the practice be "essential" is puzzling in light of his repe-
tition of the job-relatedness standard in footnote 14. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 671; Cf
Belton, supra note 22, at 1381 ("The 'legitimate business justification' rule does not fol-
low the Griggs standard which required a defendant to prove that a challenged practice is
.essential' or 'indispensable' to the operation of its business"); Player, supra note 27, at
31-32 ("In sum, 'necessity' no longer means, as the dictionary tells us, 'essential,' 'abso-
lutely required,' or 'indispensable'; it means only 'legitimate' and 'significant'"). Critics
who rely on the dictionary definition of the term "necessary" tend to overlook the fact
that a definition found in some dictionaries is "not to be dispensed with without loss,
damage, inefficiency or the like." WmsTE's NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGUSH LANGUAGE 1635 (2d ed. 1957).
228. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
229. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 671 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Dothard v. Rawlin-
son, 433 U.S. 321, 331 (1977)).
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We turn, therefore, to the appellants' argument that they
have rebutted the prima facie case of discrimination by
showing that the height and weight requirements are job
related. These requirements, they say, have a relationship to
strength, a sufficient but unspecified amount of which is
essential to effective job performance as a correctional
counselor.'
The Dothard Court then continued: "If the job-related quality that
appellants identify is bona fide, their purpose could be achieved by
adopting and validating a test for applicants that measures strength
directly.""' Thus, the Court held, if the employer could show
that strength was related to the job - not essential to the job -
the employer could legitimately impose a strength requirement. 2
Justice Stevens' dissent in American Tobacco, Co. v.
Pattersone33 also reflects an understanding of the "business neces-
sity" requirement that is much different from his exposition in
Wards Cove. In American Tobacco, Justice Stevens argued that the
Griggs analysis should be applied to attacks against seniority sys-
tems ' - a position that was rejected by the American Tobacco
majority." Justice Stevens argued that such an approach would
not place an undue burden on employers because "[i]f the initiation
of a new seniority system - or the modification of an existing
system - is substantially related to a valid business purpose, the
230. Dothard, 433 U.S. at 331 (emphasis added).
231. Id. at 332.
232. Footnote 14 in Dothard arguably supplies some support to the contrary. That foot-
note rejects the argument that public employers should be granted greater deference than
private employers: "Thus for both private and public employers, "[t]he touchstone is busi-
ness necessity,' Griggs, 401 U.S., at 431; a discriminatory employment practice must be
shown to be necessary to safe and efficient job performance to survive a Title VII chal-
lenge." Dothard, 433 U.S. at 331-32 n.14.
The term "necessary" is used in the context of the discussion of Griggs, which
makes clear.that the test is one of job-relatedness. Moreover, this footnote is contained in
a paragraph that begins: "We turn, therefore, to the appellants' argument that they have
rebutted the prima facie case of discrimination by showing that the height and weight
requirements are job related." Id. at 331. If the Court were truly holding that the test is
one of strict necessity, the above-quoted sentence should have been followed by one that
read: "Even if they have made a showing that the requirements are job related, that is no
defense because the standard is one of strict necessity." Instead, the Court went on to
discuss whether the defendants had shown that the requirement was job related. Id
233. 456 U.S. 63 (1982).
234. Id. at 89-90 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
235. Id. at 69-70.
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system is lawful." 6 Thus, at the time of American Tobacco, Jus-
tice Stevens' understanding of what Griggs required was remark-
ably similar to the test contained in Wards Cove: "substantially
related to a valid business purpose" 237 in the former, and "serves,
in a significant way, the legitimate employment goals of the em-
ployer" 238 in the latter.
The Court in New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer also
rejected a requirement of strict necessity in an opinion written,
ironically enough, by Justice Stevens.239 In Beazer, the Court
considered a disparate-impact challenge to the exclusion of metha-
done users under the New York City Transit Authority's anti-nar-
cotics policy.2  The Court described the relevant issue as wheth-
er the employer's "[legitimate employment] goals are significantly
served by - even if they do not require" the challenged prac-
tice."' The Court held that the employer met the standard be-
cause it demonstrated that the practice bore, in the words of
Griggs, a "manifest relationship to the employment in ques-
tion." 24
2
236. Id. at 90 (Stevens, ., dissenting). Justice Stevens' full statement was:
The Court's strained reading of [§ 703(h)] may be based on an assumption that
if the Griggs standard were applied to the adoption of a post-Act seniority
system, most post-Act systems would be unlawful since it is virtually impossi-
ble to establish a seniority system whose classification of employees will not
have a disparate impact on members of some race or sex. Under Griggs, how-
ever, illegality does not follow automatically from a disparate impact. If the
initiation of a new seniority system - or the modification of an existing system
- is substantially related to a valid business purpose, the system is lawful.
"The touchstone is business necessity." Griggs, supra at 431; cf. New York City
Transit Authority v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 587. A reasoned application of
Griggs would leave ample room for bona fide systems; the adoption of a se-
niority system often may be justified by the need to induce experienced
employees to remain, to establish fair rules of advancement, or to reward con-
tinuous, effective service.
Id. at 89-90 (emphasis added).
237. Id.
238. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 659.
239. New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 570 (1979).
240. Id. at 576-77.
241. Id. at 587 n.31.
242. Id. (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power, 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971)). The Beazer stan-
dard, given its similarity to the standard articulated in Wards Cove, embarrasses those
who argue that Wards Cove was an unprecedented departure from an unbroken line of
cases dating from Griggs. See, e.g., Player, supra note 27, at 23 (In Watson, the Court
"embraced a version unlike any used in the lower courts. This standard was reminiscent
of Beazer's long-ignored (if not forgotten) footnote thirty-one."); id. at 29 ("notwithstand-
ing a cryptic closing comment in Beazer's infamous footnote thirty-one, the lower courts
and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission agreed that when the plaintiff proved
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Similarly, in Washington v. Davis, 3 the Court upheld a ver-
bal-ability test on the ground that "some minimum verbal and com-
municative skill would be very useful, if not essential, to satisfac-
tory progress in the training regimen."' The Court based its de-
cision on the "positive relationship between the test and training-
course performance." 245 Justice Stevens, concurring, again demon-
strated his understanding of the Griggs rule. He explained his
belief that the tests were valid, as follows: "ITihe test serves the
neutral and legitimate purpose of requiring all applicants to meet a
uniform minimum standard of literacy. Reading ability is manifestly
relevant to the police function .. .."246 According to Justice
Stevens, the test was valid because of "a correlation between suc-
cess on the test and success in the training program." 247 Again,
this is not the language of strict business necessity. Even Justice
Brennan's dissent in Washington v. Davis did not take issue with
the majority's view that the correct inquiry was whether a corre-
lation existed between the test scores and performance. Instead, he
argued only that it was impermissible to rely upon the correlation
between test scores and training-program performance without a
showing that there was a correlation between training-program
performance and later job performance.2'
Justice Blackmun, who dissented separately in Wards Cove and
also joined Justice Stevens' dissent, at one time also took a very
different view from the one that the dissenters in Wards Cove sug-
gested had always been the law. In Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, the Court applied the EEOC Guidelines on employee test-
ing and held that the employer's validation study was defec-
the adverse impact of a particular device, the employer's burden in establishing 'business
necessity' was one of proof - of persuading the fact finder of the justification for using
the exclusionary device."); Caldwell, supra note 58, at 597 ("The only case in which the
Court appears to depart from a Robinson-like approach to business necessity is New York
City Transit Authority v. Beazer. Some lower courts have responded to Beazer by relaxing
the quantum of proof required of the defendant to satisfy the second element of the Rob-
inson test. However, the peculiar facts of Beazer more than adequately explain the Court's
seemingly liberal treatment of the defendant's business necessity proof.").
243. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
244. Id. at 250. Although Washington v. Davis was not technically a Title VII case, the
Court assumed that Title VII standards would apply.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 256 (Stevens, ., concurring).
247. Id.
248. Id. at 262 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 43:287
1993] THE CIVIL PJGH7S ACT OF 1991 345
rive.249 Justice Blackmun declined to join the majority opinion
because of what he perceived as the majority's over-reliance on the
stringent guidelines. Then, in a prescient warning concrning
an overly strict standard of justification, Justice Blackmun stated:
I fear that a too-rigid application of the EEOC Guidelines
will leave the employer little choice, save an impossibly
expensive and complex validation study, but to engage in a
subjective quota system of employment selection. This, of
course, is far from the intent of Title VII.25 1
Further evidence that the standard of "business necessity" es-
poused by the Wards Cove dissenters is at variance with prior law
lies in the treatment of alternatives.252 Under pre-Wards Cove
case law, once the defendant showed that the challenged practice
was job related, the plaintiff could still prevail by demonstrating
alternatives having less adverse impact. In Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, the Court clearly placed the burden of showing such alter-
natives on the plaintiff. 3 That rule was reaffirmed in Wards
Cove.' Defining "business necessity" to mean "essential to ef-
249. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 431-36 (1975).
250. Justice Blackmun stated:
I cannot join, however, in the Court's apparent view that absolute compliance
with the EEOC Guidelines is a sine qua non of pre-employment test valida-
tion. ... The simple truth is that pre-employment tests, like most attempts to
predict the future, will never be completely accurate. We should bear in mind
that pre-employment testing, so long as it is fairly related to the job skills or
work characteristics desired, possesses the potential of being an effective weap-
on in protecting equal employment opportunity because it has a unique capacity
to measure all applicants objectively on a standardized basis.
Id. at 449 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
In Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988), Justice Blackmun
again described his view of the law: "The criterion must directly relate to a prospective
employee's ability to perform the job effectively." Id. at 1005 (Blackmm, J., concurring).
251. Albemarle Paper, 422 U.S. at 449. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
252. Commentators frequently refer to the question as whether there are less "discrimi-
natory" alternatives to the challenged practice. See, e.g., Blumoff & Lewis, supra note 15,
at 17; Joel W. Friedman, Redefining Equality, Discrimination, and Affirmative Action Un-
der Tile VII. The Access Principle, 65 TOx. L. REV. 41, 51 n.40 (1986); Caldwell, supra
note 58, at 602; Julia Lamnber, Alternatives to Challenged Employee Selection Criteria:
The Significance of Nonstatistical Evidence in Disparate Impact Cases Under Title VII,
1985 WiSc. L. REV. 1, 13; Player, supra note 27, at 20. The Supreme Court has never
characterized alternatives with a lesser impact as "less discriminatory," suggesting that the
Court may not share the assumption of the commentators that job-related requirements
having a disparate impact are "discriminatory.-
,253. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. at 425, 436.
254. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
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fective job performance" as Justice Stevens suggested in his dissent
in Wards Cove,255 would necessarily place on the defendant the
burden of showing that there are no alternatives that would have a
lesser impact. 6 If there were an alternative with a lesser impact,
then the practice having the greater impact cannot be said to be
"essential." It makes no sense to suggest that the Court had always
required the defendant to prove that the practice was essential but
had placed the burden on the plaintiff to prove the existence of
less discriminatory alternatives."
Even if pre-Wards Cove case law did not require that the chal-
lenged practice be "essential to effective job performance," the
question still remains whether the Wards Cove formulation of the
standard - that the challenged practice must "serv[e], in a signifi-
cant way, the legitimate employment goals of the employer" -
differs from the standard of "job-relatedness" articulated by the
Court repeatedly in prior. cases.s The Court stated that it had
"phrased the query differently in different cases," but that the fun-
damental question remained the same, suggesting that the Court did
not believe it was announcing a new standard.29 However, one
might ask why the Court used this different terminology if it was
not announcing a new standard.
The answer to this question appears to be two-fold. First, the
Court's terminology was not new." ° In fact, the formulation em-
255. Id. at 671 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321,
331 (1977)).
256. See, e.g., Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 n.7 (4th Cir.), cert.
dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971) ("It should go without saying that a practice is hardly
'necessary' if an alternative practice better effectuates the intended purpose or is equally
effective but less discriminatory.").
257. Cf. Mack A. Player.
Viable alternatives to the challenged device could establish that the device was
unnecessary and thus unjustified. Logically, if the employer must prove that a
device is in fact "necessary" (as defined in the dictionary to mean "essential"),
proof that alternatives exist establishes that the device is not "necessary" or
"essential."
Player, supra note 27, at 26.
258. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 659.
259. The Court emphasized that "[a] mere insubstantial justification in this regard will
not suffice, because such a low standard of review would penit discrimination to be
practiced through the use of spurious, seemingly neutral employment practices." Id. at 659.
260. See Mack A. Player's discussion on the question of terminology:
While the Court had never clearly defined "business necessity," the Wards Cove
Packing clarification produced a definition akin to "substantial business justifica-
tion." This definition does not expressly conflict with any prior pronouncements
from the Supreme Court. Nonetheless, it will change how "business necessity"
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ployed by the Court in Wards Cove is substantially the same as
that used by the Court a decade earlier in Beazer.261 The ,second
reason the Wards Cove Court used a different terminology is that
the practices challenged in that case were different in kind from
the practices challenged in most of the Court's previous disparate-
impact cases. Prior to Watson,262 the disparate-impact cases de-
cided by the Supreme Court involved challenges to objective mea-
surements or to requirements that the employer used as a proxy for
predicted performance. 263  The question in these cases was
whether the employers' requirements, which were adopted to sepa-
rate the good from the bad applicants, were in fact related to the
applicants' ability to perform the job competently and safely.2' 6
Watson and Wards Cove, on the other hand, involved challenges to
hiring and promotion procedures, rather than qualifications. Watson
reviewed a challenge to a bank's practice of relying upon the sub-
jective judgments of supervisors who were acquainted with the can-
didates for promotion;2 5 Wards Cove reviewed a challenge to a
series of hiring and promotion practices such as nepotism, a rehire
preference, a lack of objective hiring criteria, separate hiring chan-
nels, and a practice of not promoting from within.26
The standard of "job-relatedness" is less appropriate in assess-
ing hiring practices than it is in assessing job qualifications. When
an employer uses job qualifications to predict future job perfor-
mance, the relevant question is whether satisfaction of the chal-
lenged qualification is related to the applicant's ability to perform
is articulated in virtually all circuits.
Player, supra note 27, at 16.
261. Under Wards Cove the practice has to "serveB, in a significant way, the legitimate
employment goals of the employer." Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 659. Similarly, Bearer re-
quires that the employer's "legitimate employment goals . . . are significantly served by
- even if they do not require" the challenged practice. New York City Transit Auth. v.
Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 587 n.31 (1979).
262. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988).
263. For example, Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 427-28 (1971), Albemarle
Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1975), Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440,
443 (1982), and Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 233 (1976), involved challenges to
paper-and-pencil tests that were used to predict performance either on the job or in a
training program; New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 570-72 (1979),
involved a challenge to a no-narcotics rule; Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 323-24
(1977), involved a height-and-weight requirement for prison guards.
264. See, e.g., Beazer, 440 U.S. at 576-77 (discussing employer's interest in not hiring
methadone users because of safety considerations).
265. Watson, 487 U.S. at 982.
266. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 647-48.
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the job. However, hiring procedures may be adopted for legitimate
business reasons other than prediction of future job performance.
For example, in Wards Cove the employers had entered into a
hiring-hall agreement with a largely Filipino union local in
Seattle. 267 As a result, the positions for which the union supplied
employees were held disproportionately by Filipinos. If a black
person had challenged the employers' use of a hiring hall on the
ground that a disproportionately small number of blacks were hired
for cannery positions, the employers could not possibly defend on
the basis of "job performance," since that would require a showing
that employees procured through the hiring hall performed better
than potential employees who were excluded because of the hiring-
hall agreement. However, the usual reason for an employer's enter-
ing into a hiring-hall agreement is not that employees hired under
such an agreement will perform better than other employees. Rath-
er, it is to maintain a reliable source of labor. A standard tied to
the employer's legitimate interests allows the employer to raise that.
kind of defense; a standard tied to job performance would not.
Thus, had the Court in Wards Cove described the test in terms of
relationship to job performance, it would have been providing the
lower court with a test that could not be applied rationally on
remand.
In sum, the Wards Cove standard was not a departure from
precedent. Earlier cases had exhibited a range of standards, and
Wards Cove fit neatly within those boundaries.
b. The Standard of Business Necessity under the Civil Rights Act
The 1991 Act does not explicitly alter the Wards Cove stan-
dard. Under the Act, in order for an employer to justify an em-
ployment practice having a disparate impact, the employer must
prove that "the challenged practice is job related for the position in
question and consistent with business necessity." 26 On its face
this standard appears to be two-pronged: the employer must show
that the practice is both "job related" and "consistent with business
necessity."2' However, the prior discussion demonstrates that
"business necessity," at least for the Griggs Court, meant "job
267. Id. at 647 n.3.
268. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (West Supp. 1992), infra Appendix H § 105.
269. Id.
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related."270 To the extent that the term "business necessity" is in-
terpreted to have any independent meaning, it is probably the same
meaning as the Wards Cove phrase "serves, in a significant
way"271  or the Griggs requirement of a "manifest relation-
ship"27 to the employment in question. There must be some re-
quirement that the relationship between the practice and the justi-
fication be of sufficient strength, or else any relationship, however
weak, would establish the justification.
The Act does not seem to alter the Griggs standard. In the
"purposes" section of the Act, Congress listed as one of its purpos-
es:
to codify the concepts of "business necessity" and "job
related" enunciated by the Supreme Court in Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), and in the other
Supreme Court decisions prior to Wards Cove Packing Co.
v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989).273
Thus, the apparent consequence of the Act is merely to place the
analysis of "business necessity" back to the point at which it was
prior to Wards Cove. Although earlier versions of the Act would
270. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). See supra notes 220-224
and accompanying text. In the post-compromise attempt by partisans on both sides to
influence later interpretation, diametrically opposed views were offered concerning the ef-
fect of the conjunctive in the employer justification. Senator Jeffords stated:
The use of the conjunctive "and" is very significant for it clarifies that the job
related prong must be present in all cases even where other aspects of business
necessity are asserted. The choice of proving either one or the other prong is
not preserved in this compromise.
137 CONG. REC. S15,383 (1991) (statement of Sen. Jeffords). However, Senator Jeffords
also stated that the two-pronged definition was simply codifying the Griggs "requirement"
that employment practices with a disparate impact must be "job related." Id.
On the other hand, the interpretive memorandum placed in the record by Senator
Dole stated that the term "'job related for the position in question' is to be read broadly,
to include any legitimate business purpose . . . ." I at 15,476.
Because of the restriction on the use of statements as legislative history, the wisdom
of which is demonstrated by comparing the statements of Senators Jeffords and Dole,
statements of this kind may not be relied upon by courts in interpreting the Act.
271. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 659.
272. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432.
273. The Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 § 3 (codified
as amended in scattered section of 42 U.S.C.A., 2 U.S.C.A., 16 U.S.C.A. and 29
U.S.C.A.) § 3, infra Appendix H § 3.
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have explicitly overruled this aspect of Wards Cove,274 the enact-
ed version dropped that overruling language.
Determining what change, if any, the amendment created pres-
ents a host of interpretational difficulties. First, the Act "codified"
case law that was far from harmonious.2' Rather than setting
forth a clear standard, the Act allows the Court in future cases to
pick and choose from its prior precedents. These precedents permit
a fair amount of latitude in judicial decision-making. Second, the
Act leaves in place the precedents that led to the Wards Cove ver-
sion of the business-justification standard.276 As a result, the
Court is not precluded from reinstating the Wards Cove standard or
a similar test.
Although it may be tempting to view the enacted version of
the Civil Rights Act as .a repudiation of the Wards Cove definition
of "business necessity," the legislative history does not support
such an interpretation. Instead, it shows a gradual weakening of the
articulated business-necessity standard and the elimination of any
stated intention to overrule this aspect of Wards Cove.27' Al-
though some of the original supporters of the bill wanted to over-
rule the business-necessity test of Wards Cove, they ultimately
lacked the political power to do so.27'
The original 1990 bill incorporated the standard that Justice
Stevens had proposed in his Wards Cove dissent. This standard
required the employer to demonstrate that a practice having a dis-
parate impact was "essential to effective job performance." 279 The
definition of business necessity in that bill was subsequently re-
laxed by the "Kennedy-Danforth compromise. "28O Instead of re-
quiring an employer to show that a challenged practice having a
274. See The Civil Rights and Women's Equity in Employment Act of 1991, H.R. I §
201, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., 137 CONG. REC. H3876, H3879 (1991), infra Appendix F §
201; The Original Danforth Bill, S. 1208 § 2(b)(1), 102d Cong., 1st Sess., 137 CONG.
REC. S7023, S7023 (1991), infra Appendix E § 2(b)(1); The Vetoed 1990 Bill, H.R. REP.
No. 856 § 3, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG. REC. H9552, H9552 (1990), infra Ap-
pendix D § 3.
275. See supra notes 49-68 and accompanying text.
276. Perhaps the most important precedent that the Act leaves untouched is the Beazer
formulation of the business-necessity standard.
277. See infra notes 275-99 and accompanying text.
278. See supra notes 83-99 and accompanying text (detailing the struggles in 1990 and
1991 to pass the legislation).
279. See S. 2104 § 3, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG. REC. S1019, S1019 (1990),
infra Appendix A § 3.
280. See 136 CONG. REC. S9322 (1990) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
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disparate impact was essential to effective job performance, the
revised bill would have required the employer to show that the
practice "bears a substantial and demonstrable relationship" to
effective job performance."' This change was said to eliminate
the pressure on employers to adopt quotas in order to avoid liabili-
ty under the Act. 2  However, the definition of business necessity
was still tied completely to job performance. "
The versions of the 1990 bill initially passed by the Senate?"
and the House" contained a qualitative change in the business-
necessity concept. They provided two definitions of "business ne-
cessity": one applicable to employment practices "involving selec-
tion" and one applicable to all other employment practices. Under
the House bill, the former practices would have to "bear a signifi-
cant relationship to successful performance of the job," while the
latter practices would have to "bear a significant relationship to a
significant business objective of the employer."27 6 Under the Sen-
ate version, practices involving selection were required to be sup-
ported by a "substantial and demonstrable relationship to effective
job performance," while other practices were to "bear[ ] a substan-
tial and demonstrable relationship to a compelling objective of the
[employer]." 287 The conference version, which President Bush ve-
toed, contained the House's version, requiring that employers show
that their practices involving selection "bear a significant relation-
281. Id Some versions of the bill required employers to satisfy their burden of proof
by "demonstrable evidence." See Vetoed 1990 Bill, H.RM REP. No. 856 § 3, 101st Cong.,
2d Sess., 136 CONG. REC. H9552, H9552 (1990), infra Appendix D § 3; Civil Rights and
Women's Equity in Employment Act of 1991, H.R. 1 § 201, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., 137
CONG. REC. 113876, H3879 (1991), infra Appendix F § 201. These versions stated that
-unsubstantiated opinion and hearsay" were not sufficient. This requirement was not in-
cluded in the final enacted version of the Act, presumably because of arguments that the
ordinary rules of evidence sufficiently ensure the reliability of admissible evidence. All of
these versions would have expressly allowed employers to defend practices without the
need to engage in formal validation studies. Because the enacted version does not address
the quality of evidence that employers can rely on, any probative evidence that is consis-
tent with the Federal Rules of Evidence should suffice.
282. 136 CONG. Rnc. S9322 (1990) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) ("These changes
should put to rest the spurious charge that this bill requires quotas. Restoring the prior
law in the Griggs case will not force employers to adopt quotas.").
283. See supra note 281 and accompanying text.
284. Amend. 2110, S. 2104, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG. REC. S9325 (1990).
285. H.ILR. 4000, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG. REc. H6827 (1990).
286. Id § 3.
287. Amend. 2110, S. 2104 § 3, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG. REc. S9325, S9325
(1990), infra Appendix B § 3.
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ship to successful performance of the job,"2 8 and that other prac-
tices "bear a significant relationship to a manifest business objec-
tive of the employer."28 9
The version of the 1991 Act that the House initially passed
retained the "significant relationship to successful performance of
the job" standard for practices involving selection and returned to
the "significant relationship to a significant business objective of
the employer" standard for other practices. 2"
The day before the House passed this bill,29' Senator
Danforth attempted to break the stalemate over the Act by intro-
ducing three bills. Each bill dealt with only some of the issues
contained in the omnibus bill.29 One of the express purposes of
S.1208, the Danforth bill dealing with disparate-impact standards,
was "to overrule the... meaning of business-necessity in Wards
Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio and to codify . . . the meaning of
business necessity used in Griggs v. Duke Power Co." 293 Like
the House version, the business-necessity standard contained in
S.1208 was two-pronged. Practices "involving selection" would
have to "bear[ ] a manifest relationship to requirements for effec-
tive job performance," and other practices would have to "bear[ ] a
manifest relationship to a legitimate business objective of the em-
ployer."29' Thus, the relationship to job performance had to be
"manifest," rather than "significant," and the objective of the em-
288. H.R. REP. No. 856 § 3, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG. REC. H9552, H9552
(1990), infra Appendix D § 3.
289. Id.
290. The Civil Rights and Women's Equity in Employment Act of 1991, H.RL 1 § 201,
102d Cong., 1st Sess., 137 CONG. REc. H3876, H3878, infra Appendix F § 201.
291. The House approved the bill on June 5, 1991. 137 CONG. REC. H3958 (1991).
292. See Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1991, S. 1207, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., 137
CONG. REC. S7021 (1991) (among other things, overruling Patterson v. McLean Credit
Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989), Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, 490 U.S. 900 (1989), Mar-
tin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989), and Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228
(1989)); Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1991, S. 1208, 102d Cong., Ist Sess., 137
CONG. REC. S7023 (1991) (modifying disparate-impact analysis); Civil Rights and Rem-
edies Act of 1991, S. 1209, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., 137 CONG. REC. S7024 (1991) (pro-
viding for damages and civil penalties).
No Democratic bill had been introduced in the Senate, because Senator Edward 14
Kennedy was unable to obtain the support of "moderate Republicans," including Senator
Danforth. Steven A. Holmes, Business and Rights Groups Fail in Effort to Draft Bill on
Job Bias, N.Y. TIMES, April 20, 1991, at Al.
293. S. 1208 § 2, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., 136 CONG. REC. S7023, S7023 (1990), infra
Appendix E § 2.
294. Id § 5.
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ployer need only be "legitimate," rather than "compelling," "sig-
nificant," or "manifest"
The standards underwent another metamorphosis in S.1745,
introduced by Senator Danforth on September 24, 1991. Under that
bill, to defend "employment practices that are used as qualification
standards, employment tests, or other selection criteria," the em-
ployer would have to show that the practices "bear a manifest
relationship to the employment in question." 295 Other practices
would have to "bear a manifest relationship to a legitimate business
objective of the employer."2 ' This modification was a substantial
improvement, because it imposed a job-relationship standard for
"practices that are used as qualification standards" rather than for
practices "involving selection."29 Thus, practices that involved
selection but not used as qualification standards no longer had to
be justified in terms of job performance. However, a significant
sticking point of this bill was its further definition of the term "the
employment in question." That phrase was defined to mean either
"the performance of actual work activities required by the employer
for a job or class of jobs" or-"any behavior that is important to
the job, but may not comprise actual work activities. " 298 Presi-
dent Bush vowed to veto the bill because of what he perceived to
be an overly stringent definition of business necessity.29
The President's continued opposition to the Danforth standard
of business necessity ultimately led to the compromise described at
the outset of this section.' The "Purposes" section of the bill
295. S. 1745 § 7, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 186 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No.
186, at D-1, D-3 (Sept. 25, 1991), infra Appendix G § 7.
296. Id
297. Id.
298. Id. It was not clear under this standard whether an employer could justify a prac-
tice that was based on an employee's predicted ability to complete a training program.
See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 250-51 (1976) (upholding the use of a test that
predicted performance in a training program without requiring that the employer show a
relationship to job performance as a police officer).
299. See Adam Clymer, Senate Approves Civil Rights BIl 95-5, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 31,
1991, at A20 ("business necessity" language in the Danforth Bill was at the heart of
President Bush's complaints about the bill); Adam Clymer, Senators and Bush Reach
Agreement on Civil Rights Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 1991, at Al (President Bush threat-
ened to veto the Danforth Bill as late as October 23, 1991, because of the dispute over
the "business necessity" language).
300. On October 23, 1991, the Office of Management and Budget issued a statement
which threatened that the Administration would veto the bill in order to prevent it from
"overtum[ing] two decades of Supreme Court precedent" and "driv[ing] employers to
adopt quotas and other unfair preferences." Statement of Administration Policy on S. 1745,
reprinted In DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 206, at F-1 (Oct. 24, 1991). The Statement also
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was amended to exclude language indicating an intent to overrule
the Wards Cove definition of business necessity. The new purpose
of the bill was merely to codify pre-Wards Cove holdings)'1 At
best the bill adopted what might be described as an agnostic posi-
tion as to what effect Wards Cove had on prior law. Also, rather
than proposing a new definition inconsistent with the Wards Cove
terminology, the bill simply used undefined terms that evoke mem-
ories of Griggs: "job related for the position in question and con-
sistent with business necessity."'
The statutory amendments raise a series of questions. First, in
defending practices having a disparate impact, is an employer limit-
ed to a defense based upon job performance? 3 3 Second, how
asserted that under the bill, "the deck is stacked in'ways that make a successful defense
almost impossible," since employers could not defend "a host of perfectly legitimate hiring
and promotion criteria." Id
301. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 § 3(2) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C.A., 2 U.S.C.A., 16 U.S.C.A. and 29 U.S.C.A.), infra Appendix H §
3(2).
302. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(k)(l)(A)(i) (West Supp. 1992), infra Appendix H § 105(a).
In a somewhat circular fashion, the adopted phrase was taken from the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6) (Supp. 11 1991), which in turn had adapted
language from the Supreme Court's Title VII disparate-impact decisions.
303. There was an ill-publicized attempt in the vetoed version of the 1990 Act to ex-
pand greatly the kind of practice that could be challenged under the disparate-impact
theory. In setting forth the standard for practices not involving selection, the bill contained
the language "in the case of other employment decisions, not involving employment selec-
tion practices ... (such as, but not limited to, a plant closing or bankruptcy) .....
H.R. REP. No. 856 § 3, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG. REC. H9552, H9552 (1990),
infra Appendix D § 3.
This language raised a significant issue by suggesting that a plaintiff could challenge
as practices "not involving employment selection practices" fundamental business decisions
such as whether to close a plant or declare bankruptcy. Id. The Supreme Court has
never suggested that such an approach is permissible, and the lower courts have likewise
not endorsed such a theory. See Marley S. Weiss, Risky Business: Age and Race Discrim-
ination in Capital Redeployment Decisions, 48 MD. L. REv. 901, 903 (1989). Instead, the
Court has permitted challenges under Griggs only to decisions that are properly considered
employment decisions. Of course, if the employer chooses to close a plant, its method of
selecting employees for layoff or transfer can be scrutinized under the disparate-impact
theory. However, courts have always seemed to assume that the initial decision whether to
close a plant was unreviewable. See Fumco Construction Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567,
578 (1978) ("Courts are generally less competent than employers to restructure business
practices, and unless mandated to do so by Congress they should not attempt it.").
In the early 1970s, the EEOC itself repudiated application of the disparate-impact
theory to such business judgments. In fact, in 1972, the Chairman of the EEOC stren-
uously disavowed an internal 1971 EEOC memorandum asserting that a prima facie case
of disparate-impact discrimination exists whenever a company relocates from an inner city
to a suburban area with a lower percentage of minorities in the work force. See EEOC
Memorandum of July 7, 1971, reprinted in 118 CONG. REC. 4925-27 (1972), and in
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substantial must the employer's interest be in order to justify a
practice having a disparate impact? Third, can an employer defend
its actions based upon an 'employee's ability to progress to another
job?
(1) Is the employer limited to performance-based
justifications?
Under the original 1990 bill, an employer could defend practic-
es having a disparate impact only by showing that they were "es-
sential to effective job performance." 3°4 Apparently in response to
criticisms of the early versions of the 1990 Act, the bill (as ulti-
mately vetoed by President Bush) contained a dual standard. Em-
ployment practices which involved selection, including recruitment
and retention practices, could be justified only through a relation-
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY ACT OF 1972 at
1735-39. The EEOC Chairman at the time, William Brown, informed Congress that the
memorandum -certainly does not express EEOC policy." STATEMENT BY EEOC CHAIRMAN
WILLIAM H. BROWN, ISSUED JANUARY 13, 1972, reprinted in 118 CONG. REC. 4924-25
(1972), and in LEGISLATiVE HISTORY OF THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY ACT OF
1972 at 1733.
Pertitting courts to review all business decisions that have an impact on employ-
ment would be a dramatic and unwise expansion of judicial power. It would presumably
allow challenges not just to plant closings and bankruptcy, but also to decisions involving
whether to relocate, automate, subcontract, engage in layoffs, or go out of business alto-
gether. In each of these cases, plaintiffs could argue that the employer's decision did not
satisfy the definition of "business necessity." At that point, the employer could not prevail
by showing the absence of discriminatory intent. Rather the employer would have to
prove that its decisions substantially furthered its economic health. Indeed, even if the
employer could show that its action substantially furthered its business interests, plaintiffs
still could prevail by showing that a different business decision with less disparate impact
would have served the employer just as well and that the employer declined to adopt this
alternative. Under such a rule, employers would presumably be held liable for discrimina-
tion if the plaintiffs merely convinced the court that the employer could have furthered its
efficiency goals just as well by retooling the existing plant and laying off some manage-
ment personnel.
The kinds of decisions that courts would be called upon to make under such a rule
are beyond the institutional competence of courts, which do not have the expertise to
determine whether every business decision that an employer makes is a "good" one, and
such a rule would involve courts in the day-to-day business operations of businesses to a
far greater extent than they already are. Congress was correct to reject this approach in
the 1991 Act. See First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 677 (1981)
(quoting Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 223 (1964) (Stewart,
L, concurring)) (a "decision [to close down a work site which] involv[es] a change in the
scope and direction of the enterprise, is akin to the decision whether to be in business at
all, 'not in itselfl primarily about conditions of employment, though the effect of the
decision may be necessarily to terminate employment'-).
304. S. 2104 § 3, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG. REC. S1019, S1019 (1990), infra
Appendix A § 3.
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ship to job performance, while other practices could be justified by
any "manifest business objective" of the employer.' Most ver-
sions of the 1991 bill also contained a bifurcated standard that
varied depending upon the nature of the challenged practice. The
original draft of S. 1745, on the other hand, provided a more sen-
sible dichotomy that distinguished between "employment practices
that are used as qualification standards, employment tests, or other
selection criteria" and all other practices.' This distinction al-
lows the employer to tailor its defense in terms of the reasons that
the employer adopted the practice."' Unfortunately, the provision
as enacted lacks clarity. After negotiations between Senators and
the White House, the bill seems to contain a unitary standard: "job
related for the position in question and consistent with business ne-
305. H.R. REP. No. 856 § 3, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG REC. H9552, H9552
(1990), infra Appendix D § 3. The difficulty with this standard was that not all employ-
ment practices, not even all practices involving selection, are adopted because of their
relationship to job performance. For example, the use of a hiring hall is certainly a re-
cruitment practice but not one that is justified, or justifiable, on the basis of job perfor-
mance. See supra note 269 and accompanying text. Similarly, an employer's decision
about where and how to advertise for employees may not be based on assumptions about
job performance. For example, a decision to advertise in one newspaper rather than anoth-
er may be made on the basis of a limited recruiting budget and the desire to get the
most "bang for the buck," and not on the assumption that potential employees reading
one paper will be better employees than those reading others papers. Similarly, practices
involving retention can be defined as practices "involving selection." Id. Therefore, an
employer's decision about which employees to retain in a layoff would also be governed
by this standard. Yet, employers often base such judgments on factors other than predic-
tions about job performance. For example, an employer who makes retention decisions on
the basis of seniority may be seeking to further its legitimate goals, but not the goal of
successful job performance. Indeed, employers typically view the decision of whether to
lay off employees based on their seniority or performance as a choice between two radi-
cally different alternatives.
The "bona fide seniority system" exception found in section 703(h) of Title VII
would protect many employers from liability for basing their retention decisions on senior-
ity. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1988). However, it is not clear that an employer having no
collective bargaining agreement and no established layoff policies, which is true of many
small employers, would be able to establish the existence of a "system." See Williams v.
New Orleans S.S. Ass'n, 673 F.2d 742, 754 (5th Cir. 1982) (practice of relying on se-
niority must be applied with sufficient regularity in order to be considered a "system").
See also Alfred W. Blumrosen, Society in Transition I: A Broader Congressional Agenda
for Equal Employment - The Peace Dividen4 Leapfrogging, and Other Matters, 8 YALE
L. & POL'Y REV. 257, 268 n.51 (1990) ("The question of whether the 'bona fide
seniority' proviso protects unilateral employer-established seniority systems has not been
explicitly decided by the Supreme Court.").
306. S. 1745 § 7, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 186 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No.
186, at D-l, D-3 (Sept. 25, 1991), infra Appendix G § 7.
307. Id.
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i 308cessity.
The question thus arises whether the compromise version elimi-
nated non-performance-based justifications, such as an employer's
argument that a hiring hall was justified by its legitimate interest in
ensuring a steady supply of employees. Several factors suggest that
it did not. As the bill evolved, the permissible scope of employer
justifications was broadened. The final compromise resulted from
negotiations between Senators who were already willing to allow
non-performance-based justifications' and an Administration that
contended that the standards in prior versions of the bill unduly
constrained employers.1 ° Consequently, it is difficult to sustain a
conclusion that the outcome of these negotiations was a bill that
imposed greater burdens on employers. Moreover, the compromise
negotiations leading to the enacted bill eliminated references to
overruling the Wards Cove conception of business necessity, which
would have permitted non-performance-based justifications. The use
of such justifications is also supported by the Griggs rationale,
which condemned arbitrary impediments to minority advance-
ment. 1 If, for whatever reason, a facially neutral practice serves
the employer's legitimate interests, then the practice cannot be said
to be arbitrary.
Elimination of non-performance-based defenses would not be
good policy. If the generic purpose of the disparate-impact theory
is to prohibit employers from adopting, even innocently, practices
that have a disparate impact unless they have a good reason for
doing so, any good reason should suffice. Prohibiting employers
from acting in good faith and in furtherance of legitimate business
goals - and instead requiring them to employ practices that are
308. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)i) (West Supp. 1992), infra Appendix H § 8.
309. All previous versions of the 1990 and 1991 Acts that passed the House or Senate
permitted non-performance-based justifications for some practices. See Kennedy-Jeffords
Substitute, Amend. 2110, S. 2104 § 3, 101st Cong. 2d Sess., 136 CoNG. RC. S9319,
S9319 (1990), infra Appendix B § 3; House Version of Aug. 1990, Civil Rights Act of
1990, H.R. 4000 § 3, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG REC. H6827, H6827 (1990), infra
Appendix C § 3; Vetoed 1990 Act, Conference Version of Civil Rights Act of 1990,
H.R. REP. No. 856 § 3, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG. REC. H9552, H9552 (1990),
Infra Appendix D § 3; Civil Rights and Women's Equity in Employment Act of 1991,
H.R. I § 201, 102d Cong., Ist Sess., 137 CoNG. REc. 113876, H3878 (1991), infra Ap-
pendix F § 201.
310. See supra note 300 and accompanying text.
311. 401 U.S. at 430-31. See also Lmnber, supra note 252, at 39 n.152 ("Clearly, the
Griggs Court did not intend to limit a defendant's justification to considerations of how
well employees do their jobs. After all, a company's primary motive is maximizing
profits - accomplished in a variety of ways by pursuing a number of different policies.").
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not as good for their business - simply to obtain a proportionately
representative workplace places an additional economic drag on
businesses. Of course, if the real purpose of the legislation is to
discourage employers from adopting any practice having a disparate
impact without regard to justification, then any rule limiting the
employer's defense would be a good one. No doubt there are some
who would subscribe to that purpose, but that was not the stated
objective of the Act's proponents, who steadfastly denied any in-
tent to impose a proportional-representation rule or any .other unto-
ward burden on business.
(2) How substantial must the employer's business objectives
be?
Varying characterizations of the kind of employer justification
necessary to uphold a challenged practice not involving selection
were proposed during the course of the legislative struggle: "com-
pelling business objective" from the Kennedy-Jeffords Substi-
tute, 312 "significant business objective" from the House version of
the 1990 Act,313 "manifest business objective" from the vetoed
conference version, 3 4 and "legitimate business objective" from
the bills introduced by Senator Danforth in 1991.315 The "legiti-
mate employment goals" standard announced in Wards Cove seems
indistinguishable from the standard of both Danforth bills.
The bill as enacted does not specifically address the issue,
providing only the general standard of "job related for the position
in question and consistent with business necessity." 316 It gives
little guidance as to the magnitude of the required employer inter-
est. However, given the fact that pressure for the final compromise
came from the White House, the Act should not be interpreted to
impose a greater burden on employers than the earlier Danforth
bills. Consequently, any legitimate employer goal should suffice,
provided there is the necessary nexus between the goal and the
312. Amend. 2110, S. 2104 § 3, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG. REC. S9325, S9325
(1990), infra Appendix B § 3.
313. H.R. 4000 § 3, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG. RFC. H6827, H6827 (1990),
infra Appendix C § 3.
314. H.R. REP. No. 856 § 3, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG. REC. H9552, H9552
(1990), infra Appendix D § 3.
315. S. 1208 § 5(a), 102d Cong., 1st Sess., 137 CONG. REC. S7023, 57023 (1991),
infra Appendix E § 5(a); S. 1745 § 7, 102d Cong., 1st Sees., reprinted in DAILY LAB.
REP. (BNA) No. 186, D-1, at D-3 (1991), infra Appendix G § 7.
316. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (West Supp. 1992), infra Appendix H § 105(a).
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challenged practice.
At first glance, this issue may seem merely a matter of seman-
tics, with the distinction between "significant business objectives"
and "legitimate business objectives" being at best a minor one.
Upon closer examination, however, a tremendous practical differ-
ence becomes apparent. When an employer seeks to justify a prac-
tice on the basis of its business objectives, courts would probably
have little difficulty deciding whether a business goal was legiti-
mate. Judges who have grown up in our society probably share a
view about what sorts of business goals are acceptable under our
economic system. These determinations may involve issues such as
whether the goals are legal, ethical, and consistent with public
policy, and whether they further goals of profit-making and effi-
ciency. Judges from a broad variety of backgrounds would proba-
bly resolve these questions with a reasonable degree of consistency,
and employers could generally anticipate the resolution.
The distinction between "significant business objectives" and
business objectives that are "legitimate but less than significant" is
far less objective in this context. How does one decide whether a
legitimate business objective is "significant" or not? A consensus is
unlikely to exist, and the answer would probably vary depending
upon the philosophy of the judge. The less predictable the stan-
dard, the more likely it is that employers will take the defensive
measure of hiring by the numbers to avoid litigation.
Perhaps the worst possible approach - in practice as opposed
to principle - is a "sliding scale" standard such as that advocated
by George Rutherglen. Under this approach, the magnitude of the
employer's interest must increase as the disparate impact of its
action increases.317 Not only is it difficult to find any statutory
warrant for this approach, but requiring that two variables be deter-
mined and then balanced makes predictability all the more elusive.
Because the statute provides no guidance for balancing the impact
against the employer's interest, judges must necessarily draw upon
some internal standard and are likely to have dramatically different
views about how strong an employer interest must be to justify a
given statistical disparity. Moreover, the magnitude of the justifi-
cation that an employer must prove to validate a given practice
would not be constant. Instead, the magnitude would vary over
time as the impact of the practice changed. Thus, a test that is
317. Rutherglen, supra note 27, at 1320.
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validated and justified in the workplace one year may not be legal
in the next year if the impact of the test increases, even if the test
is unchanged in its ability to predict performance. Such a standard
would also make it considerably riskier for an employer to rely on
the validation experience of other employers.
Because the employer would not know in advance the identity
of the person who would be reviewing its practices, it would be
forced to act very conservatively in order to ensure that its hiring
practices could satisfy the most demanding of judges. As
Rutherglen has noted, a heavy burden of justification places sub-
stantial pressure on employers to avoid statistical disparities in the
first place.31 8 However, the indeterminate standard that Rutherglen
advocates is functionally equivalent to an onerous standard and
would operate with striking efficiency to create just the sort of
pressure that he wishes to avoid. If the primary purpose of the law
were simply to provide a formula for deciding cases once they
have arisen, a sliding scale approach might be acceptable. Howev-
er, the primary purpose of the law is to channel behavior, and in
that enterprise such an approach cannot produce the behavior it
seeks to induce. Since employers cannot predict whether their
actions will pass muster under a complex balancing test, they may
be left with no option but to engage in litigation-proof hiring.
Efficiency and fairness would become casualties of a well-meaning,
but fundamentally misguided, approach.
(3) May the employer justify a practice based upon the
employee's ability to progress to the next job?
One of the issues left open in Griggs was whether an employer
could take into account an employee's ability to progress beyond
the job in question.319 The EEOC has traditionally taken the view
that an employer may not take into account an employee's ability
to progress in the job unless all or substantially all employees will
in fact progress to such positions. In Albemarle Paper, the Court
endorsed that aspect of the EEOC Guidelines in the context of the
validation of standardized tests,32° but it has never had reason to
address that issue in the context of other job criteria.32' The 1991
318. Id. at 1313.
319. 401 U.S. at 432.
320. Albemarle Paper, 422 U.S. at 434 (1975).
321. See Caldwell, supra note 58, at 594 (discussing the failure of courts, generally, to
apply the strict EEOC Guidelines beyond paper-and-pencil tests).
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Act's "job related for the position in question and consistent with
business necessity" standard arguably excludes consideration of an
employee's ability to progress beyond the position in question.
However, such an argument begs the ultimate question of whether
ability to progress out of a given position is a qualification that is
related to the job when moving into it.
The requirement that a qualification bear a "manifest relation-
ship to the employment in question" found in the initial version of
S. 174531 was coupled with a definition of "employment in
question" that included only "the performance of actual work activ-
ities required by the employer for a job or class of jobs" or "any
behavior that is important to the job, but may not comprise actual
work activities."3" This focus on "actual work activities for a job
or class of jobs" presumably would have prevented an employer
from relying on ability to progress, at least to progress out of a
"class of jobs." The standard also may not have permitted an
employer's reliance on an employee's ability to complete a training
program,324 since this ability, although important to the job,
might not be deemed to comprise actual work activities."
One of the reasons that there has been so little thoughtful
analysis of the ability-to-progress issue is that most of the discus-
sion has focused on absolute requirements, as opposed to "plus
factors."326 The EEOC's position assumes that the issue is one of
absolute requirements, thereby obscuring the important question,
which is not whether the employer may require that all applicants
to an entry-level job be qualified for higher-level jobs, but whether
the employer may consider an applicant's potential for promotion
at all.
Consider, for example, a not-atypical industrial setting in which
the entry-level job is "laborer"; above the laborer position are vari-
ous production and maintenance positions that require a substantial
322. S. 1745 § 7, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 7, reprinted in DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No.
186, at D-1, D-3 (Sept. 25, 1991), infra Appendix G § 7.
323. IdL
324. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 250-51 (1976) (upholding use of a test
that was predictive of performance in a training program without need for demonstration
of a relationship to performance as a police officer).
325. The primary focus of the phrase "behavior that is important to the job" seemed to
be on rules relating to such things as punctuality, attendance, and refraining from miscon-
duct. See Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1991, S. 1208 § 5, 102d Cong., 1st
Sess., 137 CONG, REC. S7023, S7023 (1991), infra Appendix E § 5.
326. See supra notes 208-09 and accompanying text (listing examples of -plus factors").
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amount of on-the-job learning. Employees may be hired directly
into production and maintenance jobs, or they may be hired as
laborers, depending upon their experience. All supervisory levels up
to plant manager are usually filled by employees who started out
in these lower-level jobs. However, most incumbents in any given
job are never promoted to supervisory levels because of high turn-
over in the lower-level positions and varying qualifications of the
incumbent workers. Likewise, most of those who are promoted into
a given supervisory level are never promoted into higher-level
management positions.
In these circumstances, what qualifications are relevant to the
entry-level jobs? Under the EEOC view, because most lower-level
employees are never promoted to supervisory positions, the em-
ployer may not require that everyone hired into lower-level posi-
tions be "supervisor material." That result is not so much wrong as
inconsequential since few employers would impose such a require-
ment given the high turnover in lower-level jobs and the relative
dearth of management positions. What is important is whether the
employer can give preference to applicants deemed to have the
potential to move up in the organization or whether it must instead
treat the applicants as fungible despite substantial differences in
potential. The EEOC position on this highly consequential matter is
that the employer may not prefer applicants who have the potential
to be supervisors if a statistical imbalance would result.
The policy justification for prohibiting an employer from ad-
vancing its long-term business needs in filling positions is far from
apparent and has never been adequately articulated by those who
would impose such a prohibition. Perhaps the EEOC position is
animated by a suspicion that an employer that requires all of its
janitorial applicants to be qualified to run the factory is using the
requirement as a pretext for intentional discrimination. Such a
suspicion might be justified in circumstances where the employer
imposes such an absolute, and unusual, requirement. However, few
employers would impose such a requirement given the additional
cost of hiring such people and the difficulty of getting highly qual-
ified people to take and remain in jobs for which they are substan-
tially overqualified. As discussed above, the real issue is whether
the employer can take into account an applicant's potential to
advance within the organization, or whether it must simply ignore
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that potential.327 The wisdom of compelling employers to ignore
their long-term interests is open to substantial doubt.
4. Alternatives
a. Wards Cove
Under pre-Wards Cove law, the employer's demonstration of
business necessity did not necessarily end the inquiry. In Albemarle
Paper Co. v. Moody the Court held, or at least stated, that the
plaintiff could then "show that other tests or selection devices,
without a similarly undesirable racial effect, would also serve the
employer's legitimate interest in 'efficient and trustworthy work-
manship. ' ' 3 According to the Court, "Such a showing would be
evidence that the employer was using its tests merely as a 'pretext'
for discrimination."
329
Wards Cove did not question this rule. Instead, the Court quot-
ed Albemarle Paper, stating that plaintiffs could
persuade the factfinder that "other tests or selection devices,
without a similarly undesirable racial effect, would also
serve the employer's legitimate [hiring] interest[s]"; by so
demonstrating, [plaintiffs] would prove that "[the employer
was] using [its] tests merely as a 'pretext' for discrimina-
tion.
The Court then went on to say that if the plaintiffs,
having established a prima facie case, come forward with
327. See supra notes 208-16 and accompanying text.
328. Albemarle Paper, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975) (quoting McDonnell Douglas v. Green,
411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973)).
329. Id. (quoting McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973)). In New
York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979), the Court reinforced the view
that the function of alternatives is to demonstrate a pretext for intentional discrimination.
The Court stated:
At best, respondents' statistical showing is weak; even if it is capable of estab-
lishing a prima facie case of discrimination, it is assuredly rebutted by TA's
demonstration that its narcotics rule (and the rule's application to methadone
users) is "job related." The District Court's express finding that the rule was
not motivated by racial animus forecloses any claim in rebuttal that it was
merely a pretext for intentional discrimination.
Id at 587 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
The Court thus contemplated a three-stage inquiry: (1) the plaintiff's prima facie case,
(2) the defendant's justification, and (3) the plaintiff's opportunity to demonstrate that the
job-related practice had been adopted for discriminatory reasons.
330. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 660 (1989).
1993]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
alternatives to petitioners' hiring practices that reduce the
racially-disparate impact of practices currently being used,
and petitioners refuse to adopt these alternatives, such a
refusal would belie a claim by petitioners that their incum-
bent practices are being employed for non-discriminatory
reasons.
331
The Court further observed that "any alternative practices which
respondents offer up in this respect must be equally effective as
petitioners' chosen hiring procedures in achieving petitioners' legiti-
mate employment goals."331 In determining equal effectiveness,
"'[f]actors such as the cost or other burdens of proposed alternative
selection devices are relevant.'"
333
Critics of the Wards Cove treatment of alternatives have fo-
cused on three points: (1) their disagreement with the Court's
holding that evidence of alternatives is relevant only insofar as it
tends to reveal a pretext for intentional discrimination; (2) their
questionable interpretation of the case as holding that in order for
the plaintiffs to prevail after the employer's demonstration of busi-
ness necessity, the employer must have refused to adopt the alter-
native after it has been suggested by the plaintiffs; and (3) their
disagreement with the Court's suggestion that increased costs or
other burdens are relevant in determining equal effectiveness.
The validity of the criticism largely depends on the proper
function of the "pretext" stage of a disparate impact case. As far as
the first and most fundamental criticism is concerned, there are
three competing explanations of that function: (1) proof of alterna-
tives may show that the employer is using a practice as a pretext
for intentional discrimination despite the fact that the practice may
be job related; (2) proof of alternatives may show that the chal-
lenged practice was not strictly "necessary," or (3) proof of alterna-
tives may provide a safety valve that allows plaintiffs to win who
would otherwise lose.
The first of these explanations seems most consistent with the
Albemarle Paper characterization of the issue in terms of "pretext,"
331. Id at 660-61.
332. Id. at 661.
333. Id (quoting Justice O'Connor in Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S.
977, 998 (1988)).
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which denotes a false reason given to mask the real reason.3M
Under such a view, the importance of evidence of alternatives is'
that it prevents exploitation of what might otherwise have been an
important loophole that would allow an employer to adopt a facial-
ly neutral practice because of its impact, not merely in spite of it.
The fact that the Court in Albemarle Paper noted that acting in the
face of alternatives with a lesser impact was "evidence" of discrim-
ination, rather than discrimination itself,335 buttresses this view of
the alternatives approach. The Court's citation to McDonnell Doug-
Las, a disparate-treatment case, also supports this perspective.
If Albemarle Paper had been endorsing the second function,
under which an employer would be liable as a matter of substan-
tive law for not adopting the practice having the least impact, it
would have made no sense for the Court to talk about evidence of
pretext. Because the employer's intent is not relevant to a dispa-
rate-impact case, the plaintiff would not have to demonstrate what
motivated the defendant; the entire focus would be on whether the
alternative was superior. Thus, the function of alternatives would
not be an evidentiary one, but rather a substantive one. 3 7 This is
a function that is inconsistent with the Court's reasoning. The
Wards Cove requirement that the employer knew of the existence
334. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 436 (1975). See WEsTER's THIRD
NEW INTERNATIONAL DIcTIoNARY 1797 (1986) (defining "pretext" as "a purpose or mo-
tive alleged or an appearance assumed in order to cloak the real intention or state of
affairs: EXCUSE; PRETENSE: COVER.").
Blumoff and Lewis question whether the Court could have been using the term
"pretext" in this way, since "[tiaken literally, the Court is saying that a plaintiff's dem-
onstration of a less discriminatory alternative must be so powerful as to yield the conclu-
sion that the employer's earlier adoption of a different practice to accomplish the same
goal was motivated by a desire to discriminate." Blumoff & Lewis, supra note 15, at 42.
Why this should be at all startling is unclear. Albemarle Paper clearly stated that the
existence of other devices without an undesirable effect "would be evidence that the em-
ployer was using its tests merely as a 'pretext' for discrimination." Albemarle Paper, 422
U.S. at 425. There is nothing, other than, perhaps, the fact that it placed quotation marks
around the word "pretext," to suggest that the Court was using the term "pretext" in a
way any different from its dictionary definition and its use in disparate-treatment cases.
335. Albemarle Paper, 422 U.S. at 436 (1975).
336. Id.
337. See Lamber, supra note 252, at 2:
Under the prevailing view, showing the existence of alternative employee selec-
tion criteria only aids in determining whether there is intentional discrimination.
Most commentary and a superficial reading of Supreme Court decisions suggest
that employees alleging discrimination must show that alternative selection crite-
ria are so superior to the existing criteria that a court can infer discriminatory
motivation from an employer's failure to adopt them.
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of the alternative and refused to adopt it after a demand by the
plaintiff 3  shows that Wards Cove was following in the footsteps
of Albemarle Paper by viewing the function as an evidentiary one.
Suggesting as much is the Wards Cove statement that the
employer's refusal to adopt the alternative "would belie a claim by
petitioners that their incumbent practices are being employed for
non-discriminatory reasons."339 Thus, Wards Cove was simply an
elaboration on the rule and rationale of Albemarle Paper that looks
to the employer's intent.
If the rule were a substantive one, it would also effectively
heighten the standard of employer justification of practices having
a disparate impact. A requirement that the employer adopt the
alternative with the least impact effectively commands that the
alternative chosen be strictly necessary? 4  Such an interpretation
would be inconsistent with the rejection by both Congress and the
Court of a strict necessity standard." It would also be contrary
to the Court's statement in Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters
that "Title VII... does not impose a duty to adopt a hiring pro-
cedure that maximizes hiring of minority employees." 342
It appears that for some commentators the real value of evi-
dence of alternatives is that it serves the third function of simply
increasing the number of victorious plaintiffs. For example, Mack
Player has complained that "[t]he viability of 'lesser discriminatory
alternatives' as a liability producing concept" has been "bled" by
the Court's treatment of the issue in Wards Cove. 43 Similarly,
Blumoff and Lewis criticize the Wards Cove Court for having
drained the rule of "practical vitality," since most employers would
probably adopt an alternative with lesser impact if it satisfied their
business objectives.3 However, instead of drawing comfort from
338. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 660-61.
339. Id. at 661.
340. Cf. Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 n.7 (4th Cir.) (holding that the
existence of an equally effective alternative with lesser impact demonstrates that the chal-
lenged practice is not necessary), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971).
341. See supra notes 255, 265 and accompanying text.
342. Fumco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577-78 (1978).
343. Player, supra note 27, at 28 (emphasis added).
344. Blumoff & Lewis, supra note 15, at 42.
[If the employer, with its greater knowledge of the demands and possibilities
of the business, could implement an alternative practice that serves its needs as
well and cheaply as the original practice but with less discriminatory impact,
would it not have done so initially, to avoid the expense of litigation?
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their observation that most employers will choose the less discrim-
inatory practice rendering litigation unnecessary, Blumoff and Lew-
is conclude that the rule is defective because plaintiffs will not
have viable claims. 4s One is reminded of the old saying that the
smartest criminals are the ones who do not break the law, because
then they get off scot free.
If the purpose of the discrimination law is to create employer
liability, then, of course, any requirement of proof by the plaintiff
and any recognition of employer defenses is a flaw in the system.
However, that is not the articulated purpose of the law. The mere
fact that few employers will adopt practices supported by legitimate
business justifications for the purpose of discrimination is no more
reason to expand the scope of liability than is the fact that not
many drivers exceed a given speed limit a valid reason for reduc-
ing the limit.
The second aspect of the Wards Cove alternatives rule that has
come under attack is its ostensible holding that an employer's
refusal to implement the suggested alternative practice is a condi-
tion precedent to recovery.346 The offending phrase is as follows:
[i]f respondents, having established a prima facie case,
come forward with alternatives to petitioners' hiring prac-
tices that reduce the racially disparate impact of practices
currently being used, and petitioners refuse to adopt these
alternatives, such a refusal would belie a claim by peti-
tioners that their incumbent practices are being employed
for non-discriminatory reasons. 7
345. Blumoff and Lewis despair over the plaintiff's burden in disparate-impact cases
under Wards Cove:
To justify a significant disproportionate adverse impact the employer would
henceforth only have to offer some evidence that its practice served, to an
uncertain degree, any legitimate business purpose. Plaintiffs would then bear the
ultimate burden of proving the contrary, and in doing so they would be limited
to evidence of less discriminatory alternatives as cheap and effective as the
employer's own chosen practice.
Id at 45.
346. See Id. at 43.
347. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 660-61 (1989). The passage
preceding this reads:
Finally, if on remand the case reaches this point, and respondents cannot per-
suade the trier of fact on the question of petitioners' business necessity defense,
respondents may still be able to prevail. To do so, respondents will have to
persuade the factfinder that "other tests or selection devices, without a similarly
undesirable racial effect, would also serve the employer's legitimate [hiring] in-
terest[s];" by so demonstrating, respondents would prove that "[petitioners were]
1993]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
If the critics were correct in their assumption that the Court was
thereby ruling that plaintiffs could establish pretext only by show-
ing the employer's refusal to adopt the plaintiff's alternative, their
displeasure would be understandable. However, the passage is at
least as susceptible of an interpretation that the employer's refusal
of superior alternatives was only an example of pretext evidence
and by no means the exclusive method of proof. Indeed, it is in-
conceivable that the Court would hold, for example, that a plaintiff
could not demonstrate pretext by presenting evidence that officers
of the employer had talked about their desire to select one job-
related test over another because of its greater adverse impact on
minorities.
Finally, critics of Wards Cove complain of the Court's recogni-
tion that "[f]actors such as the cost or other burdens of proposed
alternative selection devices are relevant."M Yet, cost must be a
relevant factor in light of both the pretext rationale and the require-
ment that the alternative practice "must be equally effective as
petitioners' chosen hiring procedures in achieving petitioners' legiti-
mate employment goals." 49 As long as the issue is one of pre-
text, then cost is a legitimate consideration, since the employer is
saying that it adopted the challenged practice and rejected the
alternative because of cost considerations rather than a desire to
exclude. Moreover, if, as Albemarle Paper suggested, the emplo-
yer's interest in "efficient and trustworthy workmanship" 31 must
be equally well served by the proffered alternative, that interest is
not served as well by an alternative that is more expensive.
Much of the criticism of the Wards Cove treatment of cost-
using [their] tests merely as a 'pretext* for discrimination." Albemarle Paper
Co., supra, at 425; see also Watson, 487 U. S., at 998 (O'Connor, J.); id., at
1005-1006 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
Id. at 660.
348. Id. at 661 (quoting Justice O'Connor in Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487
U.S. 977, 998 (1988)). See Blumoff & Lewis, supra note 15, at 42 ("The suggestion that
increased financial or other costs associated with the proposed alternative preclude it from
being considered 'equally as effective as the challenged practice' usually should render the
option unavailing to the plaintiff.- (footnote omitted)); Alexander, supra note 90, at 607
('Mhe Court weakened the effectiveness of the showing of viable alternatives by quoting
with approval the Watson plurality's holding that factors such as cost are relevant to a
determination of the viability of proposed alternatives."). Again, the "effectiveness" of the
doctrine is measured by how many plaintiffs win, rather than by how well the doctrine
furthers the purposes of the statute.
349. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 661.
350. Albermarle Paper Co. V. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975).
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justification results from a failure to distinguish between the differ-
ent roles of a cost defense in disparate-treatment and disparate-
impact cases, and a failure to recognize that there is no inconsis-
tency in rejecting such a defense in the former cases and recogniz-
ing it in the latter. For example, Blumoff and Lewis suggest that
the Wards Cove analysis is unprecedented because "the Court has
consistently rejected a general cost defense to discrimination in
employment." 351 Interestingly, critics who assume that cost should
play the same role under the disparate-impact theory as under the
disparate-treatment theory are often the same people who argue that
the fundamental flaw in the Wards Cove decision was its tendency
to blur the differences between disparate-impact theory and dispa-
rate-treatment theory.352 However, cost evidence has a different
doctrinal function under the two theories and should be treated
differently.
In a disparate-treatment case, the employer is saying that it
took race or sex into account, but did so not because of racial or
sexual animus, but because it costs more to employ minorities or
women. In effect, the employer is contending that increased cost,
in itself, justifies disparate treatment. However, the Court has held
in City of Los Angeles Department of Water & Power v.
Manhart3 53 and subsequent cases that an incremental increase in
the cost of employing members of a particular group does not war-
rant differential treatment.354 The Court's rationale in Manhart
was that Title VII requires that each person be treated as an indi-
vidual and that Congress had not created an affirmative defense of
351. Blumoff & Lewis, supra note 15, at 42. See also Belton, Causation and Burden-
Shifting Doctrines, supra note 22, at 1396-97 (suggesting that the Court "recogniz[ed], for
the first time in employment discrimination law, a cost-justification defense" and that the
Court's prior rejection of a cost-justification in City of Los Angeles Department of Water
& Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 711 (1978), "is now in question").
352. See Blumoff & Lewis, supra note 15, at 45 ("Under a regime of functional equiv-
alence, a finding of impact looks very much like a proxy for intent.").
353. 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
354. Id. at 711. See, e.g., International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 111 S.
Ct. 1196, 1209 (1991) (the potential extra cost of employing fertile woman in a battery
making operation does not provide a legitimate reason for excluding them); Arizona Gov-
erning Comm'n for Tax Deferred Annuity and Deferred Compensation Plans v. Norris,
463 U.S. 1073, 1089 (1983) (an optional fringe-benefit scheme that requires women to
pay higher rates due to actuarial predictions violates Title VII). But see Johnson Controls,
111 S.Ct. at 1209 (suggesting that its holding might not apply in -a case in which costs
would be so prohibitive as to threaten the survival of the employer's business").
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differential cost.355 Thus, no room remains for a general cost de-
fense in a disparate-treatment case.
In a disparate-impact case where pretext is the issue, the em-
ployer is saying that it did not take race or sex into account. The
employer chose the particular job-related employment practice
because it was cost-effective, not because it created an adverse
impact. In this context, the role of cost is an important evidentiary
one, since it supports the employer's claim that it adopted the
practice for job-related rather than impermissible reasons.3
The argument against a cost-justification in disparate-impact
cases is a fundamentally incoherent one. Indeed, a cost-justification
defense is compelled by the logic of the disparate-impact theo-
ry s5 Under the disparate-impact theory, any facially neutral em-
ployer practice that has a disparate impact, even if adopted with an
innocent intent, is unlawful if it does not further the employer's
legitimate (or important) interests such as its "legitimate interest in
'efficient and trustworthy workmanship."' 358 If the practice does
further the employer's legitimate business interests, then the em-
ployer prevails in the absence of a showing of alternatives that
would serve the employer's interests just as well but would have a
355. Manhart, 435 U.S. at 709-10. For criticism of the Manhart rationale, see Kingsley
R. Browne, Biology, Equality, and the Law: The Legal Significance of Biological Sex
Differences, 38 Sw. L.L 617, 664-668 (1984).
356. See Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (Discriminatory purpose
"implies that the decisionmaker . .. selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at
least in part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an identifiable
group.").
357. See Hugh S. Wilson, A Second Look at Griggs v. Duke Power Company: Rumina-
tions on Job Testing, Discrimination, and the Role of the Federal Courts, 58 VA. L. REV.
844, 851 (1972):
Prohibition of any consideration of the additional overhead an employer must
incur by hiring one employee as opposed to another extends the job relation
requirement so far as to undercut the maxim, for, if enough money and time
are expended, virtually anyone can perform almost any job satisfactorily.
Business necessity can only be meaningfully measured in terms of dol-
lars and cents. And, since money is fungible, it is of little concern to the
rational employer whether additional costs arise from an employee's poor per-
formance of a specific job, from added administrative costs, from the disruption
of other employees' normal workload, from extraordinary training or supervisory
expenses, or from any other cause. Unless the lower courts intend to use the
Griggs ruling as a means of forcing employers to pay for society's shortcom-
ings, they should be careful to consider the question of job relatedness in the
context of business necessity.
358. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975).
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lesser adverse impact.359 Those rejecting a cost defense would re-
quire the employer to adopt alternatives even if they are substan-
tially more expensive than the practices actually adopted.W That,
however, subverts a key aspect of the disparate-impact theory,
which allows an employer to defend on efficiency grounds practic-
es causing a disparate impact. According to the critics, in the ab-
sence of alternatives, the employer may defend a practice having a
disparate impact on the ground that it saves the employer a great
deal of money.361 Yet if a more expensive alternative is suggest-
ed, the employer at that point may not defend its declining to
adopt it on the ground that it would cost the employer a lot of
money.3 62 Moreover, since the suggested alternative must serve
the employer's interests equally well, it does not make sense to say
that a more expensive alternative satisfies that standard, since the
costlier alternative would not serve the employer's interests as well
as the cheaper one.
b. Alternatives with Lesser Impact under the Civil Rights Act of
1991
The potential effect of the 1991 Act on the alternatives issue is
ambiguous. The Act provides that even if an employer demon-
strates the business necessity of a practice, the plaintiff still can
prevail if he demonstrates the existence of an alternative employ-
ment practice and the employer "refuses to adopt such alternative
359. The relevance of cost-justification to the pretext issue is discussed supra at notes
351-60 and accompanying text, but its significance is not limited to the pretext issue.
360. See supra notes 353-56.
361. See, e.g., Belton, supra note 22, at 1397 (Wards Cove seems to endorse a cost-
justification defense that would allow employers to validate a practice with a disparate im-
pact on the ground that to change the practice would interfere with profit maximization).
362. Consider, for example, an employer that adopts a standardized test to predict
applicants' job performance. The test has a disparate impact on minorities, but the em-
ployer can show that it is a reasonably good, although not perfect, predictor of job per-
formance. At that point the employer has satisfied its obligation to demonstrate business
necessity. Suppose the plaintiffs then argue that rather than using the test as a screening
device, the employer could do its screening three months after hire, at which point it
would have reliable evidence of job performance. Suppose further that the plaintiffs could
convince the court that if this method were adopted there would be a lesser impact on
minorities. The employer would argue that to adopt an on-the-job screening program
would impose substantial additional personnel costs and would result in decreased effi-
ciency because for the first three months of employment, many of the employees would
not have the necessary ability. As a result, their work would have to be more closely
scrutinized and the work would not get done as fast. Yet this is still a -cost defense,-
and those who would deny the validity of any cost defense should require the employer
to do all its screening on a post-hire basis.
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employment practice."363 This demonstration is to be made in ac-
cordance with pre-Wards Cove law.314 This provision presents
four primary issues: (1) whether the existence of alternatives cre-
ates liability in itself or is instead merely evidence of pretext; (2)
whether a plaintiff must demonstrate the employer's refusal to
adopt the alternative in order to prevail in the face of the
employer's business-necessity defense; (3) at what point chronolog-
ically the employer's rejection must come; and (4) whether an
alternative may be less than adequate because of its cost or other
burdens to the employer.
The first issue is whether the existence of alternatives creates
liability in itself or is instead merely evidence of pretext. As previ-
ously discussed, Albemarle identified the importance of alternatives
evidence as showing pretext, and it is under the rule of Albemarle
that the demonstration of alternatives is to be made.36 - This sug-
gests that the pretext rule of Albermarle remains unchanged. An
argument could be made, however, that the Act modifies the
Albemarle Paper rule by making the employer's refusal to adopt
suggested alternatives illegal in itself, rather than merely evidence
of pretext. The Act provides that an employer has committed an
unlawful employment practice if the plaintiff demonstrates an alter-
native employment practice and the employer refuses to adopt
it.366 The Act further provides that the above-described "demon-
stration" shall be in accordance with pre-Wards Cove law.3 67 It
does not say that the consequences of that demonstration shall be
the same as prior to Wards Cove. However, examination of the
"purposes" section of the statute gives no indication that Congress
was attempting to modify Albemarle Paper, a case that was gener-
ally considered a substantial plaintiffs' victory. Likewise, the legis-
lative history does not reveal any widespread dissatisfaction with
363. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii) (West Supp. 1992), infra Appendix H § 105.
364. Newly added Section 703(k)(1)(A)(ii) provides that an unlawful employment prac-
tice is established if -the complaining party makes the demonstration described in subpara-
graph (C) with respect to an alternative employment practice and the respondent refuses to
adopt such alternative employment practice." Id. Subparagraph C provides: "The demon-
stration referred to by subparagraph (A)(ii) shall be in accordance with the law as it
existed on June 4, 1989, with respect to the concept of 'alternative employment practice.'"
Id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(C) (West Supp. 1992), infra Appendix H § 105.
365. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 436 (1975). See supra notes 335-40
and accompanying text.
366. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii) (West Supp. 1992), infra Appendix H § 105.
367. Id § 2000e-2(k)(1)(C) (West Supp. 1992), infra Appendix H § 105.
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Albemarle Paper, although earlier iterations of the Act would clear-
ly have rejected the pretext implications of Albemarle Paper.
These earlier versions of the Act included a clear departure
from Albemarle Paper's pretext approach. Although the Civil
Rights Act of 1990 originally did not address the subject of alter-
natives, the version that President Bush ultimately vetoed,369
as well as early versions of the 1991 Act,370 stated that an em-
ployment practice supported by business necessity was not unlawful
except that an employment practice or group of employ-
ment practices demonstrated to be required by business
necessity shall be unlawful where a complaining party
demonstrates that a different employment practice or group
of employment practices with less disparate impact would
serve the respondent as well.371  I
Under these versions, the existence of alternatives was seemingly
enough to establish liability.
The Act's apparent requirement that the plaintiff establish that
the employer refused to adopt the alternative practice after it was
pointed out to the employer lends support to the conclusion that
the Act calls for a pretext analysis.3r If the governing rule were
that the employer is required as a matter of substantive law to
select the justified practice that has the least impact, there would
be no basis for the rejection requirement. The employer's rejection
provides a basis for transforming innocent conduct into culpable
conduct, because it may justify attributing a particular mental state
to the employer. Because intent, although critical to a disparate-
treatment case, is irrelevant to a disparate-impact case, it appears
that the pretext rule remains.
As to the second issue - the necessity of an employer rejec-
368. See S. 2104, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG. REC. S.1018 (1990), infra Appen-
dix A.
369. MR. REP. NO. 856, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG. REC. H9552-54 (1990),
infra Appendix D.
370. See, e.g., Civil Rights and Women's Equity in Employment Act of 1991, H.R. 1,
102d Cong., 1st Sess., 137 CONG. REC. H13876 (1991).
371. MR. I § 202, 102d Cong., Ist Sess., 137 CONG. REC. H3876, H3789 (1991), infra
Appendix F § 202; H.R. REP. NO. 856 § 4, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG. REC.
H9552, H9553 (1990), infra Appendix D § 4.
372. Significantly, the language concerning the employer's refusal to adopt the practice
with lesser impact did not appear in the bill until S. 1745 was introduced by Senator
Danforth in September 1991. S. 1745 § 8, 102d Cong., Ist Sess., reprinted in DAILY
LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 186, at D-1 (Sept. 25, 1991), infra Appendix G § 8.
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tion - the 1991 Act may be stricter than Wards Cove itself. The
Act appears to make rejection of alternatives the sole basis for a
finding of liability once the employer has demonstrated business
necessity. This turns what was probably an illustration in Wards
Cove into a necessary requirement.373 Notwithstanding the appar-
ent codification of the rejection requirement, the Act should not be
interpreted as foreclosing other methods of demonstrating pretext.
By demonstrating pretext, the plaintiff is establishing that this is
not a standard disparate-impact case where a facially neutral prac-
tice, adopted without discriminatory intent, has had an adverse
impact on members of a particular group. Instead, the plaintiff is
showing that the employer's action is a species of intentional dis-
crimination. Consequently, the plaintiff would not appear to be
limited by the disparate-impact rules, because the case has now
become one of disparate treatment. 374 For example, it is well es-
tablished that a plaintiff in a constitutional equal protection case
cannot prevail by a showing that a state law has a disparate im-
pact.375 Nonetheless, if the plaintiff can show that the state adopt-
ed a facially neutral policy because of its disparate impact, not
merely in spite of it, the plaintiff can prevail on an intentional
discrimination theory.376 There is no requirement that this intent
be demonstrated in any particular way, and absent a clear statement
by Congress that it intends to limit the disparate-treatment theory,
the disparate-impact rules should not be so interpreted.
Another substantial ambiguity of the rejection requirement
concerns timing. The plaintiff establishes an unlawful employment
practice if he "makes the demonstration ... with respect to an
alternative employment practice and the respondent refuses to adopt
such alternative employment practice. "3" This language suggests
373. As previously discussed, see supra text accompanying notes 264-65, it is doubtful
that the Supreme Court in Wards Cove intended to make an employers refusal to adopt
an alternative practice the exclusive method of demonstrating pretext. Other strong evi-
dence that the employer selected the alternative for discriminatory reasons would establish
pretext as well.
374. It could be argued, of course, that interpreting the bill as retaining the Albemarle
Paper pretext approach to alternatives renders the rejection requirement surplusage.
375. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (a law or other official act is not
unconstitutional solely because it has a racially disparate impact).
376. Personnel Adxn'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (Discriminatory purpose
-implies that the decisionmaker ... selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at
least in part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an identifiable
group.").
377. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(k)(l)(A)(ii) (West Supp. 1992), infra Appendix H § 105.
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a temporal sequence of a plaintiff's demonstration followed by the
employer's rejection. Although the term "demonstration" is not
defined in the Act, the term "demonstrates" is defined to mean
"meets the burdens of production and persuasion."37 Thus, the
implication is that the plaintiff must first prove the existence of the
alternative in court, and then the employer must reject it.
This chronological implication was expressed in Wards Cove
itself, where the Court stated:
If [plaintiffs], having established a prima facie case, come
forward with alternatives to [the employers'] hiring practic-
es that reduce the racially disparate impact of practices
currently being used, and [the employers] refuse to adopt
these alternatives, such a refusal would belie a claim by
[the employers] that their incumbent practices are being
employed for non-discriminatory reasons.379
The Wards Cove description clearly contemplates that the plaintiffs
must first establish their prima facie case and then come forward
with evidence of alternatives. At that point, liability of the employ-
er turns on whether, after the plaintiffs' showing, the employer
adopts the alternatives.
Although one could argue that the refusal at trial retroactively
invalidates the- earlier adoption of the challenged practice, it is
difficult to articulate a rationale to justify such a rule; by defini-
tion, the practice will have been justified by business necessity and
not adopted for discriminatory purposes.3 ° Under the "retroac-
378. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e(m) (West Supp. 1992). One might argue that the definition of
the term "demonstration" should not be limited by the definition of the term "demon-
strates." However, the original version of S. 1745 - the version immediately preceding
the compromise bill - treated the alternatives issue as follows:
"[the] practice ...is ... unlawful if the complaining party demonstrates that
a different available employment practice, which would have less disparate
impact ...would serve the respondent's legitimate interests as well and the
respondent refuses to adopt such alternative employment practice."
S. 1745 § 8, 102d Cong., Ist Sess., reprinted in DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 186, at D-
1, D-4 (Sept. 25, 1991), infra Appendix G § 8 (emphasis added). There is no indication
that the change in terminology from "demonstrates" to "demonstration" was intended to
have any substantive effect, and, again, given the history of the 1991 Act, there is no
basis for inferring that the ultimate compromise bill places greater burdens on employers
than the bill that preceded it.
379. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 660-61.
380. Blunoff & Lewis predicted that under the Wards Cove formulation an employer
would not prevail in arguing that liability for back pay could not begin until the employ-
er rejects the alternative. They argued that "[t]he Court generally has not absolved em-
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tivity" analysis, the employer's legitimate adoption of a business-
justified employment practice would be rendered illegal by some-
thing that happened perhaps years later - the employer's rejection
of an alternative that might not even have existed at the time the
employer adopted its initial practice. If the wrong is the rejection
of the practice, availability of relief should run from the date of
the rejection.
A coherent rationale for alternatives is also necessary to deal
with the questions of how much information the employer must
have at the time of the rejection in order to hold it liable and how
to deal with an employer's good-faith refusal to adopt the suggest-
ed alternative. If the plaintiff's identification of alternatives can
precede trial, or even the commencement of the litigation itself,
employers will be faced with suggested alternatives about which
they have varying amounts of information. They often will not
know whether the alternatives would serve their interests equally
well or whether the alternatives would reduce the disparate impact.
If evidence of alternatives is relevant only insofar as it shows
pretext, then if the employer declines to adopt a suggested modifi-
cation in its practices because of a good-faith belief that the modi-
fication would not serve its interests as well (or that it would not
reduce the disparate impact), the plaintiff's suggestion of pretext
would be rejected. On the other hand, if liability based on rejection
of alternatives is predicated on some rationale other than pretext,
then the employer's motivation may not be relevant. Under such an
analysis, an employer that adopted a practice that in fact is justi-
fied by business necessity could be held liable for refusing to
adopt an alternative practice even if the refusal was both reason-
able and in good faith.38'
The practical significance of this distinction is enormous. Sup-
pose, for example, that in response to an employer's adoption of a
validated standardized test that has a disparate impact on blacks,
ployers from Title VII liability for violations occurring after the statute's effective date
merely because, by the time of trial or decision, the acts of discrimination have ceased."
Blumoff & Lewis, supra note 15 at 45. They recognize, however, that such an argument
"begs the question of whether the employer has committed any violation before the plain-
tiff presents it with an alternative practice." Id.
381. The two most obvious non-pretext rationales for such a rule, however, are incon-
sistent with Title VII: (1) a policy rationale that measures the worth of an interpretation
based upon how well it produces plaintiff victories; or (2) a policy rationale that requires
employers to do everything within their power to maximize the number of minorities
hired.
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lawyers for black employees protest the practice and provide a list
of twelve suggested alternative tests, without demonstrating in any
way that they would either decrease the impact or serve the
employer's interests equally well. The employer rejects the sug-
gested practices because it believes that they would not serve its
interests as well or would not reduce the impact, or because it is
completely in the dark with respect to their effect and not inclined
to devote resources to discovering it. At a subsequent trial, possi-
bly years later, after the employer has demonstrated the business
necessity of its challenged practice, plaintiffs convince the court
that one of their twelve alternatives would serve the employer's
interests as well as the challenged practice. If pretext is the issue,
employer liability would not be justified because the employer did
not continue to use the original practice as a pretext for harming
blacks, since it had no basis in fact 'for concluding that the sug-
gested modifications would improve the situation of blacks. How-
ever, under a rationale that makes the employer's good faith irrele-
vant, our hypothetical employer is liable for its rejection of the
plaintiffs' laundry list of alternatives. Thus, under a non-pretext-
based rule, the employer would have to perform validation studies
on all twelve of the alternatives to determine whether they were
good predictors of job performance. The employer would also have
to perform studies concerning the relative impact of each alterna-
tive on blacks. It is difficult to conceive of a greater incentive to
quota hiring.
One final question remains: will higher costs justify an
employer's rejection of an alternative with a lesser impact? As dis-
cussed above, if the issue is one of pretext, then the answer is
simple.3" If an employer adopts a facially neutral policy without
an intent to harm minorities and refuses to adopt an alternative
practice on the basis of its higher cost, then a pretext analysis
would not aid the plaintiff. If the underlying rationale is simply to
aid plaintiffs or increase incentives for minority hiring, then one
should conclude that the employer must adopt the more expensive
policy even if it is substantially more expensive. If that is indeed
the rationale, there would be no basis for requiring that the alterna-
tive with lesser impact serve the employers' interests as well as the
382. See supra notes 348-62.
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employer's chosen policy.383 Rather, we would say that the em-
ployer is obligated to adopt the alternative even if it is less effec-
tive.
Although the statute is not free from ambiguity, two reasons
suggest that the alternatives issue should be examined under a
pretext rationale. First, a pretext rationale was employed in
Albemarle Paper, and no overt attempt to overrule Albemarle Pa-
per appears in the legislative record.3" Second, the pretext ratio-
nale provides a coherent framework for analyzing the collateral is-
sues that will necessarily arise.385 The two primary policy justifi-
cations for rejecting pretext as a guiding principle are maximizing
plaintiff victories and maximizing minority hires. These are ratio-
nales that none of the participants who enacted the legislation will
admit to endorsing. Therefore, pretext offers the only coherent
theory of alternatives. Without this theory, each issue must be
addressed on an ad hoe basis without guidance from any dis-
cernible statutory purpose.
383. The Act does not specifically require that the alternative serve the employer's
interest as well, but such a requirement is implicit in the notion of alternativ'es. The em-
ployer always has the alternative of not adopting the challenged practice at all, so it
always has an alternative. If the challenged practice has a disparate impact, the alternative
of no practice would eliminate that impact. Nonetheless, the employer is not obligated to
select the no-practice alternative.
Earlier versions of the statute expressly addressed the issue of effectiveness of alter-
natives. For example, the original version of S. 1745 required the plaintiff to show that
the alternative would "make a difference in the disparate impact that is more than negligi-
ble [and] would serve the respondent's legitimate interests as well." S. 1745 § 8, 102d
Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in DALY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 186, D-1, D-4 (Sept. 25,
1991), infra Appendix G § 8. The vetoed version of the 1990 bill provided that a prac-
tice required by business necessity is unlawful if the plaintiff "demonstrates that a differ-
ent employment practice or group of employment practices with less disparate impact
would serve the [employer] as well." H.RL REP. No. 856 § 4, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136
CONG. Rnc. H9552, H9553 (1990), infra Appendix D § 4. Nothing about the compromise
with the White House suggests an understanding or expectation that the employer's right
to reject less-effective alternatives was being eliminated.
384. Even if some members of Congress were dissatisfied with the pretext rationale of
Albemarle Paper, it is not surprising that they did not express dissatisfaction with it,
given that their theme was that Wards Cove had broken with almost two decades of
consistent precedent that had not resulted in quotas. It is difficult to make such an argu-
ment at the same time one is overtly modifying that pre-existing precedent.
385. In addition to the issues already discussed, another issue that will have to be re-
solved is how much less impact is necessary in order to decide that this alternative is
one that the employer should have adopted. Some earlier versions of the statute required
the plaintiff to show only that the difference in impact was "more than negligible." See
S. 1745 § 8, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 186, D-l,
D-4 (Sept. 25, 1991), infra Appendix G § 8.
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III. CONCLUSION
Although the original responses to Wards Cove seemed to be
animated by a powerful group-equality sentiment, the history of the
disparate-impact provisions demonstrates a continual retreat from a
strong version of such a policy. The original 1990 Act would have
resulted in the widespread adoption of hiring quotas by employers
because the burden on employers of justifying statistical disparities
would have made those numerical disparities intolerably expensive.
While some of the proponents of the Act may not have abandoned
their individual desires to impose a proportional-representation
requirement, there was insufficient support in Congress and in the
White House to enact that wish into law.
Instead, what is seen in the evolution of the Act is an increase
in the burden on plaintiffs to demonstrate the causal nexus between
particular practices and disparate effects, as well as a decrease in
the burden on employers to justify statistical disparities. Congress
disavowed any intent to pressure employers to adopt quotas and
finally dropped its stated goal of overruling the business-necessity
test of Wards Cove. In the end Congress settled for an overruling
of the burden-of-proof holding.3 Congress also outlawed race
norming as a form of affirmative action387 and declined to en-
386. Even the 1990 Act, which was a stronger Act than its successor, was criticized by
some as too weak See Blumoff & Lewis, supra note 15, at 85 ("[i]t is surprising that
legislation so largely inspired by outrage in the civil rights cormtmity over the Court's
dismemberment of the impact case in Watson and Wards Cove would do so little to
revive it").
387. The initial pressure to outlaw race norming came from Rep. Henry Hyde (R.- IL)
who introduced an amendment before the House Judiciary Committee in March of 1991.
Steven A. Holmes, Adjusting of Test Scores Inflames Rights Debate, N.Y. TIMES, May 17,
1991, at A12. That amendment was defeated by a vote along straight party lines. Ld.
Between March of 1991, when the Hyde Amendment was defeated, and June of 1991,
when the House approved a version of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 that incorporated
Congressman Hyde's prohibition of race norming, the concept of race norming had be-
come a very contentious political issue. See, e.g., Laurence L Barrett, Cheating on the
Tests; The Controversial Practice Known as Race Norming Was Probably Doing Minori-
ties More Long-Term Harm than Good, TIME, June 3, 1991, at 57; Peter A. Brown,
Normin' Stormin': Why Republicans Love 'Race-Norming, NEW REPUBIIC, Apr. 29, 1991,
at 12; Charles Fried, Quotas: The Smoking Gun, WASH. POST, May 29, 1991, at A19;
Holly K. Hacker, Adjusted Federal Employment Tests Stir Controversy, L.A. TIMES, June
6, 1991, at AS; Steven A. Holmes, Adjusting of Test Scores Inflames Rights Debate, N.Y.
TMES, May 17, 1991, at A12; Peter T. Kilbom, 'Race Norming' Tests Becomes a Fiery
Issue, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 1991, at Sec. 4, p. 5; Paul C. Roberts, Playing Quotas
Games, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1991, at G3; Stuart Taylor, Jr., Rigging Test Scores by
Race, LEGAL TIMES, May 13, 1991, at 21; Test Cases: How 'Race-Norming' Works,
NEWSWEEK, June 3, 1991, at 16; Editorial, Unfairly Adjusting an Unfair Test, WASH.
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dorse the Supreme Court's permissive precedents on affirmative ac-
tion,388 such as Weber and Johnson, despite the known desire of
several Justices to overrule them.389 It also declined to overrule
City of Richmond v. JA. Croson Co., 3 ° which had struck down
a minority set-aside program,39' despite the dissatisfaction of
POST, May 22, 1991, at A20; George F. Will, If It Looks Like a Racial Quota
and ... , NEWSDAY, May 23, 1991, at 138.
In the glare of publicity, race norming found few supporters, since it became im-
plausible simultaneously to denounce quotas and to support race norming, which is, in
substance, simply one way to obtain quotas. But see Editorial, Race-Norming: Necessary,
for Now, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 1991, at A24.
388. Section 116 of the Act provides: "Nothing in the amendments made by this title
shall be construed to affect court-ordered remedies, affirmative action, or conciliation
agreements, that are in accordance with the law." The Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L.
No. 102-166, § 116, 105 Stat. 1071, 1079 § 116 (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 42 U.S.C.A., 2 U.S.C.A., 16 U.S.C.A. and 29 U.S.C.A.), infra Appendix H §
116. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1891 Historical and Statutory Notes (West Supp. 1992).
Representatives Brooks and Fish offered an unsuccessful amendment that would have
taken a more definitive stance by specifically approving affirmative action. That amend-
ment provided in part:
Sec. 111. VOLUNTARY AND COURT-ORDERED AFFIRMATIVE ACTION APPROVED;
QUOTAS DEEM ED UNLAWFUL EMLOYmENT PRACTCE.
(a) RULES OF CONSTRUCTION. - Nothing in the amendments made by
this Act shall be construed -
(1) to limit an employer in establishing its job requirements if
such requirements are lawful under title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
as amended; or
(2) to require, encourage, or permit an employer to adopt hiring
or promotion quotas on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national ori-
gin, and the use of such quotas shall be deemed to be an unlawful employ-
ment practice under such title: Provided, That the amendments made by this
Act shall be construed to approve the lawfulness of voluntary or court-ordered
affirmative action that is -
(A) consistent with the decisions of the Supreme Court of
the United States in employment discrimination cases; or
(B) in the absence of such decisions, otherwise in accor-
dance with employment discrimination law; as in effect on the date of the en-
actment of this Act.
(b) DEFINrION. - For purposes of subsection (a), the term -quota"
means a fixed number or percentage of persons of a particular race, color, reli-
gion, sex, or national origin which must be attained, or which cannot be ex-
ceeded, regardless of whether such persons meet necessary qualifications to
perform the job.
137 CONG. REC. H3924 (daily ed. June 5, 1991).
389. In Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987), Justice Scalia, Justice
White, and Chief Justice Rehnquist called for the overruling of Weber. Id. at 657 (White,
J., dissenting); id. at 673 (Scalia, J., dissenting). At the time of that decision, Justices
Kennedy, Souter, and Thomas had not yet joined the Court.
390. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
391. Id at 511.
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some of the leading proponents of the Act with that case.39
Even the provision of the stattite overruling Martin v. Wilks, 3
which had allowed plaintiffs to challenge affirmative-action plans
contained in consent decrees, 31 was defended primarily on the
basis of finality of judgments, rather than in terms of support for
racial preferences.3
The history of the 1991 Act demonstrates that congressional
supporters of a group-equality/proportional-representation approach
to employment discrimination do not consider that philosophy
politically viable.3 6 The anti-quota arguments had a powerful ef-
fect on members of Congress because polls have shown that the
majority of American citizens oppose not jtist rigid "quotas," but
the whole notion of racial and sexual preferences.3" The actions
392. For example, Senator Paul Simon complained about the "six decisions by the U.S.
Supreme Court that unquestionably erode basic civil rights in this country," with the sixth
decision being Croson. 136 CONG. REC. S15,339-40 (1990) (statement of Sen. Simon).
That decision was excluded from the bill, although he indicated an intent to move for-
ward "next year" on a separate bill to overrule Croson. M" at S15,340. The wisdom of
deferring consideration of a bill to enshrine affirmative action at a time when proponents
of the Act were disclaiming any intent to create a quota society is manifest.
On the other hand, Senator Specter, one of the co-sponsors of the Danforth Bill, in
expressing his opposition to quotas, described the set-aside program struck down in
Croson as a "quota." 136 CONG. REC. S15,372 (1990) (statement of Sen. Specter).
Of course, the Act declined to overrule Weber and Johnson as well. On July 18,
1990, Senator Dole offered an unsuccessful amendment that read in part: "Nothing in the
amendments made by this Act, or in any statute amended by this Act, shall be construed
to require, permit, or result in the adoption or implementation of hiring, promotion, or
termination quotas . . . on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 136
CONG. REc. S9955 (1990). That amendment was rejected in favor of language that pro-
vides that "[n]othing in the amendments made by this Act shall be construed to require
or encourage an employer to adopt hiring or promotion quotas." H.R. REP. No. 856 § 13,
101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG. REC. H9552, H9554 (1990), infrd Appendix D § 13.
393. 490 U.S. 755 (1989).
394. Id at 769.
395. Martin v. Wlky was overruled by § 108 of The Civil Rights Act of 1991.
396. Cf Robert A. Sedler, Employment Equality, Affirmative Action, and the Constitu-
tional Political Consensus, 90 MIcH. L. REV. 1315 (1992) (book review). Professor Sedler
infers from congressional failure to overturn Weber and from the continuing enforcement
of Executive Order 11,246 that there exists a "constitutional political consensus" favoring
race and sex preferences. Id. at 1336-37. To the extent that this inference is correct, it is
at best a semi-surreptitious consensus, since there is little publicly expressed willingness to
grant overt preferences.
397. A New York Times/CBS News poll conducted from June 3-6, 1991, asked respon-
dents the question: "Do you believe that where there has been job discrimination against
blacks in the past, preference in hiring or promotion should be given to blacks today?"
61% of respondents said "no," while only 24% said "yes." Robin Toner, Symbolic Justice;
Capturing an Era's Racial Conflicts and Ironies, N.Y. TiMEs, July 7, 1991, at § 4, p. 1.
The number of negative responses to that question has been increasing for the last six
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of Congress during debates over the Act were responsive to those
public sentiments, and the Act should be interpreted in that
light.39
8
The perceived political danger of endorsing racial and sexual
preferences no doubt contributed to the volatility of the reaction to
Wards Cove.399 Affirmative action in employment has largely
been the product of the courts and the administrative bureaucracy,
the least politically accountable institutions of government.'
Wards Cove was apparently perceived to threaten the accommoda-
tion between Congress, on the one hand, and the courts and the
bureaucracy, on the other, under which preferences would be repu-
diated by the former yet embraced by the latter."' Ironically, one
years. Id.
A Washington Post/ABC News poll produced similar results, with 80% of all respon-
dents opposed to racial preferences in jobs even when "there are no rigid quotas." Tom
Kenworthy & Thomas B. Edsall, Whites See Jobs on Line in Debate; Some Chicagoans
Fear Reverse Bias, WASH. POST, June 4, 1991, at Al.
398. See James Forman, Jr., Victory By Surrender: The Voting Rights Amendments of
1982 and the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 10 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 133, 174 (1992)
(arguing that in order to obtain passage of the Act, proponents were forced to back away
from "a civil rights vision that called for expanding race-based employment preferences,
repudiating traditional definitions of merit and qualifications, restraining the employer's
managerial prerogative, and broadening federal court protection for employees").
399. The political risk of appearing to endorse preferences no doubt contributed to the
lack of discussion about affirmative action during the confirmation hearings of Clarence
Thomas, despite the fact that it was in large part his opposition to affirmative action that
made him such a controversial figure. Linda Greenhouse, Who's Judge Thomas? For Now,
it Depends on Who You Are, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 1991, § 4, at 4 ("His blunt criticism
of Government programs that confer special benefits on minorities, and his opposition to
affirmative action policies during eight years as chairman of the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission, put him at odds with much of the civil rights establishment."); see
also W. John Moore, Like Souter, Thomas Left Few Ripples, 23 NAT'L J., No. 38, at
2274 (Sept. 21, 1991) ("More important, Democrats were unwilling to ask questions that
exposed their own political vulnerabilities. Few Democrats lingered on such hot-button
issues as affirmative action or civil rights.").
400. See generally HERMAN BELz, EQuAL TY TRANSFPonmD: A QUARTER-CENTURY OF
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION (1991) (chronicling the history of affirmative action); Kingsley R.
Browne, Liberty vs. Equality: Congressional Enforcement Power Under the Fourteenth
Amendment, 59 DENY. L.L 417, 452-53 (1982) (observing that "equality of result" has
been mandated largely by courts and bureaucracies without the participation of Congress
and the public).
401. There are those who defend this kind of "policy making by deception." For ex-
ample, David Strauss has advocated the adoption of "a requirement that every firm em-
ploy minorities in proportion to their percentage in the national population." Strauss, supra
note 19, at 1655. Recognizing the political unpopularity of quotas, however, he suggests
that the requirement be "implemented in a low-visibility way." Id. at 1652-54. His method
of choice is the method that the proponents of group equality have been using since the
implementation of goals-and-timetables two decades ago: "[a]n administrative agency oper-
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of the arguments against the quota claim was that opponents of the
1964 Act had raised the same claim, thus demonstrating its spe-
ciousness. History, however, suggests a very different conclu-
sion. It is true that opponents argued that the 1964 Act would
result in hiring quotas, and it is equally true that proponents of that
Act denied that it would have such an effect. In fact, proponents of
the 1964 Act, such as Hubert Humphrey, not only denied that the
Act would require quotas and preferential treatment, but asserted
that it would not permit such treatment.' 3 However, the assur-
ance that the statute required a color-blind approach was disre-
garded by the majority in United Steel Workers v. Weber",
which held that employers indeed are permitted to grant racial
preferences.' In light of this history, the skepticism of oppo-
nents of the bill to the quota disclaimers is understandable.
Any theory of discrimination that relies for its proof on statisti-
cal disparities, whether it is the disparate-impact theory of Griggs
or classwide pattern-or-practice cases such as International Brother-
hood of Teamsters v. United States, imposes pressures on em-
ployers to engage in affirmative action in order to avoid the statis-
tical disparities that they otherwise would be called upon to de-
fend.' Wards Cove did not eliminate that pressure, although it
reduced it in comparison to what some lower courts were requir-
ing. In that sense, then, even the compromise Civil Rights Act is a
"quota bill." However, one deals in degrees and not in absolutes
and it may fairly be said that the compromise bill was less of a
quota bill than its predecessors.
A proper interpretation of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 should
take into account the nature of the incentives that are created by
any given interpretation. The primary purpose of this law, like
most laws, is the voluntary compliance with its strictures rather
than its application in the context of litigation. There is an unfortu-
ating without much publicity." Id. at 1654-55.
402. See 136 CONG. REC. H6809 (1990) (statement of Rep. Edwards) (discussing the
quota debate and its effect on the 1964 Civil Rights Act).
403. See supra note 34.
404. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
405. Id. at 208.
406. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
407. See Michael M. Gottesman, The Law and Economics of Racial Discrimination in
Employment: Twelve Topics to Consider Before Opting for Racial Quotas, 79 GEO. L.
1737, 1750 (1991) (arguing that the disparate-impact doctrine itself is a form of preferen-
tial treatment because it imposes increased search costs on employers if lower-cost meth-
ods do not yield a proportionate percentage of blacks).
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nate tendency for legal commentators to focus on the application of
rules in litigation, as if the only reason for having a law is to
separate those cases where the plaintiff should win from those
where the plaintiff should lose.4° A strongly pro-plaintiff inter-
pretation of this law would have dramatic effects on employer
behavior that both opponents and proponents of the law specifically
eschewed.
The fundamental stated purpose of the proponents of the 1990
and 1991 Acts was to "restore" Griggs.4m As we have seen,
Griggs needed no restoration, and the disparate-impact provisions
of the new Act thus effected no major change in discrimination
law other than the shifting of the burden of persuasion to the em-
ployer. The purpose of Griggs was not to require employers to
lower their standards. 40 Rather, the purpose was to ensure that
any standards that had the effect of excluding minorities not be
arbitrary. The purpose of Title VII was to make race, color, na-
tional origin, religion, and sex irrelevant to employment decisions,
and that purpose was not repudiated by the 1991 Congress. Courts
that interpret the new Act in the light of the failed goals of its
original proponents would be doing a disservice to both the intent
of the Congress that passed the bill and the cause of true equality
in employment.
408. There also seems to be a further bias in favor of plaintiffs that tends to view a
law as fundamentally flawed if it is conceivable that a plaintiff who is actually deserving
might lose in a given case, without regard to the fact that interpreting the law in a way
that eliminates the possibility of incorrect findings in favor of defendants substantially
increases the likelihood of incorrect findings in favor of plaintiffs. See EPSTEIN, supra
note 13, at 225:
Why should the (assumed) importance of the antidiscrimination laws require us
to slight the errors of overenforcement? The consensus that murder is a grave
wrong, punishable under the criminal laws, has never been regarded as a reason
to make life easy for prosecutors ....
l
409. See 136 CONG. REC. S1022 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1990) (statement of Sen. Jeffords)
CAll that is intended by the framers of this provision and, we believe, all that is accom-
plished therein is the restoration of the Griggs v. Duke Power e...
410. See supra note I and accompanying text.
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APPENDICES
Selected Provisions of Various Versions of the Civil Rights Acts
of 1990 and 1991
APPENDIX A
Original "Civil Rights Act of 1990", S. 2104, 101st Cong., 2d
Sess., 136 CoNG. REC. S1019, 1019 (February 7, 1990).
SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.
Section 701 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e)
is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new sub-
sections:
"(n) The term 'group of employment practices' means a combi-
nation of employment practices or an overall employment process.
"(o) The term 'required by business necessity' means essential
to effective job performance."
SEC. 4. RESTORING THE BURDEN OF PROOF IN DISPA-
RATE IMPACT CASES.
Section 703 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C.
2000e-2) is amended by adding at the end thereof the following
new subsection:
"(k) PRooF oF UNLAwFUL EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES IN DISPA-
RATE IMPACt CASES.-
"(1) An unlawful employment practice is established under this
subsection when-
"(A) a complaining party demonstrates that an employment
practice results in a disparate impact on the basis of race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin, and the respondent fails to demon-
strate that such practice is required by business necessity; or
"(B) a complaining party demonstrates that a group of employ-
ment practices results in a disparate impact on the basis of race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin, and the respondent fails to
demonstrate that such practices are required by business necessity,
except that-
"(i) if a complaining party demonstrates that a group of em-
ployment practices results in a disparate impact, such party shall
not be required to demonstrate which specific practice or practices
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within the group results in such disparate impact; and
"(ii) if the respondent demonstrates that a specific employment
practice within such group of employment practices does not con-
tribute to the disparate impact, the respondent shall not be required
to demonstrate that such practice is required by business necessity."
APPENDIX B
Kennedy-Jeffords Substitute, Amend. 2110, S. 2104, 101st Cong.,
2d Sess., 136 CoNG. REC. S9325, S9325 (July 10, 1990) (passed
by the Senate on July 18, 1990).
SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.
Section 701 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e)
is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new sub-
sections:
"(n) The term 'group of employment practices' means a combi-
nation of employment practices that produces one or more deci-
sions with respect to employment, employment referral, or admis-
sion to a labor organization, apprenticeship or other training or
retraining program.
"(o) The term 'required by business necessity' means-
"(1) in the case of employment practices involving selection
(such as hiring, assignment, transfer, promotion, training, appren-
ticeship, referral, retention, or membership in a labor organization),
bears a substantial and demonstrable relationship to effective job
performance; or
"(2) in the case of employment practices not involving selec-
tion, bears a substantial and demonstrable relationship to a compel-
ling objective of the respondent."
SEC. 4. RESTORING THE BURDEN OF PROOF IN DISPA-
RATE IMPACT CASES.
Section 703 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C.
2000e-2) is amended by adding at the end thereof the following
new subsection:
"(k) PROOF OF UNLAWFUL EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES IN DISPA-
RATE IMPACT CASES.-
"(1) An unlawful employment practice based on disparate im-
[Vol. 43:287
THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1991
pact is established under this section when-
"(A) a complaining party demonstrates that an employment
practice results in a disparate impact on the basis of race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin, and the respondent fails to demon-
strate that such practice is required by business necessity; or
"(B) a complaining party demonstrates that a group of employ-
ment practices results in a disparate impact on the basis of race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin, and the respondent fails to,
demonstrate that such group of employment practices are required
by business necessity, except that-
"(i) except as provided in clause (iii), if a complaining party
demonstrates that a group of employment practices results in a
disparate impact, such party shall not be required to demonstrate
which specific practice or practices within the group results in such
disparate impact;
"(ii) if the respondent demonstrates that a specific employment
practice within such group of employment practices does not con-
tribute to the disparate impact, the respondent shall not be required
to demonstrate that such practice is required by business necessity;
and
"(iii) if the court finds that the complaining party can identify,
from records or other information of the respondent reasonably
available (through discovery or otherwise), which specific practice
or practices contributed to the disparate impact-
"(1) the complaining party shall be required to demonstrate
which specific practice or practices contributed to the disparate
impact; and
"(II) the respondent shall be required to demonstrate business
necessity only as to the specific practice or practices demonstrated
by the complaining party to have contributed to the disparate im-
pact."
APPENDIX C
Civil Rights Act of 1990 (first version passed by House),
H.R. 4000, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG. REC. H6827, H6827-
28 (Aug. 3, 1990).
SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.
Section 701 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e)
is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new sub-
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sections:
"(o)(1) The term 'required by business necessity' means-
"(A) in the case of employment practices involving selection
(such as hiring, assignment, transfer, promotion, training, appren-
ticeship, referral, retention, or membership in a labor organization),
the practice or group of practices must bear a significant relation-
ship to successful performance of the job; or
"(B) in the case of employment practices that do not involve
selection, the practice or group of practices must bear a significant
relationship to a significant business objective of the employer.
"(2) In deciding whether the standards in paragraph (1) for
business necessity have been met, unsubstantiated opinion and hear-
say are not sufficient; demonstrable evidence is required. The de-
fendant may offer as evidence statistical reports, validation studies,
expert testimony, prior successful experience and other evidence as
permitted by the Federal Rules of Evidence, and the court shall
give such weight, if any, to such evidence as is appropriate.
"(3) This subsection is meant to codify the meaning of 'busi-
ness necessity' as used in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. (401 U.S.
424 (1971)) and to overrule the treatment of business necessity as
a defense in Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Atonio (109 S. Ct.
2115 (1989))."
SEC. 4. RESTORING THE BURDEN OF PROOF IN DISPA-
RATE IMPACT CASES.
Section 703 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C.
2000e-2) is amended by adding at the end thereof the following
new subsection:
"(k) PROOF OF UNLAWFUL EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES iN DISPA-
RATE IMPACT CASES.- (1) An unlawful employment practice
based on disparate impact is established under this section when-
"(A) a complaining party demonstrates that an employment
practice results in a disparate impact on the basis of race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin, and the respondent fails to demon-
strate that such practice is required by business necessity; or
"(B) a complaining party demonstrates that a group of employ-
ment practices results in a disparate impact on the basis of race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin, and the respondent fails to
demonstrate that such group of employment practices is required by
business necessity, except that-
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"(i) except as provided in clause (iii), if a complaining party
demonstrates that a group of employment practices results in a
disparate impact, such party shall not be required to demonstrate
which specific practice or practices within the group results in such
disparate impact;
"(ii) if the respondent demonstrates that a specific employment
practice within such group of employment practices does not con-
tribute to the disparate impact, the respondent shall not be required
to demonstrate that such practice is required by business necessity;
and
"(iii) if the court finds that the complaining party can identify,
from records or other information of the respondent reasonably
available (through discovery or otherwise), which specific practice
or practices contributed to the disparate impact-
"(1) the complaining party shall be required to demonstrate
which specific practice or practices contributed to the disparate
impact; and
"(H) the respondent shall be required to demonstrate business
necessity only as to the specific practice or practices demonstrated
by the complaining party to have contributed to the disparate im-
pact;
except that an employment practice or group of employment prac-
tices demonstrated to be required by business necessity shall be
unlawful where a complaining party demonstrates that a different
employment practice or group of employment practices with less
disparate impact would serve the respondent as well."
APPENDIX D
Conference Version of Civil Rights Act of 1990 ("Vetoed Bill"),
H.R. REP. No. 856, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG. REC.
H9552, H9552-54 (Oct. 12, 1990).
SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.
Section 701 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e)
is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new sub-
sections:
"(in) The term 'demonstrates' means meets the burdens of
production and persuasion.
"(n) The term 'group of employment practices' means a combi-
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nation of employment practices that produces one or more deci-
sions with respect to employment, employment referral, or admis-
sion to a labor, organization, apprenticeship or other training or
retraining program.
"(o)(1) The term 'required by business necessity' means-
"(A) in the case of employment practices involving selection
such as tests, recruitment, evaluations, or requirements of educa-
tion, experience, knowledge, skill, ability or physical characteristics,
or practices primarily related to a measure of job performance, the
practice or group of practices must bear a significant relationship to
successful performance of the job; or
"(B) in the case of other employment decisions, not involving
employment selection practices as covered by subparagraph (A)
(such as, but not limited to, a plant closing or bankruptcy), or that
involve rules relating to methadone, alcohol or tobacco use, the
practice or group of practices must bear a significant relationship to
a manifest business objective of the employer.
"(2) In deciding whether the standards described in paragraph
(1) for business necessity have been met, unsubstantiated opinion
and hearsay are not sufficient; demonstrable evidence is required.
The court may receive such evidence as statistical reports, valida-
tion studies, expert testimony, performance evaluations, written
records or notes related to the practice or decision, testimony of
individuals with knowledge of the practice or decision involved,
other evidence relevant to the employment decision, prior success-
ful experience and other evidence as permitted by the Federal
Rules of Evidence, and the court shall give such weight, if any, to
such evidence as is appropriate.
"(3) This subsection is meant to codify the meaning of 'busi-
ness necessity' as used in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. (401 U.S.
424 (1971)) and to overrule the treatment of business necessity as
a defense in Wards Cove Packing Co. V. Atonio (109 S. Ct. 2115
(1989))."
SEC. 4. RESTORING THE BURDEN OF PROOF IN DISPA-
RATE IMPACT CASES.
Section 703 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C.
2000e-2) is amended by adding at the end thereof the following
new subsection:
"(k) PROOF OF UNLAWFuL EMPLoYMENT PRAcICES IN DISPA-
RATE IMPACT CASES.- (1) An unlawful employment practice
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based on disparate impact is established under this section when-
"(A) a complaining party demonstrates that an employment
practice results in a disparate impact on the basis of race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin, and the respondent fails to demon-
strate that such practice is required by business necessity; or
"(B) a complaining party demonstrates that a group of employ-
ment practices results in a disparate impact on the basis of race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin, and the respondent fails to
demonstrate that such group of employment practices is required by
business necessity, except that-
"(i) except as provided in clause (iii), if a complaining party
demonstrates that a group of employment practices results in a
disparate impact, such party shall not be required to demonstrate
which specific practice or practices within the group results in such
disparate impact;
"(ii) if the respondent demonstrates that a specific employment
practice within such group of employment practices is not re-
sponsible in whole or in significant part for the disparate impact,
the respondent shall not be required to demonstrate that such prac-
tice is required by business necessity; and
"(iii) the complaining party shall be required to demonstrate
which specific practice or practices are responsible for the disparate
impact in all cases unless the court finds after discovery (I) that
the respondent has destroyed, concealed or refused to produce
existing records that are necessary to make this showing, or (1I)
that the respondent failed to keep such records; and except where
the court makes such a finding, the respondent shall be required to
demonstrate business necessity only as to those specific practices
demonstrated by the complaining party to have been responsible in
whole or in significant part for the disparate impact;
except that an employment practice or group of employment prac-
tices demonstrated to be required by business necessity shall be
unlawful where a complaining party demonstrates that a different
employment practice or group of employment practices with less
disparate impact would serve the respondent as well.
"(4) The mere existence of a statistical imbalance in an
employer's workforce on account of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin is not alone sufficient to establish a prima facie
case of disparate impact violation."
19931
CASE WESTERN RESERFE LAW REVIEW
SEC. 13. LAWFUL COURT-ORDERED REMEDIES, AFFIR-
MATIVE ACTION AND CONCILIATION AGREEMENTS NOT
AFFECTED.
Nothing in the amendments made by this Act shall be con-
strued to require or encourage an employer to adopt hiring or
promotion quotas on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or na-
tional origin: Provided, however, That [sic] nothing in the amend-
ments made by this Act shall be construed to affect court-ordered
remedies, affirmative action, or conciliation agreements that are
otherwise in accordance with the law.
APPENDIX E
Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1991 ("The Original
Danforth Bill"), S. 1208, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., 137 CONG. REC.
S7023, S7023 (June 4, 1991).
SEC. 2. FINDING AND PURPOSES.
(a) FINDN.- Congress finds that the decision of the Supreme
Court in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115
(1989) has weakened the scope and effectiveness of Federal civil
rights protections.
(b) PURPosE.- The purposes of this Act are -
(1) to overrule the treatment of business necessity as a defense
in Wards Cove Packing Co., [sic] v. Atonio and to codify the
meaning of business necessity used in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
401 U.S. 424 (1971); and
(2) to provide statutory authority and guidelines for the adjudi-
cation of disparate impact suits under title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq.).
SEC. 3. BURDEN OF PROOF IN DISPARATE IMPACT CASES.
(a) IN GENERAL.- Section 703 of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e-2) is amended by adding at the end the
following new subsection:
"(k)(1)(A) An unlawful employment practice based on disparate
impact is established under this title only if -
"(i) a complaining party demonstrates that a particular employ-
ment practice or group of employment practices results in a dispa-
rate impact on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin; and
"(ii)(1) the respondent fails to demonstrate that the practice or
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group of practices is required by business necessity; or
"(]I) the complaining party makes the demonstration described
in subparagraph (C) with respect to a different employment practice
or group of employment practices.
"(B)(i) With respect to an unlawful employment practice based
on disparate impact as described in subsection (A), the complaining
party shall identify with particularity each employment practice that
is responsible in whole or in significant part for the disparate im-
pact, except that if the complaining party can demonstrate to the
court, after discovery, that the elements of a respondent's
decisionmaking process are not capable of separation for analysis,
the group of employment practices as a whole may be analyzed as
one employment practice.
"(ii) If the elements of a decisionmaking process are capable of
separation for analysis, the complaining party must identify each
element with particularity, and the respondent must demonstrate
that the element or elements identified that are responsible in
whole or in significant part for the disparate impact are required by
business necessity. If the respondent demonstrates that a specific
employment practice within a group of employment practices is not
responsible in whole or in significant part for the disparate impact,
the respondent shall not be required to demonstrate that such prac-
tice is required by business necessity.
"(C) An employment practice or group of employment practices
responsible in whole or in significant part for a disparate impact
that is demonstrated to be required by business necessity shall be
lawful unless the complaining party demonstrates that a different
employment practice or group of employment practices, which
would have less disparate impact and make a difference in the
disparate impact that is more than merely negligible, would serve
the respondents as well.
"(2) In deciding whether a respondent has met the standards
described in paragraph (1) for business necessity, the court may re-
ceive evidence as permitted by the Federal Rules of Evidence, and
the court shall give such weight, if any, to the evidence as is ap-
propriate.
"(3) A demonstration that an employment practice or group of
employment practices is required by business necessity may be
used as a defense only against a claim under this subsection.
"(5) The mere existence of a statistical imbalance in the work
force of an employer on account of race, color, religion, sex, or
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national origin is not alone sufficient to establish a prima facie
case of disparate impact violation."
SEC. 5. DEFINITIONS.
(a) IN GENERAL.- Section 701 of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e) is amended by adding at the end the fol-
lowing new subsections:
"(n) The term 'group of employment practices' means a combi-
nation of particular employment practices in which each practice is
responsible in whole or in significant part for an employment deci-
sion.
"(o) The term 'required by business necessity' means-
"(1) in the case of employment practices involving selection,
that the practice or group of paractices [sic] bears a manifest rela-
tionship to requirements for effective job performance; and
"(2) in the case of other employment decisions not involving
employment selection practices as described in paragraph (1), the
practice or group of practices bears a manifest relationship to a
legitimate business objective of the employer.
"(p) The term 'requirements for effective job performance'
includes-
"(1) the ability to perform competently the actual work activi-
ties lawfully required by the employer for an employment position;
and
"(2) any other lawful requirement that is important to the per-
formance of the job, including, but not limited to, factors such as
punctuality, attendance, a willingness to avoid engaging in miscon-
duct or insubordination, not having a work history demonstrating
unreasonable job turnover, and not engaging in conduct or activity
that improperly interferes with the performance of work by others."
(b) INTERPRETATION.- It is the intent of Congress in enacting
sections 701(o) and 703(k) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (as
added by subsection (a) of this section and subsection (a) of sec-
tion (3) respectively) that the sections codify the meaning of busi-
ness necessity used in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S.C. [sic]
424 (1971) and overrule the treatment of business necessity as a
defense in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115
(1989), with respect to an employment practice or group of em-
ployment practices.
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APPENDIX F
Civil Rights and Women's Equity in Employment Act of 1991,
H.R. 1, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., 137 CONG. REc. H3876, H3878-
3880 (June 4, 1991).
SEC. 201. DEFINITIONS.
Section 701 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e)
is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new sub-
sections:
"(n) The term 'group of employment practices' means a combi-
nation of employment practices that produces one or more deci-
sions with respect to employment, employment referral, or admis-
sion to a labor organization, apprenticeship or other training or
retraining program.
"(o)(1) The term 'required by business necessity' means-
"(A) in the case of employment practices involving selection
(such as hiring, assignment, transfer, promotion, training, appren-
ticeship, referral, retention, or membership in a labor organization),
the practice or group of practices must bear a significant relation-
ship to successful performance of the job; or
"(B) in the case of employment practices that do not involve
selection, the practice or group of practices must bear a significant
relationship to a significant business objective' of the employer.
"(2) In deciding whether the standards in paragraph (1) for
business necessity have been met, unsubstantiated opinion and hear-
say are not sufficient; demonstrable evidence is required. The de-
fendant may offer as evidence statistical reports, validation studies,
expert testimony, prior successful experience and other evidence as
permitted by the Federal Rules of Evidence, and the court shall
give such weight, if any, to such evidence as is appropriate.
"(3) This subsection is meant to codify the meaning of 'busi-
ness necessity' as used in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. (401 U.S.
424 (1971)) and to overrule the treatment of business necessity as
a defense in Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Atonio (109 S. Ct.
2115 (1989))."
SEC. 202. RESTORING THE BURDEN OF PROOF IN DISPA-
RATE IMPACT CASES.
Section 703 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C.
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2000e-2) is amended by adding at the end thereof the following
new subsection:
"(k) PROOF OF UNLAWFUL EMPLOYMENT PRACTICEs IN DISPA-
RATE IMPACr CASES.- (1) An unlawful employment practice
based on disparate impact is established under this section when-
"(A) a complaining party demonstrates that an employment
practice results in a disparate impact on the basis of race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin, and the respondent fails to demon-
strate that such practice is required by business necessity; or
"(B) a complaining party demonstrates that a group of employ-
ment practices results in a disparate impact on the basis of race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin, and the respondent fails to
demonstrate that such group of employment practices is required by
business necessity, except that-
"(i) except as provided in clause (iii), if a complaining party
demonstrates that a group of employment practices results in a
disparate impact, such party shall not be required to demonstrate
which specific practice or practices within the group results in such
disparate impact;
"(ii) if the respondent demonstrates that a specific employment
practice within such group of employment practices does not con-
tribute to the disparate impact, the respondent shall not be required
to demonstrate that such practice is required by business necessity;
and
"(iii) if the court finds that the complaining party can identify,
from records or other information of the respondent reasonably
available (through discovery or otherwise), which specific practice
or practices contributed to the disparate impact-
"(I) the complaining party shall be required to demonstrate
which specific practice or practices contributed to the disparate
impact; and
"(E) the respondent shall be required to demonstrate business
necessity only as to the specific practice or practices demonstrated
by the complaining party to have contributed to the disparate im-
pact;
except that an employment practice or group of employment prac-
tices demonstrated to be required by business necessity shall be
unlawful where a complaining party demonstrates that a different
employment practice or group of employment practices with less
disparate impact would serve the respondent as well.
"(4) The mere existence of a statistical imbalance in an
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employer's workforce on account of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin is not alone sufficient to establish a prima facie
case of disparate impact violation."
SEC. 211. LAWFUL COURT-ORDERED REMEDIES, AFFIR-
MATIVE ACTION AND CONCILIATION AGREEMENTS NOT
AFFECTED.
Nothing in the amendments made by this Act shall be con-
strued to require or encourage an employer to adopt hiring or pro-
motion quotas on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or national
origin: Provided, however, That [sic] nothing in the amendments
made by this Act shall be construed to affect otherwise lawful
affirmative action, conciliation agreements, or court-ordered reme-
dies.
APPENDIX G
The Civil Rights Act of 1991, S. 1745, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., re-
printed in DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 186, D-1, D-1, D-3 to D-4
(Sept. 25, 1991) (as originally introduced by Senator Danforth on
September 24, 1991).
SEC. 3. PURPOSES.
The purposes of this Act are-
(2) to overrule the proof burdens and meaning of business
necessity in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio and to codify the
proof burdens and the meaning of business necessity used in
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971);
SEC. 7. DEFINITIONS.
Section 701 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e)
is amended by adding at the end the following new subsections:
"(n) The term 'the employment in question' means-'
"(1) the performance of actual work activities required
by the employer for a job or class of jobs; or
"(2) any behavior that is important to the job, but may
not comprise actual work activities.
"(o) The term 'required by business necessity' means-
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"(1) in the case of employment practices that are used as
qualification standards, employment tests, or other selection
criteria, the challenged practice must bear a manifest relation-
ship to the employment in question; and
"(2) in the case of employment practices not described
in paragraph (1), the challenged practice must bear a manifest
relationship to a legitimate business objective of the employer."
SEC. 8. BURDEN OF PROOF IN DISPARATE IMPACT CASES.
Section 703 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C.
2000e-2) is amended by adding at the end the following new sub-
section:
"(k)(1)(A) An unlawful employment practice based on disparate
impact is established under this title only if-
"(i) a complaining party demonstrates that a particular
employment practice or particular employment practices (or
decisionmaking process as described in subparagraph B(i))
cause a disparate impact on the basis of race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin; and
"(ii)(I) the respondent fails to demonstrate that the prac-
tice or practices are required by business necessity; or
"(HI) the complaining party makes the demonstration de-
scribed in subparagraph (C) with respect to a different employ-
ment practice and the respondent refuses to adopt such alterna-
tive employment practice.
"(B)(i) With respect to demonstrating that a particular employ-
ment practice or particular employment practices cause a disparate
impact as described in subsection (A)(i), the complaining party
shall demonstrate that each particular employment practice causes,
in whole or significant part, the disparate impact, except that if the
complaining party can demonstrate to the court that the elements of
a respondent's decisionmaking process are not capable of separation
for analysis, the decisionmaking process may be analyzed as one
employment practice.
"(ii) If the respondent demonstrates that a specific employment
practice does not cause, in whole or significant part, the disparate
impact, the respondent shall not be required to demonstrate that
such practice is required by business necessity.
"(C) An employment practice that causes, in whole or signifi-
cant part, a disparate impact that is demonstrated to be required by
business necessity shall be unlawful if the complaining party dem-
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onstrates that a different available employment practice, which
would have less disparate impact and make a difference in the
disparate impact that is more than negligible, would serve the
respondent's legitimate interests as well and the respondent refuses
to adopt such alternative employment practice."
APPENDIX H
The Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat.
1071 §§ 3, 105, 116 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
42 U.S.C.A., 2 U.S.C.A., 16 U.S.C.A. and 29 U.S.C.A.) (signed
into law on November 21, 1991).
SEC. 3. PURPOSES.
The purposes of this Act are-
(1) to provide appropriate remedies for intentional discrimi-
nation and unlawful harassment in the workplace;
(2) to codify the concepts of "business necessity" and "job
related" enunciated by the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), and in the other Supreme
Court decisions prior to Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,
490 U.S. 642 (1989);
(3) to confirm statutory authority and provide statutory
guidelines for the adjudication of disparate impact suits under
title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e et
seq.); and
(4) to respond to recent decisions of the Supreme Court by
expanding the scope of relevant civil rights statutes in order
to provide adequate protection to victims of discrimination.
SEC. 105. BURDEN OF PROOF IN DISPARATE IMPACT
CASES.
(a) Section 703 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C.
2000e-2) is amended by adding at the end the following new sub-
section:
"(k)(1)(A) An unlawful employment practice based on disparate
impact is established under this title only if-
"(i) a complaining party demonstrates that a respon-
dent uses a particular employment practice that causes a dis-
parate impact on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or
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national origin and the respondent fails to demonstrate that
the challenged practice is job related for the position in ques-
tion and consistent with business necessity; or
"(ii) the complaining party makes the demonstration
described in subparagraph (C) with respect to an alternative
employment practice and the respondent refuses to adopt such
alternative employment practice.
"(B)(i) With respect to demonstrating that a particular employ-
ment practice causes a disparate impact as described in subpara-
graph (A)(i), the complaining party shall demonstrate that each
particular challenged employment practice causes a disparate im-
pact, except that if the complaining party can demonstrate to the
court that the elements of a respondent's decisionmaking process
are not capable of separation for analysis, the decisionmaking pro-
cess may be analyzed as one employment practice.
"(ii) If the respondent demonstrates that a specific employment
practice does not cause the disparate impact, the respondent shall
not be required to demonstrate that such practice is required by
business necessity.
"(C) The demonstration referred to by subparagraph (A)(ii)
shall be in accordance with the law as it existed on June 4, 1989,
with respect to the concept of 'alternative business practice'."
SEC. 116. LAWFUL COURT-ORDERED REMEDIES, AFFIR-
MATIVE ACTION, AND CONCILIATION AGREEMENTS NOT
AFFECTED.
Nothing in the amendments made by this title shall be con-
strued to affect court-ordered remedies, affirmative action, or con-
ciliation agreements, that are in accordance with the law.
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